Climate Science and Policy » Obama http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu CLISP - Climate Science and Policy Tue, 24 Jan 2012 15:40:25 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.6 en hourly 1 Challenges for a Post-Kyoto Agreement http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/10/challenges-for-a-post-kyoto-agreement/ http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/10/challenges-for-a-post-kyoto-agreement/#comments Mon, 25 Oct 2010 17:52:24 +0000 Raymond J. Kopp http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/?p=1141 Picture from the album Flickr: {link:http://www.flickr.com/photos/fotogezi/2887406194/} voyageAnatolia.blogspot.com {/link}

Picture from the album Flickr: {link:http://www.flickr.com/photos/fotogezi/2887406194/} voyageAnatolia.blogspot.com {/link}

“The first issue is that anything that results in foreign policy from any particular government whether it’s a developed country or a developing country is really based on the domestic policies of those countries. You can’t have foreign policy without a foundation of domestic policy. Basically what is this going to cost to deal with it? I think that’s true in the US, it’s true in the EU, and it’s certainly true in the Brics countries”.

To achieve a new climate agreement we need both domestic and global policy, Ray Kopp (Resources for the Future – RFF) says in this video interview to Climate Science&Policy

Challenges for a Post-Kyoto Agreement

I think there’s probably 3 or 4 things that are important to keep in mind. The first issue is that anything that results in foreign policy from any particular government whether it’s a developed country or a developing country is really based on the domestic policies of those countries. You can’t have foreign policy without a foundation of domestic policy. Domestic policy then respect to climate bears on the perceptions that the population of individual countries have respect to the challenges posed by climate change, the costs, and the benefits. Basically what is this going to cost to deal with it? I think that’s true in the US, it’s true in the EU, and it’s certainly true in the Brics countries, which is Brazil, India, China. And so the second thing I think to is to realise that the major emitters that we are dealing with are competitors on the global scheme. So, China, the EU, the US, Russia, India, compete with one another politically and they compete with one another economically. Therefore whatever we do in terms of climate change, it’s got to be in some sense what you might call completion neutral. In that sense there cannot be massive amounts of wealth moving among these competitors that would disadvantage one competitor versus another competitor and so I think you need to take that into mind. The third point is I’d say a lot of things we’re talking about in terms of organising international regimes we’ve based around large-scale carbon markets or flows of money from Annex 1 developing countries to developed countries to developing countries to entice them to undertake particular kinds of domestic actions. Given the current world status right now, fiscal status of the developed countries, massive amounts of flows of currency working in those particular directions I think is not very viable even if it’s into a carbon market. So again I think there is a difficult problem we face in bringing these large-scale economic and political competitors to the table to discuss climate change when there’s larger political and economic issues that are on the horizon.

USA and Developing Countries. Domestic and International Initiatives in Climate Policy


The first issue that faces the present administration is that the US needs to undertake domestic action. This is the big problem right now. What would the US do? How aggressively would it go after the greenhouse gas emissions and reducing those emissions? There’s a bill that has just been introduced in the US Senate which I think would position the US well with respect to it’s leadership in the world but it’s very unclear whether that’s going to pass the US Senate or not. If that does not pass it does not mean that the US is not going to take domestic action. The Clean Air Act, which is one of our major environmental statutes, is in place and we will regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act. So I think the US will become a player on the world stage with some credibility but it may take a few more years for that to become apparent. Then of course the administration is heavily engaged in discussions; bilateral discussions, certainly with China and India to provide incentives for those countries to join a larger scale action across the major emitters or the major economies to reduce emissions and so I think the US administration is certainly very much committed to bringing those countries into the fold in some sense, to reduce emissions. But that’s all predicated on the assumption that the US will get its own house in order and reduce its emissions at home. There are bilateral incentives with respect to China having to do with trade and property rights and technologies and what have you. Again I don’t think there’s going to be an awful lot of enthusiasm with respect to the US Congress for massive amounts of money to flow from the US to China. The investments the Chinese are going to have to undertake themselves but I do think there’s going to be coordination with respect to trade, international technology flows, intellectual property and what have you.

Resource for the Future and the Think Tank’s Role in Climate Change Policy


The role we play as a research institution as opposed to an advocacy organisation is to help inform policy makers about the options available and the strengths and weaknesses of each option. At least in the US there’s usually a window within these political discussions, perhaps early on in those discussions when the policy makers are truly interested in understanding the pros and cons of a different source of approaches. At some point that window narrows and the politics takes over. When the politics takes over recourses for the future necessarily has to leave the stage. But right now with respect to US politics that window is still open. There are still policy makers which tend to be members of Congress that are very interested in the different options available to the US to control emissions and the role we play in helping informing them from a science basis, a research basis about the pros and cons.

The Oil Spill and Its Impact in the American Debate


It’s surely already having an effect on the politics of Washington. It’s not clear what sort of “environmental disaster” this will be. As you should probably know the oil has not hit the beaches or the shoreline in the US. It’s a large amount of oil but what injuries it’s going to end up causing if any, are unknown at the present time. That said given the magnitude of the oil that’s coming from the well is having an effect I think on Washington and on perceptions about expanding offshore drilling and exploration in the Gulf Waters and elsewhere in the United States. How that’s going to play out, we’ll know within the next few months or so but it certainly is having an impact right now.

]]> http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/10/challenges-for-a-post-kyoto-agreement/feed/ 0 Smart Power for Global Climate Negotiations http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/06/smart-power-for-global-climate-negotiations/ http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/06/smart-power-for-global-climate-negotiations/#comments Mon, 28 Jun 2010 08:57:56 +0000 Joseph S. Nye http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/?p=1043

Picture from {link:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Jonesy22}Jonesy22 page in Wikimedia Commons{/link}

Picture from {link:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Jonesy22}Jonesy22 {/link} page in Wikimedia Commons

It could be described as the ability to shape the preferences of others and attract them so that they want what you want. It is Soft Power and it is crucial in order to create a narrative of climate change which is widely accepted. But soft power alone isn’t enough: we need smart power, a combination of soft power and hard power.
Prof. Joseph S. Nye (Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government) talks about the role of transnationl institutions, the new american course on climate policy  and “How could we get everybody into the act and still get action”. “We are going to have to use a variety of international institutions and focus the European phrase, Variable Geometry”, Prof. Nye says to Climate Science&Policy.


Soft, Smart, and Hard. A Combination of Power for International Climate Politics


Soft power, the ability to attract, is set partly by the example: if Europe is doing very well in managing its carbon emissions, that may make it attractive. But its soft power also establishes a narrative, for example the IPCC creates the view, which is widely accepted that there is a major danger from business as usual. Then that narrative creates a tendency for people to want to move in that direction. So that’s another dimension, which is not just an example but also the narrative that’s created. But I would say that soft power alone isn’t enough. There also has to be some hard power which is essentially payments and the payments can take the form of transfers or they could take the form of border adjustment taxes on lets say the carbon content of countries that don’t participate. So, a combination of soft power and hard power is smart power. I think you could find Developing Countries to contribute to this narrative. Obliviously states that are likely to be affected, the Baltic Islands or the various islands that work together in the UN meetings; they also have a certain amount of soft power and so it’s not just the narrative created by the rich or the powerful.

Obama and the New American Course on Climate Politics


Obama has changed the rhetoric of the American decision. In the Bush Administration there was not a favourable rhetoric about climate change. Obama has basically said we take it seriously, we want to work with others, and indeed his participation at Copenhagen helped to rescue something at the end of some political agreement even if not a binding legal treaty. So I think Obama has taken it seriously. The difficulty is more in terms of being able to pass energy legislation at home which depends on the congress and that has been less successful.

Variable Geometry. A Useful Definition for Climate Institutions


I think we are going to have to use a variety of institutions to use the European phrase, “Variable Geometry”. The UN framework is going to be important for legitimisation, but it’s not been very useful for negotiation because there are some countries that basically are spoilers and are not terribly interested. But if you had a G20 that would recover about 85% of the countries that are responsible for emissions then it’s easier to bargain in a smaller group. You’re going to also need some form of representation of those who are most effected to make sure their interests are taken into account so some people are G30 to make sure that that includes the most severely affected countries.

Narratives and Transnational Institutions


Well, transnational institutions can develop a narrative. They can provide the information, which also allows countries to understand their self-interests better. The IPCC I think does that. One could also imagine informal monitoring of those groups that basically give an independent opinion on whether a country which says its going to reduce its carbon intensity, actually is reducing the carbon intensity as much as it says so I think they can play a variety of roles.

USA/China: Are We Coming Back to a Bipolar World?


No, I don’t agree with that. I don’t think you can talk seriously about solving climate problems with just the US and China. Europe is still an economy, which is larger than the US, slightly. And Japan is still an economy, which is about the same size as China. So to imagine trying to deal with a trans-national global problem like climate without Europe and Japan doesn’t make sense. So I think we are going to need ways in which we organise the major stings to work out hard bargains about how we are going to solve this and that’s obliviously going to have to include the US and China since those are the two largest emitters but it’s also going to have to include Europe, Japan and a number of other countries.

Get Everybody into The Act. International Relations and Climate Change


Well, I think at this stage we need to think a lot about the International Relations. In other words, how do you organise so that we can manage this? There is a wonderful expression by a diplomat named Harlan Cleveland, which was, “How do you get everybody into the act and still get action?” And that problem is with us in climate change. When you are dealing with 192 countries all together at the same time, everybody’s in the act but it’s hard to get action. At the other hand you need to find ways if you have bargaining among smaller groups to relate back to the larger groups for legitimacy and enforcement so I think international relations and looking at the problem of institutions is going to be an essential question.

]]> http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/06/smart-power-for-global-climate-negotiations/feed/ 0 If No Treaty in Copenhagen, How About a Climate Bail Out by the US? http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2009/12/if-no-treaty-in-copenhagen-how-about-a-climate-bail-out-by-the-us/ http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2009/12/if-no-treaty-in-copenhagen-how-about-a-climate-bail-out-by-the-us/#comments Sat, 05 Dec 2009 13:04:32 +0000 Henry Tulkens http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/?p=482 Kyoto Protocol participation map 2005

Kyoto Protocol {link:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kyoto_Protocol_participation_map_2005.png}participation map 2005{/link}

A few days away from COP15 it becomes clear that a potential global agreement on climate change will be limited to a political agreement, instead of being the long expected treaty that would extend the Kyoto Protocol beyond 2012 and further enhance the Climate convention. The main obstacle is that the US politically needs to have first a domestic legislation in place before committing to any international agreement. Delays in the Senate make it unlikely that a climate bill could be approved before April 2010. In the meantime, couldn’t President Obama offer a tangible political gesture to the world community and thereby restore leadership and credibility for the US in the climate negotiations?

Our suggestion is that the Obama administration negotiates a deal in Copenhagen by which the US would buy a quantity of emission units corresponding to all emissions exceeding its Kyoto target over the commitment period 2008-2012, some of the money being allocated to adaptation funding in developing countries. There are three major advantages to this:

  • The environmental ambition of the Kyoto Protocol would be restored to its original level (5,2% of GHG emission reductions of Annex I countries from 1990 levels).
  • The US would credibly and immediately show its willingness to take its part — a major and a leading one — in the world effort on climate change.
  • The Copenhagen meeting would deliver a concrete result with benefits for the environment and financial support for adaptation to developing countries.

How much would our proposal cost to the US? Everyone seems to accept that the US cannot meet its Kyoto target. Let us see whether this is true. The Kyoto target for the US is to reduce its net GHG emissions by 7% from their 1990 level over the period 2008-2012. According to US inventories of GHG emissions (submission 2009) the net emissions in 1990 amounted to 5257.3 Mt CO2eq. Therefore over the 5 years Kyoto period, the maximum US emissions allowed by the Protocol amount to 24446.5 MtCO2eq (i.e. 0.93 x 5257.3 x 5).

Now, according to the most recent inventory, the figure reported for the 2007 actual emissions is 6087.5 Mt-CO2eq. Therefore, and if we assume that US emissions remain at this 2007 level over the commitment period 2008-2012, we can project that the US will have emitted 30437.5 MtCO2eq (= 5 x 6087,5) over that period.To meet its Kyoto objective, the US would thus have to purchase emissions units for an equivalent of 30437,5 – 24446,5 = 5 991 MtCO2eq . Assuming that 1 ton of CO-2equivalent can be purchased for 10 US$ the total cost to bail out the US from its Kyoto commitment would be 59 910 million $((A more accurate estimate should be based on US GHG emissions projections for the years 2008-2012. However, official projections in the public domain over that period
do not account for the impact of the current economic crisis on US emissions which is known to be significant. We therefore chose to rely on reported data which provided
a relevant order of magnitude for the cost. Similarly, the price of 10$/tCO2eq is a guesstimate based on currently observed prices.)).

Most importantly, the modalities for such a bail out agreement should be defined with the suppliers of credits (mostly Russia and Ukraine) and with developing countries potential suppliers of emission units from the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism.A fixed price should be negotiated for this purchase so as to avoid speculative price movements at the announcement of a bail out deal. Finally in order to provide funding to developing countries for adaptation – a request of long standing by developing countries – a fraction of the proceeds of the sale could be allocated to adaptation projects in the most vulnerable least developed countries.

To put the above cost figure in perspective, it represents, over the same time span less than 10% of the observed cost of the war in Irak, or, per year, 0.01% of the US GDP.

With those figures in mind is this project unthinkable?
Economically, it is affordable for the US economy.
Politically it would be a bold move with many advantages, the no least important of which would be to restore confidence in the willingness of the US to act effectively on climate change, and do it globally in a cooperative way. Buying out now the full Kyoto target would prove that. It requires no new treaty, and would open a credible way for trustful negotiations on the future commitments to be concluded soon.

]]> http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2009/12/if-no-treaty-in-copenhagen-how-about-a-climate-bail-out-by-the-us/feed/ 0