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At the moment there is no a single spokesperson for the global atmosphere; there are rather multiple competing interpretations of global warming.
Mass media constitute the arena in which these different versions are presented and discussed. “Who Speaks for the Climate? Making Sense of Media Reporting on Climate Change”, by Maxwell T. Boykoff of the University of Colorado explores the different narratives around climate change.
In Laura Caciagli’s interview, the author talks about the new role of media, highlighting the factors that influence media coverage of climate change.

Prof. Boykoff, what’s your opinion on the new role of the media in communicating climate science and what do you think about the way media representations of climate change are produced and negotiated?

In my book I analyse media coverage of climate change because of its important role in reaching out everyday people. To keep myself up-to-date about the major topics of climate change, I participate in climate science conferences and workshops; I follow climate talks and negotiations as well.
But, in reality, very few people have access to the science literature and to policy documents so they generally rely upon media representations of climate change. Mass media help to interpret and translate important but difficult information and processes.
In terms of reaching a mass audience and shaping public awareness, public engagement as well as public support for positive action, mass media play a very important role and need to be studied carefully.

What do you mean by “competing frames” in your book?

Well, there are a lot of different ways in which mass media address dimensions and aspects of climate change. When I introduce the notion of “competing frames” I want to explicitly discuss how media rely upon actively shape public discussions on climate change and its impacts. For example, a charismatic leader talking about climate change action becomes a chance for the media to cover the issue. This, in turn, shapes ongoing considerations on action in the public arena.
Statements and pronouncements of leaders, politics and policy makers often become frames.
When covering climate change mass media mainly focus on few topics such as weather extreme events or charismatic megaphones like polar bears, while some important themes – i.e. socioeconomic aspects of climate change or environmental justice – are completely ignored.

{link:http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/publications/special/who_speaks_for_climate/index.html} Who Speaks for the Climate? {/link} "In my book I analyse media coverage of climate change because of its important role in reaching out everyday people"

How could journalistic norms affect and influence media coverage of climate change?

In terms of socioeconomic factors I find the situation quite discouraging.
I think it is very challenging to cover stories such as those of climate change in a comprehensive, responsible way. At the moment hope is raised by some ONGs that are stepping forward to provide a connection between climate scientists and the media, although they remain small examples in a larger scene openly discouraging mass media consolidation and enduring.
As for journalistic norms, they really influence the ways in which stories are shaped and realized and how pieces of information are translated into news. In this process, the trend is to rely upon personalities and dramatic events with journalists trying to give a spectrum of opposing points of view. In this way the audience is provided with a framework of competing on the same stage but there isn’t any emerging difference if one point of view is brought into the media arena by a scientist, an opinion leader, a politician.
The journalistic norms that I have tracked on the book are personalization, dramatization, novelty, reliance on authoritative spokepersons and journalistic balance of opposing viewpoints. They all contribute to a coverage that coheres with dominant market-based and utilitarian approaches to discussing the spectrum of possible mitigation and adaptation action on climate change. The journalistic norm of balance in news reporting has in particular served to amplify outlier views on anthropogenic climate change and concurrently caused an appearance of increased uncertainty regarding this issue. This, in turn, has permeated climate policy discourse and decision-making.

Are climate experts able and effective in communicating climate change enough? Is there a way to improve their PR skills?

The role of expertise, authority and perceived legitimacy remain very important. To understand a changing climate we have to rely upon climate models and experts, whose role is critical in terms of reaching out the mass media and the public. As a scientist, I consider a duty and an extension of my work trying reach out the public and spread knowledge among the general audience.
In recent years, Internet and social media changed the situation a lot: today many people find information about climate change via Google searches, and the legitimacy checks in place there are much different than those in place in academic ‘peer review’. I think that these democratizing and complementary developments are net positive changes, with many more people discussing and participating. Yet there are costs as well. My book works through these sorts of issues in the context of 21st century climate challenges.

Why climate change has become so important in politics?

I think that climate has become very important in politics because it cuts our relationship with the environment and every aspect of daily life: how we work, travel, produce food and use land, how we play and relax. Curbing emissions has become central in considerations of critical phenomena such as poverty, inequality, justice and armed conflicts. More and more people recognise climate change as a central issue to discuss.

In your opinion, how can we improve media reporting on climate change?

Research like mine can help to re-consider media institutional practices and theirrelationship with the scientific and policy communities as well as with the public. Journalists should work to provide accurate metaphors in order to describe climate change and its impacts in a simpler and clear way.
Scientists too might improve their way to communicate this complex issue.
Media, scientists, policy actors and focus groups in the public must dialogue and cooperate to democratize these topics and inspire more reactive engagement about climate change. At the moment some media outlets are trying to connect journalists – especially those from developing countries who have no access to peer-reviewed articles – with the relevant experts in order to improve and foster the media coverage about climate change.

You may also be interested in:

• Nature’s challenges to communicate climate science – a post by TeC, the CMCC’s blog
• Maxwell Boykoff’s page at the Center for Science and Technology Policy
• The official page of the book “Who Speaks for the Climate? Making Sense of Media Reporting on Climate Change” at Cambridge University Press website
• A review of the Boykoff’s book at Yale Forum on Climate Change & the Media
• Andrew Revkin’s (NYTimes) Book Report in his blog Dot Earth

A specific option, currently discussed in UNFCCC negotiations, is the use of standardized approaches for the determination of baselines and additionality. Determining the baseline (emission scenario that would occur in the absence of the proposed project activity) and demonstrating additionality (proving that the project generates real emission reductions beyond the baseline) are often the most complex phases of the project cycle, implying some level of subjectivity and less certainty on the generation of carbon credits.

The challenge is to set up methodologies applicable to multiple projects, regardless of project specific conditions. This may contribute to reduce transaction costs, increase transparency, ensure better predictability of emission reductions and allow a faster project cycle. Yet, their use may not be appropriate for all types of projects and could require significant upfront costs and efforts to be developed. Standardization is not a new concept under the CDM, however it has not been widely exploited, for reasons related to the origins of the mechanism itself. In fact, the CDM was conceived as a global mechanism encompassing any possible emission reduction activity for the six gases of the Kyoto Protocol. For such a mechanism, it was impossible to elaborate top-down methodologies for all eligible activities, both financially and within a reasonable timeframe. Therefore, in view of a quick start-up of the mechanism, it was decided to leave to project proponents the possibility to propose methodologies, that would be subject to approval by the “CDM Executive Board”. Therefore, the tendency was inevitably project-specific (none of the proponents had interest in developing methodologies applicable to other projects). On the contrary, in other offset schemes outside the UNFCCC, restricted geographical scope and limited eligible project categories allowed easier development of top-down methodologies. Offset schemes used in Australia, Canada and US make wide use of standardized approaches.

Following the recent Cancun decision on “further guidance relating to the clean development mechanism”, there is a stronger mandate for the CDM Executive Board to work on standardization. Yet, considering limited availability of financial resources, work needs to be concentrated on clear priorities. In this regard, the challenge of standardization should be considered within the wider exercise of streamlining methodologies and facilitating their applicability in under-represented regions, thus enhancing geographical distribution of the CDM. Across the different standardization approaches, some may be helpful in this direction. For instance, the development and use of “default values” may facilitate baseline calculation where project data are not available or would require very costly measurement campaigns. Some default values (e.g. IPCC values) are already used in UNFCCC methodologies and this approach should be further developed. While an important challenge remains the development of new methodologies, the potential of “hybrid” approaches, combining standardization and project specific elements, should be duly investigated, starting from existing methodologies.

A project scouting exercise carried out in the Northern African region highlighted several difficulties of application of UNFCCC methodologies to local technology practices. For instance, applying the UNFCCC methodology “AMS.III.H, Methane recovery in wastewater treatment” to some emission reduction projects, posed a number of issues where lagoon treatment was used. These issues were related to technical definitions, availability of historical data, application in conjunction with other methodologies (where energy production was also contemplated) and additionality tests. Provision of historical data represented one of the hardest barriers, both in the methodology itself and in the application of the “emission factor tool”, required to calculate the electricity delivery component in case of methane utilization for energy production. In this regard, uncommon grid delivery layouts (with onsite diesel generators, very frequent in rural areas) represented an additional barrier. Another major barrier was linked to monitoring and verification: a very high number of parameters are required by this methodology (e.g. methane content at different locations), with high risks of failure in the phases of verification and issuance of carbon credits. This is an aspect discouraging projects in regions where other kinds of investment risks already exist.

In general, methodologies are often too demanding in terms of baseline calculation and monitoring parameters, with a number of requirements that could imply, for small scale projects, a micro-difference in emission reductions. In these cases, minor differences in percentage of emission reductions should be deemed acceptable, if technology diffusion and other environmental benefits outweigh such difference. In general, for underrepresented regions, methodologies should become more manageable, with increased certainty on project registration and generation of credits.

Whatever the outcome of Kyoto negotiations, flexible mechanisms are likely to continue playing a role in mitigation policies. Their rules should be improved, with the aim of enhancing regional distribution, efficiency and environmental integrity. Standardization, although not applicable to all categories of projects, can be part of this exercise. The COP/MOP decision adopted in Cancun, while limited in its scope, is a good first move. The decision had the merit to set some priorities (especially for under-represented regions), include additionality within the scope of the baselines, give a mandate to the Executive Board for a top-down work and plan work for the refinement of other aspects over the next negotiating sessions. The Executive Board has a challenging work ahead and next UNFCCC sessions, including Durban, are expected to further pave the way to the improvement of the CDM. While being also a political issue, with potential effects on the carbon market, standardization should remain a tool to overcome current weaknesses of the CDM and improve investment in clean technologies.

References

• Broekhoff, D. – Expanding global emissions trading: Prospects for standardized carbon offset crediting. Prepared for International Emissions Trading Association. World Resources Institute, 2007
• Carnahan, K. – Multi-Project, Standardized Baselines: Explaining A Key Issue in the Reform of the Clean Development Mechanism. International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), 2009
• De Sepibus, J. – The environmental integrity of the CDM mechanism – A legal analysis of its institutional and procedural shortcomings – NCCR Trade Regulation, Working Paper No 2009/24, 2009
• Ellis, J., and Kamel, S. – Overcoming Barriers to Clean Development Mechanism Projects. OECD and UNEP/RISOE, 2007.
• Fischer, C. – Project-Based Mechanisms for Emissions Reductions: Balancing Trade-Offs with Baselines – Energy Policy, Vol. 33, pp. 1807-1823, 2005
• Hayashi D., Müller N., Feige S., Michaelowa A. – Towards a more standardized approach to baselines and additionality in the CDM. Determining nationally appropriate performance standards, thresholds and default factors – Commissioned by the UK Department for International Development, Perspectives GmbH, 2010
• Houdashelt, M., et al. – Alternative Tools for the Demonstration of Additionality: An Assessment of Proposals – Center for Clean Air Policy, Washington, DC, 2006.
• IPCC – 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, Prepared by the National Greenhouse Gas Inventories Programme, Eggleston H.S., Buendia L., Miwa K., Ngara T. and Tanabe K. (eds). Published: IGES, Japan.
• Kartha, S., Lazarus, M. and Bosi, M. – Practical Baseline Recommendations for Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Projects in the Electric Power Sector – OECD/IEA, 2002.
• Lazarus, M., Kartha, S. and Bernow, S. – Key Issues in Benchmark Baselines for the CDM: Aggregation, Stringency, Cohorts, and Updating – Tellus Institute / Stockholm Environment Institute. Prepared for U.S. EPA, 2000.
• Lory, J. A., Massey, R. E., Zulovich, J. M. – An Evaluation of the USEPA Calculations of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Anaerobic Lagoons – Journal of Environmental Quality, 2010
• Presicce, F. – Enhanced action on mitigation in the future climate change regime: implications of the use of standardized multi-project baselines for the improvement of project-based mechanisms. Doctoral thesis, PhD on “Science and Management of Climate Change”, Ca’ Foscari University, Venice, 2011. Available at http://hdl.handle.net/10579/1114
• Schneider L. – Is the CDM fulfilling its environmental and sustainable development objectives? An evaluation of the CDM and options for improvement – Oeko institute, 2007.
• Schneider, L. – Assessing the additionality of CDM projects: practical experiences and lessons learned – Climate Policy, Volume 9, Number 3, 2009.
• Sikirica B., Presicce F., Di Andrea F. – Evaluation du potentiel des projets dans les domaines des energies renouvelables, de l’efficacite energetique et de la gestion des forets, dans le cadre des mecanismes flexibles du Protocole de Kyoto au Royaume du Maroc – Italian Ministry for the Environment, Land and Sea, 2008
• Sutter C., Parreño J.C. – Does the current Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) deliver its sustainable development claim? An analysis of officially registered CDM projects – Climatic Change No. 84, 2007
• Van der Gaast, W. – Application of Multi-Project Baseline Methods in Practice – Foundation JIN, 2006.
• Website of the “Alberta Offset System” – www.carbonoffsetsolutions.ca/index.htm
• Website of the California Climate Action Registry, CCAR – http://www.climateregistry.org/
• Website of the Chicago Climate Exchange – www.chicagoclimatex.com
• Website of the Climate Leaders Programme – www.epa.org/climateleaders
• Website of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative – www.rggi.org
• Website of the South Wales GHG Reduction Scheme – www.greenhousegas.nsw.gov.au
• Website of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change – www.unfccc.int
• WRI/WBCSD GHG Protocol for Project Accounting – pdf.wri.org/ghg_project_accounting.pdf

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In the last two years the international community shared the objective  to limit the increase of  mean global temperatures to 2°C above pre-industrial levels in order to prevent the risks and effects of climate change. This agreement was made in a number of international meetings: G8 2009/2010, G20 2009, UN General Assembly 2009/2010, Copenhagen Conference 2009.
The Council of the European Union, on October 29, 2010, acknowledged that to stay below 2ºC would require global greenhouse gas emissions to peak at least by 2020.  In order to limit the atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) concentrations to less than 450 parts per million (ppm), global greenhouse gas emissions are reduced by at least 50% compared with 1990 by 2050 and continue to decline thereafter.  The developed countries as a group should reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 80% to 95% by 2050, through an intermediate legally binding quantified emission reduction commitment of 30% by 2020, with respect to 1990.
The developing countries as a whole should achieve a substantial deviation below the currently predicted emissions growth rate by 15-30% by 2020.
Furthermore, estimates based on available information such as current population projections by 2050, calculate that global average greenhouse gas emissions per capita should be reduced to around two tons  CO2 equivalent. A  gradual convergence of national per capita emissions between developed and developing countries would be necessary considering the national circumstances.

Feasible Targets? Atmospheric CO2 concentration and global emissions

The present atmospheric level of CO2 is approximately 390 ppm (NOAA, 2010).
Taking into account all the greenhouse gases, the CO2 equivalent is already 448 ppm  (EPRI, 2009, pdf) and it is expected to rise in the next years.

Until now,  efforts to reduce  carbon emissions through international legally binding agreements have not worked..
Ten years after the agreement of  the Kyoto Protocol, 1998-2007, the global emissions rose by an average of 2.5% a year. Although emissions fell in USA, Canada, Japan, EU, between 2008-2009 as the global recession took hold, they continued to grow in China, India and in the most of the developing countries. With 1.86 billion tons of CO2 emissions in 2009 (25% of the global emissions)China succeeded the USA as the world’s biggest carbon emitter.
Meanwhile India’s, emissions  have been growing at about a 5% yearly rate in the last decade,  succeeding Russia as the world’s third largest emitter.

The energy scenarios of 2030  project a significant increase in the demand for global fossil fuels as well as CO2 emissions. According to IEA World Energy Outlook 2009, the global demand grows by 40%  between 2008-2030, with coal use rising in absolute terms. The global energy demand is increasing mostly in the emerging and developing world, to sustain their economic growth and social development. CO2 emissions continue to grow (+45% in 2030) mostly from the emerging and developing world.

Nevertheless, per capita emissions in emerging and developing economies are far below those of most in  the developed world.
In 2010, per capita emissions in USA are three times larger than in China and 15 times larger than India.
Per capita emissions are a sensible indicator of the energy and social divide between the countries considering that 2 billion people in the developing world do not have access to energy.

The IEA Business As Usual scenario suggests  that after 2030, the global energy demand will continue to grow. In the Business As Usual (BAU) scenario, the “carbon neutral” energy sources (renewables, biofuels, nuclear),  combined with energy efficiency and the technology of carbon capture and storage are not sufficient to replace the fossil fuels  to meet the increasing energy demand, and fossil fuels will continue to supply more than two-thirds of the world’s energy.
Therefore, the global emissions will be larger than+ 130% with respect to 1990.

The “energy revolution” to meet the stabilization target

According to the ‘Blue Map’ scenario in 2010 Energy Technology Perspectives (IEA/ETP, pdf)

• global greenhouse gas emissions should peak by around 2020, and decline steadily towards the 50 % cut in carbon emissions by 2050;
• investments (public and private) in clean technologies should rise from the present $165bn a year, to $750bn in 2030 and $1.6 trillion in 2050;
• renewables should account for 48% of power generation, nuclear 24% and plants equipped with carbon capture and storage 17%;
• the widespread use of next-generation biofuels should replace gasoline and diesel;
• a huge improvement in energy efficiency should reduce the energy demand growth by only  32%, compared with 84 % under the BAU;
• the widespread introduction of electric, hybrid or fuel cells cars should account for at least 80% of all vehicles on the road;
• stable, long-term incentives such as feed-in tariffs, loan guarantees and tax credits must be introduced to encourage the adoption of low-carbon technologies, while market barriers such as planning obstacles, building codes and red tape must be cut.

The “Blue Map”, with the convergence of the “Per Capita Emissions” issue (2 tons  in 2050, as suggested by EU)  demand immediate global action to address :

• the “burden sharing” of 2020 peak and 2050 per capita emissions,  taking into account the present and predicted  gaps in carbon intensity and per capita between the countries;
• the energy technologies “revolution”  in terms of  agreed and mandatory
  • international standards ( in energy efficiency, sustainable biofuels, renewable performances…..);
  • international  rules to shift the energy system towards the “carbon neutral” technologies (for example phasing out the existing fossil fuel energy infrastructures not equipped with Carbon Capture&Storage technologies and forbidding  new plants, like in the case of  CFCs under Montreal Protocol);
• the international and domestic trade and fiscal rules, both to support low carbon technologies investments and to  avoid unfair competition and carbon leakage;
• the establishment and the management of international financial mechanisms to support the energy security in the developing world.

The challenge is new, complex and unprecedented. An international agreement to address the issues that are needed to tackle climate change, carbon intensity of the economies,and energy security has not yet been made. The traditional format of the agreements under the Climate Change Convention (Kyoto Protocol, Copenaghen Accord) is not adequate to meet the challenge.

The “test” of complexity lies within the combination of the low carbon strategies and measures with the existing and forecasted investments in oil and gas infrastructures. Is it possible to design and manage the exit strategy from fossil fuels while tens of  trillions of dollars are invested in new energy infrastructures based on oil, sand oil, natural gas and shale gas? How will it be possible to meet the long-term lifetime of such infrastructures with the 2020 peak?
Is the combination of international regulations  and the Environmental Social Responsibility of the private energy companies enough to address the exit strategy from fossil fuels?

Another test is the “parallel” case of China and USA

According to the head of the International Energy Agency, Nobuo Tanaka, “China’s emissions need to peak by 2020. Without such commitment from China, halving CO2 emissions by 2050, is simply impossible”.
According to the Chinese government, the 2020 peak target  combined with a projected 36 % cut in coal consumption by 2050, will force China to sacrifice economic growth.
China has already pledged to reduce energy intensity (CO2 emissions/GDP) by 40-45 % by 2020.  Today China is the biggest global investor in renewables, nuclear and carbon capture&storage technologies.
In addition, China’s per capita emissions , in comparison with USA, are 3 times lower in 2010, and are predicted to be 2,5 times lower in 2020.

As noted by Amy Heinzerling of the Earth Policy Instituter, 22% of China emissions come  from the production of exported goods, while goods imported by USA are responsible for 190 million tons of emissions per year.

Further domestic and international commitments made by China can be considered only if USA and the most developed countries make proportional and comparable commitments.  These commitments also depend on the efforts supported by multilateral/bilateral technology and financial cooperation in China.
Otherwise  China’s peak of emissions will be reached between 2030-2040,  under the present domestic policies and measures.

The United States have not been able to make commitments  to reduce emissions and shift from fossil fuel to a low carbon economy.
In September 1999, the US Senate rejected the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, proposed by the Clinton Administration, considering that the international treaty would affect the energy security and the national sovereignty of USA.

In 2010, the US Senate refused to examine the draft law for the introduction of limits to CO2 emissions through a mechanism similar to the European one. This occurred because of missing cost estimates and serious concerns regarding the effects on energy security and on the national sovereignty.
Furthermore, US Senate expressed its uneasiness to accept commitments that emerging economies, such as China and India, have not shared.

Meanwhile, in 2010, the EU countries and Japan, with comparable standards of life in  USA, emit only half per capita CO2. This is a case of unfair competition by  USA with EU and Japan because of unequal commitments for the emissions reduction.

A new leadership for Europe?

The European Council on October 28 suggested  “a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, as part of a wider outcome including the perspective of the global and comprehensive framework engaging all major economies “
Perhaps it is time that the EU  acknowledge that the Kyoto format is not adequate to meet the multiple challenges of climate change, low carbon economy and energy security.
Rather than focusing on complex legal structures and the construction of a new international bureaucracy on climate change, Europe should focus on promoting international projects. These projects will face the global technological challenge using the great potential of the European integrated economy, which has already achieved important levels of efficiency and innovation.
Europe should test the possible rules and measures necessary to promote a global “de-carbonized” economy able to sustain growth and reduce emissions, building a European “Global Platform” based on the three technological pillars: energy efficiency, renewable energy and nuclear energy, also including forestry management.

In this perspective, it is necessary to work at two levels:

The national level: through common EU policies and strategies on technologies and financing measures.  In spite of the framework established by the “climate and energy package” the lack of harmonized measures for energy efficiency, efficiency standards for renewables, nuclear, energy fiscal policy, agriculture and animal husbandry, forestry management, financing for research and development, hinder the valorization and development of the European potential to build a “green” and “de-carbonized” economy;

The international level: through a new and structured European initiative for the technological cooperation with emerging economies and with USA/Canada/Japan in order to use the European platform as a “Hub” for the global innovation and dissemination of low-carbon technologies. The technological initiative could represent an evolution of the Kyoto Protocol JI and CDM mechanisms.

The Threat of Climate Change: the Need of Adaptation Measures

Waiting for USA and China,  no agreement will be effective, and tackling global climate change will be more difficult, also because of the increasing CO2 concentration in the atmosphere.
The Atmosphere CO2 stabilization at 450 ppm is difficult to achieve.
Some scientific institutions suggest the consideration of more realistic targets, taking into account that the CO2 concentration, due to carbon cycle, is the result of both the emissions and the carbon dioxide already “stored” in the atmosphere.
According to EPRI (2009), two stabilization targets could be considered, taking into account the radiative forcing and the relative increasing in the mean global temperature.

Click to enlarge

Stabilization at 550 ppm  (target 3,7) which corresponds to + 2,5 °C,  requires too strong of a commitment even if postponed, in the deviation from the emissions baseline.
Stabilization at 650 ppm ( target 4,5) which corresponds + 3 °C,  requires challenging global measures  which address the emissions reduction and the adaptation to the effects of the temperature increasing above 2°C

However, as the temperature is increasing, extreme events may occur with greater frequency and intensity.

Last summer many regions and countries  were affected by extreme events, worse than any other in the historical record, with high economic costs and the loss of thousands of lives: flooding in Pakistan, Western China, and India; heat waves in eastern USA, parts of Africa and  Asia, and Russia with unprecedented drought and fires.

According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, in the first six months of the year 2010, the average temperatures were the warmest on record, in accordance with the trend of the recent decades.
Statistics show that the added heat in the atmosphere in the last decades is the driving force for the worsening of the extreme events.

Locally, “some extreme events occurring over a relatively short time period, especially in close proximity, could mutually reinforce each other in such a way that the resulting cascade of consequences becomes a global catastrophe.” Other extreme events can have secondary consequences that generate additional, substantial damage.   Secondary consequences, in turn, can trigger tertiary consequences that further amplify the adverse consequences, and so on” (“Responding to Threats of Climate Change Mega-Catastrophes”, Carolyn Kousky and others, 2009).

Pitcure from  “Climate Change and its possible security implications” – Report of the Secretary General to the General Assembly (September 2009) Click to enlarge

Drought and/or flooding, are the best examples of extreme events, which generate multiple effects: food and water shortage, loss of cultivated areas, devastation of urbanized areas in the coastal zones, migration of the populations, regional conflicts, and political instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world.
Projected climate change will seriously exacerbate already marginal living standards in many Asian, African, and Middle Eastern nations, causing widespread political instability and the likelihood of failed states.
According to UN secretariat (2009) the multiplier threat of climate change should be addressed while considering the adaptation (prevention policies) and the international assistance in the case of the extreme events.
Until now, such policies  have not been put in place.
This is an additional and urgent task for the international community.

References

• Geoffrey J. Blanford, International Participation in Post-Kyoto Climate Policy, Epri 2009
• Amy Heinzerling, Global Carbon Dioxide Emissions Fall in 2009 – Past Decade Still Sees Rapid Emissions Growth, Earth Policy Institute, July 2010
• International Energy Agency  – World Energy Outlook 2010
• International Energy Agency  – 2010 Energy Technology Perspectives (pdf)
• International Energy Agency  – World Energy Outlook 2009
• Martin I. Ioffert, Climate Change: Farewell to Fossil Fuels?, Science, 10 september 2010
• Carolyn Kousky, Olga Rostapshova, Michael A. Toman, Richard Zeckhauser, Responding to Threats of Climate Change Mega-Catastrophes, RFF Discussion Paper 09-45, November 2009
• Richard Richels, Feasible Climate Targets, Epri 2009 (pdf)
• UN General Assembly, Climate Change and its possible security implications – Report of the Secretary General to the General Assembly, September 2009

Image by {link:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tehran_Pollution.jpg} Matthias Blume on WikiMedia Commons {/link}

* The views of the authors do not necessarily represent the views of the OECD or of its member countries.

After Copenhagen, concerns over an uneven playing field for producers, caused by regional differences in climate mitigation policies, appear to be heightened. Consequently, the debate over protective measures continues, focusing largely on carbon-based border tax adjustments (BTAs).

In Europe, citing concerns over fair play for industries and jobs, French President Sarkozy has repeated calls for a carbon tax on imports into Europe, to be applied to countries that fail to implement a climate change mitigation policy. Yet the European Commissioner for Trade, Karel De Gucht, opposes this approach, citing apprehension about inciting trade wars (Chaffin et al, 2010). While the European Council concluded in October 2009 that the first-best solution to address carbon leakage is with a broad and deep climate deal, it left the option available to use appropriate measures to address the risk of leakage, and continues to evaluate additional approaches to address competitiveness (EC, 2009 and EC, 2010).

In the United States, similar fears have resulted in provisions for BTAs in the Waxman-Markey bill passed by the House of Representatives in 2009, and the Kerry-Lieberman bill introduced (and subsequently abandoned) in the Senate in 2010. The draft cap and trade policy in both bills included additional allowances for affected industries based on output (Waxman-Markey, 2009; Kerry-Lieberman, 2010). The extent of competitiveness concerns in the Congress was underscored in a letter to President Obama from nine Democrat Senators in December 2009, noting that “any new US climate change laws should establish a national system of border adjustments, in concert with emission allowances or rebates to trade- and energy-intensive sectors of the economy” (Broder, 2009).

In response, key trading partners are voicing their concerns. India along with the G-77 and China have been calling for language in the draft text of the UN climate negotiations that would caution against developed countries resorting to BTAs and other countervailing border measures (Khor, 2009).

Political debates about BTAs confuse several of the underlying issues. To clarify, there are two related issues of concern for countries taking on climate action:

1. that some of their domestic industrial production will lose competitiveness, and
2. that part of their efforts will be undermined by an increase in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions elsewhere, or “carbon leakage”.

In economic terms, loss of competitiveness stems from relative price differentials in traded goods: companies confronted with a relatively stringent climate policy will have higher production costs than competitors without such constraints. Insofar as this leads to a shift in economic activity towards regions with a less stringent or no climate policy, this will increase emissions in these new locations (leakage). There is, however, a second indirect channel driving leakage: policy dampens world energy demand, which puts downward pressure on global energy prices that in turn increases demand for GHG-emitting fuels in locations where emissions are not constrained.

Figure 1 – Carbon leakage with and without BTAs in 2030 Source: OECD ENV-Linkages model (Burniaux et al, 2010) Note: Results shown for scenarios with US, Japan, EU and Annex I respectively acting alone to reach a target of a 50% emission reduction by 2050. Leakage rates are calculated as the ratio of emission changes in non-acting countries over the emission reduction in acting countries or regions. Click to enlarge

The degree of carbon leakage depends on which countries are taking climate action and on differences in the level of stringency of policies. In an illustrative simulation using the OECD ENV-Linkages model, the leakage rate is estimated at almost 12% when the European Union cuts emissions unilaterally by 50% in 2050 from 2005 levels (OECD, 2009). Recent research (Burniaux et al, 2010) shows that similar results would occur if the US or Japan would act alone.  Figure 1 shows these leakage rates for 2030. However, if the effort to achieve a similar level of emission reduction is spread across all Annex I countries simultaneously, carbon leakage becomes negligible, falling to less than 2%. This reflects both the broader country coverage (fewer countries where leakage occurs) and reduced mitigation costs (as efforts are shared). Moreover, not only the magnitude but also the nature of carbon leakage changes with the size and composition of the mitigating coalition: larger coalitions have smaller losses in competitive position but a stronger effect on global fossil fuel prices.

While leakage and competitiveness concerns are inter-related, they can stem from different causes and may require separate policy treatment. Although BTAs could be effective to address leakage stemming from the competitiveness channel for a small group of acting countries, they do not address leakage that occurs through the world fossil fuel markets, nor do they directly address the loss of domestic production. And BTAs come with other costs: they can be damaging to the economy, costly to implement, and could instigate trade wars. The perhaps greater concern of loss of competitiveness for domestic industry should therefore be addressed with more targeted and effective policy levers. This article investigates each of these issues in more detail.

BTAs may reduce carbon leakage from the competitiveness channel

BTAs help to reduce the leakage rate when the coalition of acting countries is small by limiting the competitiveness channel. As the number of acting countries increases, the role and the effectiveness of BTAs decline rapidly, because leakage rates are much lower and tariffs address a smaller share of remaining leakage.

The effectiveness of BTAs in reducing leakage also depends on which channel of leakage is dominant. OECD (2009) analysis shows that if the EU were to act alone, and were to supplement its domestic action with a carbon-based border tax adjustment (calculated on the imported direct and indirect carbon content), then leakage disappears. Burniaux et al (2010) find that BTAs are also effective at limiting leakage when Japan acts alone. But if the USA implements a BTA, or all Annex1 countries together, then a BTA is less effective at reducing leakage; in the case of the USA acting alone, the BTA would reduce the amount of leakage by an estimated 2.5 percentage-points (Ross et al, 2009; Burniaux et al, 2010). This is because in these cases the major channel of leakage is not the loss of competitive position, but rather the second channel through international fossil fuel prices.

Figure 2: Impact of BTAs on production volumes of energy-intensive industries in 2030 Source: OECD ENV-Linkages model (Burniaux et al, 2010) Note: Results shown for scenarios with EU and US respectively acting alone to reach a target of a 50% emission reduction by 2050. Click to enlarge

BTAs fail to protect domestic industry

Although addressing competitiveness concerns is often voiced as a rationale for BTAs, analysis shows that BTAs may not curb the output losses incurred by domestic energy‑intensive industries. While carbon leakage may become very small with a large acting coalition, the impact of carbon pricing on the output of energy‑intensive industries in domestic and international markets may still be large in some countries, reflecting a shift in economic structure away from carbon‑intensive production. As Figure 2 shows, in certain cases (e.g. when the EU acts alone), BTAs can actually worsen the impact on the domestic energy-intensive industry. This is due to several factors, including the impact of BTAs on exchange rates and terms of trade, and the (usually large) share of imports of energy-intensive goods demanded by a number of domestic energy-intensive industries (for instance, car companies import huge amounts of steel products). The impact of BTAs on trading partners depends, in part, on the degree of international linkage and the relative energy-efficiency of trading partner industries.  For example, if the EU implements a BTA, Canada and the USA may actually benefit in comparison to less energy-efficient competitors, such as China, who will be impacted negatively.

Figure 3: Real GDP and welfare impacts in 2030 Source: OECD ENV-Linkages model (Burniaux et al, 2010) Note: Results shown for acting countries, the rest of the world (‘Non-Acting’) and global average for simulation scenarios with US, Japan, EU and Annex I respectively acting alone to reach a target of 50% emission reduction by 2050. Welfare is measured by equivalent variation in household income; it does not incorporate impacts of climate change. GDP and welfare are expressed in percentage change from the baseline. Click to enlarge

BTAs come at a cost

Clearly, BTAs can entail substantial economic losses when looking globally and particularly for non‑participating trading partners. For instance, in a scenario where Annex I countries cut their emissions unilaterally by 50% by 2050, BTAs help reduce world emissions, but the cost to non-acting countries’ GDP in 2030 would increase substantially as shown in Figure 3. The costs to world GDP would also increase as the BTA policy reduces global international trade.

BTAs improve welfare for the implementing country, but negatively impact global welfare. Figure 3 illustrates results from the OECD ENV-Linkages model (Burniaux et al, 2010), showing this negative effect on global consumer welfare, as reduced losses in acting countries cannot compensate fully for the additional losses in other countries. These effects are in line with existing estimates of other recent modelling studies (Mattoo et al, 2009; Dong and Whalley, 2009).

An interesting result for acting countries is that even if welfare is improved by imposing BTAs, they still have a negative impact on GDP (Figure 3). In the ENV-Linkages model the welfare improvement is the consequence of a positive effect on terms of trade; even though the policy increases import prices, export prices increase relatively more.

BTAs have additional complications

Apart from the disadvantages of BTAs in terms of aggregate mitigation costs and failure to protect domestic industry, they are also likely to be difficult and costly to implement. There are inherent challenges in measuring the emissions embodied in the full production cycle of goods abroad, including foreign emissions from production, combustion and indirect electricity use.

In addition, there are potential political implications of BTAs. Protectionist policies could incite retaliation from trading partners. BTAs could also face legal challenges by members of the World Trade Organisation. On the other hand, the “threat” of using BTAs may incite broader and deeper participation in a carbon market by trading partners. While this may hold to some extent for certain countries, it is uncertain that it will be credible for strong trading partners such as China.

More effective policy levers

Clearly the first-best option to address carbon leakage and loss of competitiveness would be to have global coverage of a climate policy. But given these uncertain times for the carbon market, the threat of BTAs is likely to remain. Yet considering the wide range of countries that have associated with the Copenhagen Accord and/or pledged mitigation targets and actions for 2020, even as a fragmented carbon market develops, leakage is likely to be very limited. BTAs are only effective in addressing leakage through one of the channels, do not directly address the loss of domestic production, and are costly. Thus the real focus should be on exploring more effective policy options to level the playing field than BTAs.

References:

• Broder, John M. (2009), “In Letter to Obama, Senators State Conditions for Supporting Climate Bill”, The New York Times, 3 December, (web).
• Burniaux J.M., J. Chateau, and R. Duval (2010), “Is there a case for carbon-based border tax adjustment? An applied general equilibrium analysis”, OECD Economic Department Working Paper No. 794, July 2010, (web)
• Chaffin, J., N. Tait and T. Barber (2010), “Trade War Fears Raised on Carbon Border Tax”, Financial Times, 12 January.
• Dong, Y. and J. Whalley (2009), “How Large Are the Impacts of Carbon Motivated Border Tax Adjustments”, Working Paper 15613, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts, (web)
• EC (2009), “Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (29/30 October 2009)”, 15265/1/09 REV 1, (web).
• EC (2010), “Analysis of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions and assessing the risk of carbon leakage”, COM(2010) 265 final, Brussels 26.5.2010.
• Khor, M. and H. Jhamtani (2009), “India, G77 Propose Text Against Trade Protection in Copenhagen Draft”, South Bulletin (Issue 40), South Centre, 10 September 2009,  (web).
• Kerry-Lieberman (2010), “American Power Act”, http://kerry.senate.gov/work/issues/issue/?id=7f6b4d4a-da4a-409e-a5e7-15567cc9e95c.
• Mattoo, A., A. Subramanian, D. van der Mensbrugghe, and J. He. (2009), “Reconciling Climate Change and trade Policy”, World Bank, CGD Working Paper No 189, November 2009.
• OECD (2009), Economics of Climate Change Mitigation: Policies and Options for Global Action beyond 2010, (web).
• Ross, M., A. Fawcett, A. and C. Clapp (2009), “U.S. Climate Mitigation Pathways Post-2012: Transition Scenarios in ADAGE.” Energy Economics, (web).
• Waxman-Markey (2009), “The American Clean Energy and Security Act (H.R. 2454)”, (web).

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International structure affects the foreign policy issues and the domestic politics; you can’t just prioritise one or the other you have to do both sequentially and simultaneously.
Prof. Robert Keohane (Princeton University) talks about international relations, cap-and trade and a “dual-leadership world” where Usa and China have to take the lead, but you can’t say to say which players can determine the outcomes in the system. How can we get action from people and leaders in climate negotiations?
“In the presence of a deadlock on the traditional ways of solving climate change questions, may be the Economy of Esteem could help us” Prof. Keohane argues in this interview to Climate Science&Policy.

A Two Level Game

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Climate Change and the Economy of Esteem

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Incentives, Credible Actions and Binding Limits for a Global Climate Policy Architecture

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Interrelated Topics for a Multilevel Issue

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USA and China Potential Leadership for Important Players

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It could be described as the ability to shape the preferences of others and attract them so that they want what you want. It is Soft Power and it is crucial in order to create a narrative of climate change which is widely accepted. But soft power alone isn’t enough: we need smart power, a combination of soft power and hard power.
Prof. Joseph S. Nye (Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government) talks about the role of transnationl institutions, the new american course on climate policy  and “How could we get everybody into the act and still get action”. “We are going to have to use a variety of international institutions and focus the European phrase, Variable Geometry”, Prof. Nye says to Climate Science&Policy.

Soft, Smart, and Hard. A Combination of Power for International Climate Politics

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Obama and the New American Course on Climate Politics

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Variable Geometry. A Useful Definition for Climate Institutions

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Narratives and Transnational Institutions

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USA/China: Are We Coming Back to a Bipolar World?

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Get Everybody into The Act. International Relations and Climate Change

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{link:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Charminar.jpg}© Rhaessner at the German language Wikipedia{/link}

Transforming the energy system, improving economy and reducing carbon emissions. These are the milestones of the Indian climate challenge. “We are working to become a more modern country and to build an economy where emissions would be significantly lower”, Prof. Shukla says. The solution requires a large portfolio of energy options and a different perception of the problem: “The conventional perception – Prof. Shukla explains – looks at energy related technologies and innovations from the supply side. Now, we are also looking for solutions that are coming from the demand side”. On the path toward a sustainable development, is the 2° target achievable?
Watch at the video interview with Prof. P.R. Shukla (Indian Institute of Management) at the International Workshop “Reconciling Domestic Energy Needs and Global Climate Policy: Challenges and Opportunities for China and India” in Venice

From Copenhagen to Cancun. Toward a Global Agreement

Let’s bring back the focus in the United Nations Framework Commission on Climate Change and let’s use economic forums to reach the necessary target: the global agreement

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Technologies for a Low Carbon Economy: the Indian Portfolio

Innovations from wind, solar and biomass; after the “123 Agreement” signed with United States, nuclear will be an energy option. All the innovations of the India’s  National Action Plan on Climate Change

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Global Emissions. The 2050 Scenario

We need need a different perception of the problem, but the 2 degree target could be reached.  We are a developing country; we are on the transition to a more modern and to an economy where emissions would be significantly lower

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The Copenhagen conference is a bitter disappointment for European countries. While environment is one of the domains in which European integration is deepest, European countries failed to build and support a common position that would have weighed on the outcome of the conference, the Copenhagen Accord. Significantly, this outcome has been negotiated and signed at the national level and European countries had different position on its content. Moreover, this Accord appears at odd with the expectations of most European countries. In particular, this agreement gives up the “global governance” approach of the Kyoto Protocol, which set a collective goal in terms of reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and translated this collective goal into individual targets for each member country. In the Copenhagen accord, instead, each country announces unilaterally an individual target for its 2020 emissions, and the accord introduces a simple verification of individual commitments.

Compared to the Kyoto approach, four essential elements are lost. Firstly, the agreement is not legally binding and there is no provision in case of non compliance. Secondly, in a system where each country unilaterally announces its commitment to reduce emissions, there is no guarantee that individual efforts are of comparable magnitude, and we can only note that the Russian and American proposals are more modest than European ones. Thirdly, although the Copenhagen agreement recalled the objective of maintaining global warming below 2°C, there is no guarantee that the sum of individual commitments is sufficient to achieve this collective goal. And we know that in the current situation, the efforts announced drive us toward a 3°C-or-more warming. Finally, the Copenhagen agreement was negotiated by 28 countries only, and has not been validated by the 192 member countries that are parties to the Climate Convention of the United Nations. It is therefore a partial agreement to a problem that concerns all countries, and the way this agreement has been reached threatens the Climate Convention, a unique 17-year international negotiation process.

Forget Kyoto: Four European Answers

For all these reasons, the outcome of the Copenhagen conference is disappointing. But today, it appears that it was simply impossible to maintain the Kyoto approach. Instead of distributing blames and accusations to explain this failure, it seems more reasonable for Europe to forget the Kyoto Protocol and its philosophy and to recognize that it is an important progress to have included the United States and China in a unique agreement. From there, Europe could try to (re)construct a common position on how to build on the Copenhagen Accord to make it more ambitious and credible. Such a common European position could be based on answers to the four limitations mentioned above.

First, progress is needed on the fact that the accord is not legally-binding and lacks credibility. In the current situation, building a legally-binding framework seems impossible. But if all countries wish to fulfil their obligations, and their reluctance to accept stronger commitments suggests they do, then they can accept a control that is stronger than what is currently agreed on. To do so, an international organization could be created to control emissions of each country and verify that commitments are respected. This proposal was already supported by France and others at Copenhagen, but it met strong opposition. It could now be supported by the European Union, its chance of success increasing if a cap-and-trade law passes the US Congress in 2010. Of course, such an international organization would not make the agreement legally-binding, but it would give weight to the political agreement signed in Copenhagen.

Then, it seems clear that no country can agree to make efforts that are much greater than what other countries are doing, at the risk of disadvantaging its industry and losing jobs and market shares. From an ethical point of view, moreover, it seems unfair that the most ambitious countries suffer from their desire to protect a global public good. In absence of an international mechanism to share emission reduction efforts in a fair manner and in the framework of unilateral commitments, it appears unavoidable to recognize the right to establish fiscal compensation mechanisms. Countries with most ambitious climate policies, whose production costs would increase, would be allowed to introduce a border tax to maintain their competitiveness on their domestic market. The most publicized risk associated with such a tax, namely its use for pure and simple protectionism, could be mitigated if the commitment-control international organization were required to authorize the tax before its introduction. At a later stage, such fiscal mechanisms could even be used to ensure compliance: in practice, a border tax could be applied to exports of countries that do not meet their commitments, after proper analysis and control by the international control organization.

Third, a solution needs to be found to ensure that the sum of individual national efforts is sufficient to achieve the collective objective of maintaining global warming below 2°C. The lack of consistency between the collective goal and individual commitments is undoubtedly the most glaring weakness of the Copenhagen Accord. As the philosophy of this agreement makes it inadequate to impose additional emission reductions, an incentive-based system should be favoured. To do so, the Climate Convention or the IPCC could make a systematic evaluation of the sum of national commitments – in developed and developing countries – and provide an estimate of future emissions trajectories and of the corresponding climate projections. A comparison of these climate projections against the 2°C collective objective would allow to announce a “commitment shortfall,” i.e. the need for additional action to achieve the collective objective. Such an analysis has been done by Carlo Carraro and Emanuele Massetti, and published in Climate Science&Policy (“Two good news from Copenhagen?” January 7th, 2010). They show that the abatement plans proposed by major emitters in Copenhagen are inconsistent with the 2°C target, even if all the climate international finance proposed in the Accord is dedicated to mitigation in developing countries, and they discuss the need for additional effort, i.e. the commitment shortfall. From this type of information, a further mission of the annual Climate Convention conferences could be to announce this commitment shortfall, and to invite all countries to do more to reduce this deficit. The shortcomings of such a process are obvious, but it now seems difficult to do better, and hopefully public opinion pressure will encourage countries to make the necessary commitments.

Finally, it is essential to bring the Copenhagen Accord under the UN Climate Convention and ensure that all countries join its new approach. It could be possible to give up this global approach and work only among big emitters, like in the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate. But this approach is inadequate because the climate change issue will not be settled if the most vulnerable countries are not at the negotiation table. And even if mitigation commitments could be discussed in such a group, it is inappropriate to discuss mitigation and adaptation in different arenas, since these two topics are interlinked through financial flows, technology exchanges, and infrastructure design. The Copenhagen approach, based on the selection of a few “representative” countries is also flawed: on which basis should the Maldives be considered as representative of all small islands? In absence of any better solution, therefore, it is urgent to reinstall the Copenhagen agreement within the Climate Convention. And today, acknowledging the impossibility to save the Kyoto Protocol, it may be possible to convince all countries to join a new approach, provided that the three preceding issues are treated properly and that the Copenhagen Accord reaches an acceptable level of credibility.

The Financial Fluxes Issue

In addition to these four questions, it will be necessary to specify as rapidly as possible the modalities of the financial transfers planned by the Copenhagen agreement, i.e. $30 billion for the 2010-2012 period, and annual flows increasing to $100 billion per year in 2020. To make the agreement acceptable to all developing countries, these transfers will have to support emission reduction and adaptation to climate change effects. Supporting emission reductions in developing countries can be done through the financing of the additional costs due to climate policies. These fluxes will be mainly directed toward big emerging economies. Adaptation support, on the other hand, should target in priority the poorest countries through the financing of their infrastructure deficit, i.e. the required infrastructures to manage water, waste, energy, and natural hazards. Adaptation funding should help pay the cost of these basic infrastructures, and not only the additional cost due to climate change, since a poor country that cannot finance any dike system would have little use of a funding source that pay only the cost of upgrading it.

Furthermore, the Copenhagen Agreement puts on an equal foot the adaptation of Bangladesh to rising sea level and the adaptation of Saudi Arabia to climate-policy-driven reductions in oil consumption. Without reconsidering this agreement, financing arrangements have to be developed in such a way that oil-exporting countries do not capture too much funding, to ensure that aid is effective and directed towards the most vulnerable populations.

These five points provide for the year 2010 a European roadmap that is simple, realistic and potentially acceptable by all countries: the creation of an international institution to control country-level commitments, the recognition of the right for countries with particularly ambitious climate policies to introduce fiscal border-adjustment mechanisms, the annual publication of the commitment shortfall, the reinstatement of the strengthened Copenhagen Accord within the Climate Convention, and the development of efficient and fair financial transfer modalities. Rebuilding a European position could help make significant progress on these points over the year, and turn the Copenhagen failure into a Mexican success.

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As largely predicted by many analysts, the Fifteenth Conference of Parties (COP 15) held at Copenhagen from the 7th to the 18th of December, did not lead to the signature of a legally binding agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol after 2012.

The outcome of COP 15 could have not been different and hopes for a different result did not take into account the reality of facts. First, it would have been impossible for the United States to sign a binding agreement without first having the Senate pass the Boxer-Kerry Bill that, coupled with the already approved American Clean Energy and Security Act (Waxman-Markey Bill), would give President Obama the credibility to propose more ambitious steps internationally. Second, without the commitment of fast-growing developing countries to reduce emissions – not necessarily immediately, more realistically after a “grace” period – any attempt of developed countries to contain temperature rise below safe levels would be vain.

Fast-growing developing countries are reluctant to take on any legally binding commitment on the grounds that their primary objective is to reduce poverty and to widen economic well-being, and that the responsibility for the high concentrations of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere is only marginally attributable to their emissions. Hence, their refusal to sign any legally binding agreement when the major world economies are not ready to do so is largely comprehensible.

These are in the essence the basic ingredients of the so-called “climate deadlock” that prevented to sign a real substitute for the Kyoto Protocol and pushed the climate summit in Copenhagen to “take note” of a more modest Copenhagen Accord on the morning of Saturday, December 19th.

Effectiveness and consistency of the Copenhagen Accord

Let us analyse the first one. Are the domestic abatement plans announced in Copenhagen sufficient to significantly reduce global GHG emissions and to contain temperature increase below the proposed 2°C target?

Table 1 – The Copenhagen Emissions Reductions Commitment. Click the picture to enlarge

Table 1 summarizes the emissions targets that major countries have announced in Copenhagen. Unfortunately, the Annex I to the Copenhagen Accord, in which abatement targets were listed for each country, was empty in the official version released by the UNFCCC. We gathered the national targets from a variety of sources, including the unofficial Annex I to the Copenhagen Accord, and we homogenized them to reflect changes of emissions with respect to 1990. For those countries that have used the Business as Usual (BaU) scenario as a reference, we employed the WITCH model BaU scenario to calculate future emission reductions. China and India have indeed announced an intensity target: they pledge to reduce the carbon intensity – the ratio between carbon emissions and GDP – of their economies by 45% and 20-25%, respectively. Both these targets appear to be non-binding according to the BaU scenario of the WITCH model (which predicts autonomous carbon intensity reductions of 53% for China and 42% for India). The recently published World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2009 also confirms that China might have chosen a BaU scenario and India might have simply underestimated the BaU improvement of its carbon intensity (WEO 2009 predicts a 45% reduction of carbon intensity for China and a 38% reduction for India). Accordingly, for both India and China we substituted the announced targets with BaU emissions of all GHGs.

As a group, the Copenhagen commitments for the biggest emitters, if confirmed, would imply a 28% increase of emissions above the 1990 level. With respect to the BaU scenario for those countries, emissions would be reduced by 21%. Assuming that the rest of the world continues on a BaU path, global emissions would increase to about 48 GT CO2-eq by 2020. This represents a 29% increase with respect to 1990, a 5% increase with respect to 2005 and a 16% reduction with respect to BaU.

Are the promised emissions reductions sufficient to control global warming? The stabilization scenarios presented in the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC show that emissions of CO2 need to peak before 2015, to decrease by roughly 5-10% at 2020, and then decline steadily to limit temperature rise above the pre-industrial level to 2.0-2.4°C by 2100; if emissions peak before 2020, the temperature rise will be of 2.4-2.8°C¹. Therefore, although not negligible if compared to the BaU, the emissions reduction declarations proposed in Copenhagen are clearly insufficient to control global warming below 2°C.

Hence, the first seemingly good news – the Copenhagen emission reduction declarations – is largely inconsistent with the 2°C temperature target re-stated in the Copenhagen Accord². What about the second important news, i.e. that additional, predictable and adequate funding, and improved access to technologies, will be provided to developing countries to enable and support action on mitigation and adaptation?

Financial adequacy of the Copenhagen Accord

The commitment contained in the Copenhagen Accord is to set-up a fast track fund that will consist of USD 10 billion per year from 2010 to 2012 (totalling USD 30 billion). If there is sufficient and transparent action towards mitigation, developed countries commit to mobilize, jointly, USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020. This funding will come from private and public sources, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance. A significant portion of such funding will flow through a newly established Copenhagen Green Climate Fund (CGCF).

The distribution of funds between mitigation and adaptation efforts is not yet defined and it deserves careful consideration. Even though it is now clear that both mitigation and adaptation will be needed to reduce the negative impacts of climate change, the optimal timing of investments is not the same. Recent research with an enhanced version of the WITCH model – designed to quantify the optimal time profile of investments in adaptation and in mitigation – clearly shows that while it is optimal to invest immediately in mitigation actions, most investments in adaptation could be delayed to later in the future³. The reason is that while it is imperative to control GHG emissions as soon as possible to attain low temperature targets, in the short term climate change impacts are still moderate and adaptation measures can be put in place relatively fast later on in the future.

Table 2 - The Mitigation Potential of the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund. Click the picture to enlarge

Let us therefore suppose that the financial resources mobilised in Copenhagen will be used to mitigate GHG emissions, at least from 2011 until 2020. We also assume that these emissions reductions will be additional to those already announced, including the Clean Development Mechanisms (CDMs). Are these resources sufficient to fund the investments which are necessary to restructure the energy system, reduce deforestation, improve land use, in order to close the gap between the announced emissions reductions and the optimal trajectories towards a safe GHG concentrations stabilization pathway?

Our estimates, again using the WITCH model, show that, by directing about 60% of the CGCF to financing low cost abatement actions in developing countries, global emissions could peak in 2020, as shown in Table 2⁴. About 50 billions per year from 2011 until 2020 would reduce emissions by 2.9 GT CO2-eq between 2011 and 2015 and by 2.4 GT CO2-eq from 2016 to 2020, for a total of 26.4 GT CO2-eq⁵. It is hard for emissions to peak before 2015 with this financing scheme. The emissions trajectory would thus show a remarkable contraction with respect to the BaU, but the abatement effort would still be insufficient to achieve the announced temperature target.

Figure 1 - Historical and BaU Scenario Emissions, Copenhagen Commitment and the role of the CGCF for Mitigation. Click the picture to enlarge

The transformation of the CGCF into a full mitigation fund (100% for abatement actions) would allow to reduce emissions by 3% with respect to 2005, it would limit to 18% the increase with respect to 1990 and it would reduce emissions by 22% with respect to BaU. With smooth rapid mitigation action, it is in principle possible to have the peak of emissions around 2015, but in order to achieve the required emissions reductions in 2020 (-5% -10% wrt 2005), additional funding would be needed. A graphical representation of the abatement potential of a mitigation-driven CGCF is given in Figure 1.
Therefore, even if all financial resources were devoted to mitigation, they would not be sufficient to direct carbon emissions along a path consistent with the 2°C target. A much bigger financial effort seems to be necessary.

Conclusion

A first analysis of the mitigation targets to which major world economies informally committed for the year 2020 in Copenhagen, reveals that the expected impact on global emissions is not negligible if measured with respect to BaU, but it is still insufficient to curb emissions below 2005 levels by 2020, a necessary condition to contain global warming within safe levels. GHGs will continue to grow and concentrations in the atmosphere will easily pass 450 ppm CO2-eq at 2020, a threshold above which it will be almost impossible to keep temperature increase below 2°C.

It would therefore be necessary to invest in the development of low carbon technologies and their diffusion, on energy efficiency, avoided deforestation, carbon capture and storage, etc. If all the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund is used to finance cheap, additional, mitigation actions in developing countries, this would make emissions peak before 2020. With steady emissions cuts in the following decades, it would be possible to limit temperature increase to about 2.5°C, above the 2°C threshold but well below the temperature level that would be achieved without strong mitigation action.

There seems to be mixed news coming from Copenhagen. Announced mitigation targets are far from being adequate to control climate change. However, if all financing to developing countries is directed towards mitigation, there are chances to put the world on the right trajectory to reduce global warming significantly. Therefore future negotiations rounds should devote a great attention on how to shape the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund.

Carlo Carraro: University of Venice, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), and Euro-Mediterranean Center for Climate Change (CMCC):
Emanuele Massetti: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) and Euro-Mediterranean Center for Climate Change (CMCC).

1. IPCC, Fourth Assessment Report, WG3, Chapter 3, Table 3.10. In order for temperature increase to be contained between 2.0 and 2.4 °C CO2 concentrations should not exceed 350-400 ppm, all GHG concentrations should not exceed 445-490 ppm CO2-eq; in order for temperature increase to be contained between 2.4-2.8 °C, CO2 concentrations must remain below 400-440 ppm and GHGs concentrations below 490-535 ppm CO2-eq. In our estimates we assume that all GHGs are abated in equal proportions.
2. For an analysis of the chances to achieve the 2°C target please see Carraro and Massetti, “The Improbable 2°C Target,” voxeu.org, 3 September 2009
3. Bosello, F., C. Carraro and E. De Cian (2009). “An Analysis of Adaptation as a Response to Climate Change.” University of Venice, Working Papers of the Department of Economics, No. 2 6 /WP/2009, Sept 2009.
4. Emissions reductions do not include the abatement to which Brazil has already committed at Copenhagen. Reducing emissions by 36% below BaU is a challenging task for Brazil that requires strong action against deforestation.
5. These estimates are based on marginal abatement costs at the year 2015 and 2020, and thus represent an upper bound to average abatement costs. On the other hand, we assume smooth and costless transactions, which is clearly optimistic.

After Copenhagen,
which prospect for climate negotiations?

The answer by
Christa Clapp, OECD Environment Directorate
"A twofold mission for the next year: strangthening signals from Copenhagen with an effective international regime and domestic policy frameworks” (read more)

The answer by
Manfred Fischedick, Vice-President and Director Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy
and
Wolfgang Sterk, Project Co-ordinator Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy
“Don't tie horses to the US waggon: for a green coalition leaded by EU” (read more)

The answer by
Emilio Lèbre La Rovere, Coordenador Executivo, Centro de Estudos Integrados sobre Meio Ambiente e Mudanças Climáticas – CentroClima and Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
“Climate negotiations will have to promote additional mitigation commitments from both Annex I and emergent countries” (read more)