Climate Science and Policy » USA http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu CLISP - Climate Science and Policy Tue, 24 Jan 2012 15:40:25 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.6 en hourly 1 International and Domestic Politics: Climate Change as a Two Level Game http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/06/international-and-domestic-politics-climate-change-as-a-two-level-game/ http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/06/international-and-domestic-politics-climate-change-as-a-two-level-game/#comments Wed, 30 Jun 2010 09:54:40 +0000 Robert O. Keohane http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/?p=1063 Picture from {link:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:World_Map_1689.JPG}Wikimedia Commons{/link}

Picture from {link:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:World_Map_1689.JPG}Wikimedia Commons{/link}

International structure affects the foreign policy issues and the domestic politics; you can’t just prioritise one or the other you have to do both sequentially and simultaneously.
Prof. Robert Keohane (Princeton University) talks about international relations, cap-and trade and a “dual-leadership world” where Usa and China have to take the lead, but you can’t say to say which players can determine the outcomes in the system. How can we get action from people and leaders in climate negotiations?
“In the presence of a deadlock on the traditional ways of solving climate change questions, may be the Economy of Esteem could help us” Prof. Keohane argues in this interview to Climate Science&Policy.

A Two Level Game

Climate change is an issue that is described by a two level game in political science; that is you have to do both (international and national level) at the same time. You can’t just prioritise one or the other because the international structure affects the foreign policy issues and the domestic politics. It affects the costs and benefits of the states and therefore the reactions of domestic groups and of course domestic politics shapes what states can do and therefore shapes their bargaining positions and their credibility of their negotiating positions. So you have to do this simultaneously. That’s one reason why it’s so difficult; it requires this mutual back and forth. And this is also true of trade for example; trade is also a two level game. You only get a trade agreement if you both get a negotiation among the major trading partners and at the same time you get a domestic agreement on the trade agreement. So it’s a common phenomenon in international politics but it means you can’t make a choice being one or the other level. You have to do both sequentially and simultaneously.

Climate Change and the Economy of Esteem


You have to start with the basic problem, which is that it’s difficult to find incentives that are self-interested for states and leaders to pursue a responsible climate policy. And we’ve had a hard time doing this. The first best way to do it is with some sort of international agreement that everybody agrees to but we have failed in doing that, so far, at least. So Geofrey Brennan and Philip Pettit have a book on the economy of esteem, a general book from about five or six years ago. And they point out that prizes and prestige and reputation can be important incentives for leaders. So we could think about ways in which we could give prizes to states for taking advance action, prizes to cities or to cooperations. Some sort of awards, a distinction for people who take initiatives on climate change that is giving them reputational incentives to act in a way that otherwise a purely material basis wouldn’t act. It’s one way to think outside of the box as we say, to try to think about ways that may not be the principal way, I’m not at all saying that this is the principal way to solve climate change, but in the presence of a deadlock on the traditional ways of doing it. It’s one way to think about getting some action from some people in some context.

Incentives, Credible Actions and Binding Limits for a Global Climate Policy Architecture


(Talking about cap-and-trade architecture) I think it’s the best way that I have seen so far although you may not call it cap and trade anymore; it’s going to be very complicated. But the basic architecture has the advantage that it enables resources to be transferred from richer countries that are more willing to take action to poorer countries that are reluctant to have binding commitments without public funds explicitly being sent so that if you set up a situation where there were caps on everybody but the caps on the developing countries came into force later or were high enough that there was space, a so-called hot air, between the level of their actual emissions and the cap. They could sell the credits for that amount into the world market or into national carbon markets. So cap and trade is a way of giving material incentives to reluctant developing countries to actually take action. Now, so far they haven’t decided to do this. Partly because the actions by developed countries have not been sufficiently credible, especially the United States, and partly because they are reluctant to accept a binding limit in the condition of uncertainty. But the basic principle of market driven flows of funds that provide incentives to developing countries is I think going to have to be part of any climate architecture. It may not be called cap and trade. It may have lots of different variations to it. It may be safety valves and ways to reassure developing countries that they aren’t locked into a certain cap, which they then can’t meet effectively. But something like it, some adaptation of it will have to be part of the global structure.

Interrelated Topics for a Multilevel Issue


(Environmental topics, energy market, economics, policy and science) all of the above (are important) because you can’t separate them very well; that is you can analyse them somewhat separately but take energy market and climate emissions; those are inseparable. You change the nature of the energy market and you change climate emissions one way or the other. If you look at different sectors, that of course effects the general pattern and the international politics part involves especially the question of bargaining, how the commitments are going to be made via these other commitments and also the question of compliance. That is how you arrange patterns so that once agreements have been made in a very decentralised environment without any normally hierarchal way of forcing compliance, how you use reciprocity in some form to give incentives to states to comply with their commitments or at least to come close enough, they don’t have to always totally comply, but they come close enough where they are actually doing something worthwhile.

USA and China Potential Leadership for Important Players


It’s different to talk about which are the most important players then to say which players can determine the outcomes in the system. China and the US are the most important players. Each of them emitting approximately the same amount, roughly 20% of world emissions. So without them, nothing will happen. And no other blocks except for maybe Europe to some limited extent will take major action without the US and China acting. So their action is necessary, but it’s not sufficient; they can’t dictate terms. Europe is a major actor, India, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Russia are in different ways major actors and the combination of everyone else is also substantial. So you take the 17 or 18 major emitting countries that account for about 85% of the emissions. So all or almost all of them have to somehow be included. Although the US and China have to take the lead, and as long as the US and China are not taking the lead which they are not yet, then everybody else will not just use them as an excuse not to act but it will rightly see that they can’t really act from an economic point of view unless the US and China take action. So they are the key to the logjam but it’s not a bipolar world. They can’t dictate and you could imagine some set of rules that they could propose that everybody else would say this is terrible. For example, rules that were especially helpful to the US and China are bad for everybody else. So it’s not a bipolar world. You might call it a world of dual leadership or potential leadership.

]]> http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/06/international-and-domestic-politics-climate-change-as-a-two-level-game/feed/ 0 Smart Power for Global Climate Negotiations http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/06/smart-power-for-global-climate-negotiations/ http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/06/smart-power-for-global-climate-negotiations/#comments Mon, 28 Jun 2010 08:57:56 +0000 Joseph S. Nye http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/?p=1043

Picture from {link:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Jonesy22}Jonesy22 page in Wikimedia Commons{/link}

Picture from {link:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Jonesy22}Jonesy22 {/link} page in Wikimedia Commons

It could be described as the ability to shape the preferences of others and attract them so that they want what you want. It is Soft Power and it is crucial in order to create a narrative of climate change which is widely accepted. But soft power alone isn’t enough: we need smart power, a combination of soft power and hard power.
Prof. Joseph S. Nye (Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government) talks about the role of transnationl institutions, the new american course on climate policy  and “How could we get everybody into the act and still get action”. “We are going to have to use a variety of international institutions and focus the European phrase, Variable Geometry”, Prof. Nye says to Climate Science&Policy.


Soft, Smart, and Hard. A Combination of Power for International Climate Politics


Soft power, the ability to attract, is set partly by the example: if Europe is doing very well in managing its carbon emissions, that may make it attractive. But its soft power also establishes a narrative, for example the IPCC creates the view, which is widely accepted that there is a major danger from business as usual. Then that narrative creates a tendency for people to want to move in that direction. So that’s another dimension, which is not just an example but also the narrative that’s created. But I would say that soft power alone isn’t enough. There also has to be some hard power which is essentially payments and the payments can take the form of transfers or they could take the form of border adjustment taxes on lets say the carbon content of countries that don’t participate. So, a combination of soft power and hard power is smart power. I think you could find Developing Countries to contribute to this narrative. Obliviously states that are likely to be affected, the Baltic Islands or the various islands that work together in the UN meetings; they also have a certain amount of soft power and so it’s not just the narrative created by the rich or the powerful.

Obama and the New American Course on Climate Politics


Obama has changed the rhetoric of the American decision. In the Bush Administration there was not a favourable rhetoric about climate change. Obama has basically said we take it seriously, we want to work with others, and indeed his participation at Copenhagen helped to rescue something at the end of some political agreement even if not a binding legal treaty. So I think Obama has taken it seriously. The difficulty is more in terms of being able to pass energy legislation at home which depends on the congress and that has been less successful.

Variable Geometry. A Useful Definition for Climate Institutions


I think we are going to have to use a variety of institutions to use the European phrase, “Variable Geometry”. The UN framework is going to be important for legitimisation, but it’s not been very useful for negotiation because there are some countries that basically are spoilers and are not terribly interested. But if you had a G20 that would recover about 85% of the countries that are responsible for emissions then it’s easier to bargain in a smaller group. You’re going to also need some form of representation of those who are most effected to make sure their interests are taken into account so some people are G30 to make sure that that includes the most severely affected countries.

Narratives and Transnational Institutions


Well, transnational institutions can develop a narrative. They can provide the information, which also allows countries to understand their self-interests better. The IPCC I think does that. One could also imagine informal monitoring of those groups that basically give an independent opinion on whether a country which says its going to reduce its carbon intensity, actually is reducing the carbon intensity as much as it says so I think they can play a variety of roles.

USA/China: Are We Coming Back to a Bipolar World?


No, I don’t agree with that. I don’t think you can talk seriously about solving climate problems with just the US and China. Europe is still an economy, which is larger than the US, slightly. And Japan is still an economy, which is about the same size as China. So to imagine trying to deal with a trans-national global problem like climate without Europe and Japan doesn’t make sense. So I think we are going to need ways in which we organise the major stings to work out hard bargains about how we are going to solve this and that’s obliviously going to have to include the US and China since those are the two largest emitters but it’s also going to have to include Europe, Japan and a number of other countries.

Get Everybody into The Act. International Relations and Climate Change


Well, I think at this stage we need to think a lot about the International Relations. In other words, how do you organise so that we can manage this? There is a wonderful expression by a diplomat named Harlan Cleveland, which was, “How do you get everybody into the act and still get action?” And that problem is with us in climate change. When you are dealing with 192 countries all together at the same time, everybody’s in the act but it’s hard to get action. At the other hand you need to find ways if you have bargaining among smaller groups to relate back to the larger groups for legitimacy and enforcement so I think international relations and looking at the problem of institutions is going to be an essential question.

]]> http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/06/smart-power-for-global-climate-negotiations/feed/ 0 If No Treaty in Copenhagen, How About a Climate Bail Out by the US? http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2009/12/if-no-treaty-in-copenhagen-how-about-a-climate-bail-out-by-the-us/ http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2009/12/if-no-treaty-in-copenhagen-how-about-a-climate-bail-out-by-the-us/#comments Sat, 05 Dec 2009 13:04:32 +0000 Henry Tulkens http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/?p=482 Kyoto Protocol participation map 2005

Kyoto Protocol {link:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kyoto_Protocol_participation_map_2005.png}participation map 2005{/link}

A few days away from COP15 it becomes clear that a potential global agreement on climate change will be limited to a political agreement, instead of being the long expected treaty that would extend the Kyoto Protocol beyond 2012 and further enhance the Climate convention. The main obstacle is that the US politically needs to have first a domestic legislation in place before committing to any international agreement. Delays in the Senate make it unlikely that a climate bill could be approved before April 2010. In the meantime, couldn’t President Obama offer a tangible political gesture to the world community and thereby restore leadership and credibility for the US in the climate negotiations?

Our suggestion is that the Obama administration negotiates a deal in Copenhagen by which the US would buy a quantity of emission units corresponding to all emissions exceeding its Kyoto target over the commitment period 2008-2012, some of the money being allocated to adaptation funding in developing countries. There are three major advantages to this:

  • The environmental ambition of the Kyoto Protocol would be restored to its original level (5,2% of GHG emission reductions of Annex I countries from 1990 levels).
  • The US would credibly and immediately show its willingness to take its part — a major and a leading one — in the world effort on climate change.
  • The Copenhagen meeting would deliver a concrete result with benefits for the environment and financial support for adaptation to developing countries.

How much would our proposal cost to the US? Everyone seems to accept that the US cannot meet its Kyoto target. Let us see whether this is true. The Kyoto target for the US is to reduce its net GHG emissions by 7% from their 1990 level over the period 2008-2012. According to US inventories of GHG emissions (submission 2009) the net emissions in 1990 amounted to 5257.3 Mt CO2eq. Therefore over the 5 years Kyoto period, the maximum US emissions allowed by the Protocol amount to 24446.5 MtCO2eq (i.e. 0.93 x 5257.3 x 5).

Now, according to the most recent inventory, the figure reported for the 2007 actual emissions is 6087.5 Mt-CO2eq. Therefore, and if we assume that US emissions remain at this 2007 level over the commitment period 2008-2012, we can project that the US will have emitted 30437.5 MtCO2eq (= 5 x 6087,5) over that period.To meet its Kyoto objective, the US would thus have to purchase emissions units for an equivalent of 30437,5 – 24446,5 = 5 991 MtCO2eq . Assuming that 1 ton of CO-2equivalent can be purchased for 10 US$ the total cost to bail out the US from its Kyoto commitment would be 59 910 million $((A more accurate estimate should be based on US GHG emissions projections for the years 2008-2012. However, official projections in the public domain over that period
do not account for the impact of the current economic crisis on US emissions which is known to be significant. We therefore chose to rely on reported data which provided
a relevant order of magnitude for the cost. Similarly, the price of 10$/tCO2eq is a guesstimate based on currently observed prices.)).

Most importantly, the modalities for such a bail out agreement should be defined with the suppliers of credits (mostly Russia and Ukraine) and with developing countries potential suppliers of emission units from the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism.A fixed price should be negotiated for this purchase so as to avoid speculative price movements at the announcement of a bail out deal. Finally in order to provide funding to developing countries for adaptation – a request of long standing by developing countries – a fraction of the proceeds of the sale could be allocated to adaptation projects in the most vulnerable least developed countries.

To put the above cost figure in perspective, it represents, over the same time span less than 10% of the observed cost of the war in Irak, or, per year, 0.01% of the US GDP.

With those figures in mind is this project unthinkable?
Economically, it is affordable for the US economy.
Politically it would be a bold move with many advantages, the no least important of which would be to restore confidence in the willingness of the US to act effectively on climate change, and do it globally in a cooperative way. Buying out now the full Kyoto target would prove that. It requires no new treaty, and would open a credible way for trustful negotiations on the future commitments to be concluded soon.

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