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At the moment there is no a single spokesperson for the global atmosphere; there are rather multiple competing interpretations of global warming.
Mass media constitute the arena in which these different versions are presented and discussed. “Who Speaks for the Climate? Making Sense of Media Reporting on Climate Change”, by Maxwell T. Boykoff of the University of Colorado explores the different narratives around climate change.
In Laura Caciagli’s interview, the author talks about the new role of media, highlighting the factors that influence media coverage of climate change.

Prof. Boykoff, what’s your opinion on the new role of the media in communicating climate science and what do you think about the way media representations of climate change are produced and negotiated?

In my book I analyse media coverage of climate change because of its important role in reaching out everyday people. To keep myself up-to-date about the major topics of climate change, I participate in climate science conferences and workshops; I follow climate talks and negotiations as well.
But, in reality, very few people have access to the science literature and to policy documents so they generally rely upon media representations of climate change. Mass media help to interpret and translate important but difficult information and processes.
In terms of reaching a mass audience and shaping public awareness, public engagement as well as public support for positive action, mass media play a very important role and need to be studied carefully.

What do you mean by “competing frames” in your book?

Well, there are a lot of different ways in which mass media address dimensions and aspects of climate change. When I introduce the notion of “competing frames” I want to explicitly discuss how media rely upon actively shape public discussions on climate change and its impacts. For example, a charismatic leader talking about climate change action becomes a chance for the media to cover the issue. This, in turn, shapes ongoing considerations on action in the public arena.
Statements and pronouncements of leaders, politics and policy makers often become frames.
When covering climate change mass media mainly focus on few topics such as weather extreme events or charismatic megaphones like polar bears, while some important themes – i.e. socioeconomic aspects of climate change or environmental justice – are completely ignored.

{link:http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/publications/special/who_speaks_for_climate/index.html} Who Speaks for the Climate? {/link} "In my book I analyse media coverage of climate change because of its important role in reaching out everyday people"

How could journalistic norms affect and influence media coverage of climate change?

In terms of socioeconomic factors I find the situation quite discouraging.
I think it is very challenging to cover stories such as those of climate change in a comprehensive, responsible way. At the moment hope is raised by some ONGs that are stepping forward to provide a connection between climate scientists and the media, although they remain small examples in a larger scene openly discouraging mass media consolidation and enduring.
As for journalistic norms, they really influence the ways in which stories are shaped and realized and how pieces of information are translated into news. In this process, the trend is to rely upon personalities and dramatic events with journalists trying to give a spectrum of opposing points of view. In this way the audience is provided with a framework of competing on the same stage but there isn’t any emerging difference if one point of view is brought into the media arena by a scientist, an opinion leader, a politician.
The journalistic norms that I have tracked on the book are personalization, dramatization, novelty, reliance on authoritative spokepersons and journalistic balance of opposing viewpoints. They all contribute to a coverage that coheres with dominant market-based and utilitarian approaches to discussing the spectrum of possible mitigation and adaptation action on climate change. The journalistic norm of balance in news reporting has in particular served to amplify outlier views on anthropogenic climate change and concurrently caused an appearance of increased uncertainty regarding this issue. This, in turn, has permeated climate policy discourse and decision-making.

Are climate experts able and effective in communicating climate change enough? Is there a way to improve their PR skills?

The role of expertise, authority and perceived legitimacy remain very important. To understand a changing climate we have to rely upon climate models and experts, whose role is critical in terms of reaching out the mass media and the public. As a scientist, I consider a duty and an extension of my work trying reach out the public and spread knowledge among the general audience.
In recent years, Internet and social media changed the situation a lot: today many people find information about climate change via Google searches, and the legitimacy checks in place there are much different than those in place in academic ‘peer review’. I think that these democratizing and complementary developments are net positive changes, with many more people discussing and participating. Yet there are costs as well. My book works through these sorts of issues in the context of 21st century climate challenges.

Why climate change has become so important in politics?

I think that climate has become very important in politics because it cuts our relationship with the environment and every aspect of daily life: how we work, travel, produce food and use land, how we play and relax. Curbing emissions has become central in considerations of critical phenomena such as poverty, inequality, justice and armed conflicts. More and more people recognise climate change as a central issue to discuss.

In your opinion, how can we improve media reporting on climate change?

Research like mine can help to re-consider media institutional practices and theirrelationship with the scientific and policy communities as well as with the public. Journalists should work to provide accurate metaphors in order to describe climate change and its impacts in a simpler and clear way.
Scientists too might improve their way to communicate this complex issue.
Media, scientists, policy actors and focus groups in the public must dialogue and cooperate to democratize these topics and inspire more reactive engagement about climate change. At the moment some media outlets are trying to connect journalists – especially those from developing countries who have no access to peer-reviewed articles – with the relevant experts in order to improve and foster the media coverage about climate change.

You may also be interested in:

• Nature’s challenges to communicate climate science – a post by TeC, the CMCC’s blog
• Maxwell Boykoff’s page at the Center for Science and Technology Policy
• The official page of the book “Who Speaks for the Climate? Making Sense of Media Reporting on Climate Change” at Cambridge University Press website
• A review of the Boykoff’s book at Yale Forum on Climate Change & the Media
• Andrew Revkin’s (NYTimes) Book Report in his blog Dot Earth

A specific option, currently discussed in UNFCCC negotiations, is the use of standardized approaches for the determination of baselines and additionality. Determining the baseline (emission scenario that would occur in the absence of the proposed project activity) and demonstrating additionality (proving that the project generates real emission reductions beyond the baseline) are often the most complex phases of the project cycle, implying some level of subjectivity and less certainty on the generation of carbon credits.

The challenge is to set up methodologies applicable to multiple projects, regardless of project specific conditions. This may contribute to reduce transaction costs, increase transparency, ensure better predictability of emission reductions and allow a faster project cycle. Yet, their use may not be appropriate for all types of projects and could require significant upfront costs and efforts to be developed. Standardization is not a new concept under the CDM, however it has not been widely exploited, for reasons related to the origins of the mechanism itself. In fact, the CDM was conceived as a global mechanism encompassing any possible emission reduction activity for the six gases of the Kyoto Protocol. For such a mechanism, it was impossible to elaborate top-down methodologies for all eligible activities, both financially and within a reasonable timeframe. Therefore, in view of a quick start-up of the mechanism, it was decided to leave to project proponents the possibility to propose methodologies, that would be subject to approval by the “CDM Executive Board”. Therefore, the tendency was inevitably project-specific (none of the proponents had interest in developing methodologies applicable to other projects). On the contrary, in other offset schemes outside the UNFCCC, restricted geographical scope and limited eligible project categories allowed easier development of top-down methodologies. Offset schemes used in Australia, Canada and US make wide use of standardized approaches.

Following the recent Cancun decision on “further guidance relating to the clean development mechanism”, there is a stronger mandate for the CDM Executive Board to work on standardization. Yet, considering limited availability of financial resources, work needs to be concentrated on clear priorities. In this regard, the challenge of standardization should be considered within the wider exercise of streamlining methodologies and facilitating their applicability in under-represented regions, thus enhancing geographical distribution of the CDM. Across the different standardization approaches, some may be helpful in this direction. For instance, the development and use of “default values” may facilitate baseline calculation where project data are not available or would require very costly measurement campaigns. Some default values (e.g. IPCC values) are already used in UNFCCC methodologies and this approach should be further developed. While an important challenge remains the development of new methodologies, the potential of “hybrid” approaches, combining standardization and project specific elements, should be duly investigated, starting from existing methodologies.

A project scouting exercise carried out in the Northern African region highlighted several difficulties of application of UNFCCC methodologies to local technology practices. For instance, applying the UNFCCC methodology “AMS.III.H, Methane recovery in wastewater treatment” to some emission reduction projects, posed a number of issues where lagoon treatment was used. These issues were related to technical definitions, availability of historical data, application in conjunction with other methodologies (where energy production was also contemplated) and additionality tests. Provision of historical data represented one of the hardest barriers, both in the methodology itself and in the application of the “emission factor tool”, required to calculate the electricity delivery component in case of methane utilization for energy production. In this regard, uncommon grid delivery layouts (with onsite diesel generators, very frequent in rural areas) represented an additional barrier. Another major barrier was linked to monitoring and verification: a very high number of parameters are required by this methodology (e.g. methane content at different locations), with high risks of failure in the phases of verification and issuance of carbon credits. This is an aspect discouraging projects in regions where other kinds of investment risks already exist.

In general, methodologies are often too demanding in terms of baseline calculation and monitoring parameters, with a number of requirements that could imply, for small scale projects, a micro-difference in emission reductions. In these cases, minor differences in percentage of emission reductions should be deemed acceptable, if technology diffusion and other environmental benefits outweigh such difference. In general, for underrepresented regions, methodologies should become more manageable, with increased certainty on project registration and generation of credits.

Whatever the outcome of Kyoto negotiations, flexible mechanisms are likely to continue playing a role in mitigation policies. Their rules should be improved, with the aim of enhancing regional distribution, efficiency and environmental integrity. Standardization, although not applicable to all categories of projects, can be part of this exercise. The COP/MOP decision adopted in Cancun, while limited in its scope, is a good first move. The decision had the merit to set some priorities (especially for under-represented regions), include additionality within the scope of the baselines, give a mandate to the Executive Board for a top-down work and plan work for the refinement of other aspects over the next negotiating sessions. The Executive Board has a challenging work ahead and next UNFCCC sessions, including Durban, are expected to further pave the way to the improvement of the CDM. While being also a political issue, with potential effects on the carbon market, standardization should remain a tool to overcome current weaknesses of the CDM and improve investment in clean technologies.

References

• Broekhoff, D. – Expanding global emissions trading: Prospects for standardized carbon offset crediting. Prepared for International Emissions Trading Association. World Resources Institute, 2007
• Carnahan, K. – Multi-Project, Standardized Baselines: Explaining A Key Issue in the Reform of the Clean Development Mechanism. International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), 2009
• De Sepibus, J. – The environmental integrity of the CDM mechanism – A legal analysis of its institutional and procedural shortcomings – NCCR Trade Regulation, Working Paper No 2009/24, 2009
• Ellis, J., and Kamel, S. – Overcoming Barriers to Clean Development Mechanism Projects. OECD and UNEP/RISOE, 2007.
• Fischer, C. – Project-Based Mechanisms for Emissions Reductions: Balancing Trade-Offs with Baselines – Energy Policy, Vol. 33, pp. 1807-1823, 2005
• Hayashi D., Müller N., Feige S., Michaelowa A. – Towards a more standardized approach to baselines and additionality in the CDM. Determining nationally appropriate performance standards, thresholds and default factors – Commissioned by the UK Department for International Development, Perspectives GmbH, 2010
• Houdashelt, M., et al. – Alternative Tools for the Demonstration of Additionality: An Assessment of Proposals – Center for Clean Air Policy, Washington, DC, 2006.
• IPCC – 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, Prepared by the National Greenhouse Gas Inventories Programme, Eggleston H.S., Buendia L., Miwa K., Ngara T. and Tanabe K. (eds). Published: IGES, Japan.
• Kartha, S., Lazarus, M. and Bosi, M. – Practical Baseline Recommendations for Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Projects in the Electric Power Sector – OECD/IEA, 2002.
• Lazarus, M., Kartha, S. and Bernow, S. – Key Issues in Benchmark Baselines for the CDM: Aggregation, Stringency, Cohorts, and Updating – Tellus Institute / Stockholm Environment Institute. Prepared for U.S. EPA, 2000.
• Lory, J. A., Massey, R. E., Zulovich, J. M. – An Evaluation of the USEPA Calculations of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Anaerobic Lagoons – Journal of Environmental Quality, 2010
• Presicce, F. – Enhanced action on mitigation in the future climate change regime: implications of the use of standardized multi-project baselines for the improvement of project-based mechanisms. Doctoral thesis, PhD on “Science and Management of Climate Change”, Ca’ Foscari University, Venice, 2011. Available at http://hdl.handle.net/10579/1114
• Schneider L. – Is the CDM fulfilling its environmental and sustainable development objectives? An evaluation of the CDM and options for improvement – Oeko institute, 2007.
• Schneider, L. – Assessing the additionality of CDM projects: practical experiences and lessons learned – Climate Policy, Volume 9, Number 3, 2009.
• Sikirica B., Presicce F., Di Andrea F. – Evaluation du potentiel des projets dans les domaines des energies renouvelables, de l’efficacite energetique et de la gestion des forets, dans le cadre des mecanismes flexibles du Protocole de Kyoto au Royaume du Maroc – Italian Ministry for the Environment, Land and Sea, 2008
• Sutter C., Parreño J.C. – Does the current Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) deliver its sustainable development claim? An analysis of officially registered CDM projects – Climatic Change No. 84, 2007
• Van der Gaast, W. – Application of Multi-Project Baseline Methods in Practice – Foundation JIN, 2006.
• Website of the “Alberta Offset System” – www.carbonoffsetsolutions.ca/index.htm
• Website of the California Climate Action Registry, CCAR – http://www.climateregistry.org/
• Website of the Chicago Climate Exchange – www.chicagoclimatex.com
• Website of the Climate Leaders Programme – www.epa.org/climateleaders
• Website of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative – www.rggi.org
• Website of the South Wales GHG Reduction Scheme – www.greenhousegas.nsw.gov.au
• Website of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change – www.unfccc.int
• WRI/WBCSD GHG Protocol for Project Accounting – pdf.wri.org/ghg_project_accounting.pdf

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It is relatively cheap, it is abundant and its renaissance started before the Fukushima accident. In the future energy mix, gas and renewables will play an important role, but coal will be the most important source. That’s why we need to implement CCS and make it economically affordable if we want to meet our mitigation targets. Prof. Ottmar Edenhofer, in this interview conducted by Mauro Buonocore, talks about the future of energy, the opportunity of a European super-grid and proposes a two-track model for climate negotiations.

Prof. Edenhofer, how have climate negotiations been going since the last COP in Cancùn?  What can we  envision for the future of international negotiations on a post-Kyoto agreement?

It’s very hard to predict what will happen after Cancùn. By and large, I would say that the prospects for a quite comprehensive climate regime in the near future are not very good. And the likelihood that this would happen at the Cop 17 in Durban, South Africa, unfortunately is very low. Nevertheless people become aware of what happened in Fukushima, which has basically nothing to do with the climate change issue, but has a lot to do with the energy issue and will change things substantially in the energy market at the international level. I think that people are going to be a little bit more aware that energy security, human development, economic growth and climate change are all parts of the one integrated issue which deserves much more attention than we gave to these single topics in the last decade. So, I do not assume that the Cop in Durban will be a great success, but I think that in the next three years something will happen at the international scale, which will help us with the broader sustainability issue. The longer we wait, the more expensive mitigation becomes – and the risk increases that climate change reaches tipping points in the earth system like Greenland ice sheet melting.

Should the international community drop the project of a global agreement and should it concentrate its efforts on countries’ individual pledges without a legally binding framework?

I think that a legally binding agreement is important but this should not be the one and only target to camp on. Think about China, for example. China has recently presented the 12th five-year which is extremely ambitious, in some aspects. We don’t necessarily need legally binding agreements. What we need is some kind of international cooperation, which could be very effective as a starting point of negotiations and, with its new 12th five-year plan, China could be one of the driving forces for international cooperation.

After the conferences in Copenhagen and Cancùn the format of the COP was criticized and some experts said it was  not the most  effective way to get concrete results for climate negotiations. Do you agree with this assessment?

That’s probably true. The whole framework of the UNFCCC is good at getting a consensus in the end of a process, but it is not the best format to do real negotiations and therefore I would strongly propose to have a two-track model. On the one hand we could negotiate within the G20 and other international arenas about several issues. In the end if we have achieved any concrete results, the UNFCCC would be a very good framework to get everybody on board and to have the strongest legitimacy on the achieved outcomes.

Could you please make some examples of these other arenas?

G20 would be one of them, for example; or other arenas where you could achieve a bilateral agreement, let’s say between Europe and China, on climate and energy topics. Let me give  you a more concrete example. China intends to implement an emissions-trade scheme and the European Union,  which has great experience on this issue, could advise China on how to implement such a thing. This could be done at a bilateral level. There are so many opportunities for international cooperation and I would avoid the kind of negotiations where people are only focusing on the UNFCCC. I mentioned the G20 as a good arena to achieve outcomes because in the G20 we have already agreed to abandon fossil fuels subsidies. This kind of decision should be simply implemented and this would also be a very good starting point to do something at the international scale. So I think we have to combine different scales of cooperation, we should be aware that in the end we have to achieve an international agreement but there are many ways and many smaller steps that could have a strong impact on all the international negotiations.

Will the Fukushima nuclear crisis have any consequences on energy policy and on nuclear strategies around the world?

First of all, Fukushima has a strong impact on the European policy and I am quite convinced that in the end it will have a strong impact on the global energy policy. I would like to give you a number. Up to now, 14% of the  entire world’s electricity production comes from nuclear power. We have now about 455 light water reactors on the globe. And, given that the electricity consumption will double within the next 20 years, if we  would decide to stabilize the share of nuclear power on the electricity production, we will have to implement around 450 other light water reactors across the globe by the year 2030. I think that – independent of the question whether this is something to aspire to – at the international level we will simply not be able to stabilize the electricity production at 14% from nuclear plants around the world.  I also think that China and India will think about nuclear power again. I’m not saying that they would phase out nuclear power, but the speed and the race to build nuclear power plants might very well be much slower than the project many people anticipated before the Fukushima event. I would say that we could  expect a decline in the share of nuclear power in the global energy mix. From my point of view, in the global scale, the big issue in the future will be coal because it is relatively cheap, it is abundant and many countries will then substitute their nuclear power capacities with coal. Therefore, it is absolutely crucial for an ambitious climate policy, that we have Carbon Capture and Storage technologies available. I know that CCS is not available now at the commercial level and we have only a few pilot plans. People, particularly in Europe, think that CCS is not an important part of the mitigation portfolio. I think it is an almost inevitable part because coal remains the most important issue. Gas will also become important, energy efficiency also has to play a very important role. And the scenarios produced by IEA show that renewables will play an extremely important role and then we have to make sure that renewables really become competitive and cost efficient.

Are the European targets on mitigation achievable with an energy strategy with no nuclear plants?

It is an issue, which has to be analyzed very carefully, but I have the feeling that the European Union  can achieve its mitigation targets if we have a common and a unified European energy policy. If we would have a grid across Europe, we would be able to have integrated energy from the best sites for renewables. We could concentrate, for example, solar power in Spain, wind plants in the North Sea, and so on. With this perspective, I think that we could achieve the ambitious climate protection goals even without nuclear power, but admittedly a   European super-grid requires a lot of investments in the infrastructure.

But renewables are not competitive in the energy market, today. And they are growing on public incentives. Do you think that they will soon become competitive?

It is a stepwise process and it has to be complemented by energy efficiency. Wind is to a certain extent already competitive and also an increasing CO2 price will make coal and gas less competitive. So this is a timing issue and I’m not saying that we can achieve it immediately, but over a reasonable time horizon we can build  this kind of super-grid which  integrates renewables from all over Europe. It’s definitely an option, but it takes time. Even in Germany we  are now debating about by when we should phase out nuclear power. It is my expectation that we will not phase out nuclear power immediately, but we will also do this step by step. And although we have to invest, we have to inform the people and  ask them if they would like to phase out nuclear power by 2020 or a bit later. Anyway, new investments in renewables are inevitable and people have to accept that this is not a free lunch.

Which kind of energy mix are China and India going to compose?

I definitely think China  now has the goal to increase the energy efficiency to an unprecedented scale so China is also thinking about an emissions trade scheme at a national scale, which is very encouraging. The Chinese energy portfolio will count on renewables, but they also have a huge amount of coal and gas. The role of nuclear power will depend on how fast they will be able to build up new nuclear plants. But, again, coal will be a  prominent energy source and so we need CCS and we have to clarify to what extent it is feasible and economically affordable. China is now willing and is committed to do something to reduce their emissions and I find this a very encouraging sign.

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Many recent climate projects focus on present-day climate variability and its consequences in the centuries to come. Regarding observations made in past centuries, trends present an increase in global temperatures therefore, anthropic contribution is important. Various indicators, such as GHGs, have already reached  the highest levels recorded in ice cores (~ 290 ppm for CO2; < 700 ppmv for CH4) during previous interglacial periods (Petit et al., 1991). Several strong interglacials, proving temperatures to be warmer than present-day associated with higher eustatic sea-levels, have been proposed as analogues for present-day global warming (Figure 1). The Eemian Marine Isotope Stage 5.5 (126 kiloyears ago, ka hereafter) is the second warmest interglacial of the last 600 ka. The MIS 11, ~400 ka has recently been considered the closest analogue for present-day climate despite the low GHGs relatively to present-day (EPICA Dome C, Lüthi et al., 2008). During both peak interglacials, high latitudes temperatures were warmer than today by 2.2°C and 1.8°C respectively (Bintanja et al., 2005). Both orbital configurations corresponded to a maximum in eccentricity and a minima in precession, placing the Earth very close to the Sun during summers. However sea level was similar (Bowen, 2009).

Will the climate reach a warm equilibrium and gradually cool? How will the climate respond to extreme warming on long time-scale variability? Will there be an abrupt glacial inception similar to previous glacials/interglacials?

Figure 1 δ18O stack (LR04) from Lisieki and Raymo (2005), sea level estimates (m) (Bintanja et al., 2005) and CO2 concentration in ppmv from EPICA, Dome C, Antarctica (Lüthi et al., 2008) for the last 1 million years. Maxima in δ18O values indicate a glaciation while minima indicate interglacials. Two great interglacials, MIS 5.5 and MIS 11, used as present-day climate analogues are indicated. click to enlarge

During the last 5 Million years, the climate variability have experienced two types of transitions: «abrupt» and «extreme». During the last 800 kyrs, glacial/interglacial periods have been pacing the climate natural variability following saw-tooth abrupt transitions . These cold/warm oscillations, are part of a larger time-scale gradual cooling that was initiated during the Mid-Pliocene (~ 4 Million year ago, Ma) and that brought global climate into the Northern Hemisphere glacial/interglacial alternation (Ma hereafter, Figure 2). The onset of glacial inception is generally said to have occured toward 2.7 Million years ago, evidenced by geological proxies. However, these two types of transitions have to be considered on different time scales. During the Late Pleistocene, the transitions between glacial/interglacial periods seem to have been paced by the fluctuations in eccentricity and precession approximately following a 100-kyr cycle (Hays et al., 1976). On the contrary, during the Late Pliocene, the slow gradual cooling occurred over a period of several million years as the climate mainly oscillated, mostly following the ~ 41-kyr obliquity cycle from 2.8 Ma (Lisieki & Raymo, 2005, 2007).

Five Million Years Ago

The Pliocene period (starting at 5.3 Ma) has raised interest because the continental configuration was almost similar to present-day and because until ~ 3 Ma, the climate was warmer than today (by ~4°C in the tropics and by ~10°C near the poles). This caused sea level to rise by ~20 m (Haywood  et al., 2000; Ravelo et al., 2004) although CO2 concentration was almost similar (415 ppm, Pagani et al., 2010). An El-nino-like state existed in the Pacific and lasted several millions of years (Wara et al., 2005). However, the lack of sensitivity of climate models prevents a realistic simulation of the Pliocene warm climate without artificially introducing an increase of atmospheric CO2 larger than that inferred from geological records for this period (Pagani et al., 2010). This suggests that CO2 is not the only factor that influenced the regional gradual cooling at the end of the Pliocene. Note that, the Earth’s climate history alternated between warm and cold periods  throughout several hundreds of million of years. Pliocene represents a warm period in a cold global climate state, i.e. icehouse, which  initiated ~ 50 Ma (Antarctica started to grow toward 30 Ma).

Figure 2 LR04 δ18O from Lisieki and Raymo (2005) correlated to the temperature anomaly inferred from the deuterieum concentration in ice cores from EPICA Dome C, Antarctica (Jouzel et al., 2007). The main orbital (purple), tectonic (brown) and oceanic (blue) events are indicated (see the text for the references of each event). The orange box represents the start of the onset of the Northern Hemisphere glaciations. 100 kyrs and 40 kyrs correspond to the orbitally-driven glacial/interglacial cycles period. This period changed from 41 kyrs to 100 kyrs during the Mid-Pleistocene Transition toward 1 Ma (MPT). click to enlarge

Although the factors influencing the Northern Hemisphere glacial inceptions during the Late Pleistocene have been deeply investigated, they are still poorly constrained. The few simulations focusing on a full glacial cycle hardly reproduced accurate ice volume fluctuations without accounting for more precise internal climate feedbacks such as vegetation and dust. Until now, such long-term simulations have not been performed with full General Circulation Models (GCMs), but with Earth Models of Intermediate Complexity (e.g. Calov et al., 2005; Kubatski et al., 2006; Bonelli et al., 2009). The primary driver of the glacial/interglacial cycles is the Earth’s orbital configuration and the resulting variations in insolation (Hays et al, 1976). Other factors, such as the CO2 and CH4 concentration, which have corresponding climate response lags of several thousands of years (~ 5 kyrs), are thought to drive the ice sheet growth and decay (in that case, GHG effect is similar to that of insolation) or to be driven by the ice sheets fluctuations (Ruddiman, 2006). Oceans are often seen not as a driver of these long time-scale climate fluctuations, but as an amplifier of those oscillations since their thermal inertia is large and may have delayed the climate response to external forcings variations (Knorr and Lohmann, 2003). Ultimately, the role of vegetation and aerosols transportation and deposition feedbacks during glacial/interglacial has been highlighted. Indeed, vegetation and dust changes amplify the regional climate trend through changes in local albedo and may have played an important part in triggering the growth and decay of the ice sheets (e.g., Kubatzki and Claussen, 1998; Peltier and Marshall, 1995). Finally, the mechanisms driving the transition between glacial/interglacial periods are poorly understood. As for the glacial period, insolation changes seem to trigger interglacial periods but full GCMs cannot reproduce those transitions at the moment.

The Glacial Inception in the Northern Hemisphere

If the mechanisms of the 100-kyr glacial/interglacial cycles are still not fully understood, the onset of the Northern Hemisphere Glaciations (NHG) toward 2.7 Ma will continue to be a mystery. First, what defines the onset of the NHG? A drop in CO2 from 415 ppm to less than 280 ppm has been recorded in geological data (Pagani et al., 2010) and simultaneously, the first ice rafted debris  (IRD) event is dated at 2.7 Ma in the Pacific (Prueher and Rea, 2001). IRD are continental material (sediments and rocks), which are embedded in continental ice (glaciers or ice sheets) and  are deposited onto the bottom of the ocean when the ice breaks into icebergs at the continental margins, which drift along oceanic currents. IRD events imply ice dynamics and thus, the presence of ice sheets. These  two observations clearly indicate that toward 2.7 Ma, ice sheets were already growing on the Northern Hemisphere continents.

Which processes triggered the gradual cooling and the glacial inception in the Northern Hemisphere? The onset of the NHG is thought to be caused by processes acting on a time scale of several million years (Figure 2). There are different hypothesis that have been tested in GCMs simulation to check their potential importance in the glacial inception of the Northern Hemisphere. One of the major hypotheses is the closure of both the Indonesian (~3-5 Ma, Cane and Molnar, 2001) and Panama seaways (~3 Ma, Bartoli et al, 2005). The closure of the Panama isthmus, which began 13 Ma, was very slow. When the connection between the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans closed, it intensified the thermohaline circulation in the Atlantic intensifying the heat transport from the equator toward high latitudes. Such hypotheses tested in GCMs circulation show that, even if a larger heat export could bring more precipitation and lead to the built of an ice sheet, the difference in ice sheet volume accumulated between an “open” or “closed” isthmus is small (Klocker et al., 2005; Lunt et al., 2008). On the contrary, the closure of the Indonesian seaway stopped the warm waters from the South Pacific from flowing into the Indian Ocean. This increased the amount of the North Pacific cold waters involved in  circulation into the Indian Ocean and thus reduced the heat transport from the tropics toward the higher latitudes, finally triggering a global cooling (Cane and Molnar, 2001). Another hypothesis involves the increase in stratification of the Northern Pacific ~ 2.7 Ma (Haug et al., 2005) that would have risen the summer and autumn sea surface temperatures (SST) and cool the winter SST enough to allow the snow cover to become permanent and initiate  glaciation. Fedorov et al. (2006) proposed that the shoaling of the equatorial Pacific thermocline reached a threshold ~ 3 Ma, which allows the surface winds to bring cold waters to the surface in the various upwelling zones. This affected the response of tropical SSTs to orbital variations and thus initiated glaciations in the high latitudes. A very recent study by Steph et al. (2010), supported by new sea surface temperatures data, suggests that the progressive closure of the Panama isthmus increased the North Atlantic meridional overturning circulation.  This in turn triggered the shoaling of the tropical thermocline between 4.8 and 4 Ma, finally intensifying the NHG toward 3.6 Ma (suggested earlier than previous studies). This directly contradicts the hypothesis that shoaling of the thermocline first triggered the cooling of the deep ocean as suggested by Fedorov et al. (2006). Finally, Rea et al., (1998) suggested that the drop in CO2 at the end of the Pliocene was caused  by the uplift of the Tibetan plateau (start ~ 3.6 – 4 Ma) that caused an intensification of the subpolar westerly winds, cooling the Northern Hemisphere.

All the processes described here are not critical and could not have triggered  the onset of the NHG alone. However, combined together, they could explain the drop in CO2 and the changes in heat distribution which decreased the global temperature and led the cold climate state that started ~ 2.7 Ma (Figure 2). How will our climate respond to the large increase in CO2 and in temperature that we are recording at present? The various studies dealing with the cyclicity of the glacial/interglacial cycles may suggest that anthropogenic warming may have postponed the next glacial period (Berger and Loutre, 2002). Given the recently high CO2 concentration reached in the present atmosphere it is suggested that our interglacial could last for some more ~ 50 kyrs (Berger and Loutre, 2002; Mysak, 2008).

References:

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• Berger, A. and Loutre, M. F., An exceptionally long interglacial ahead?, “Science”, 2002, 297, 1287–1288.
• Bintanja, R.; van de Wal, R. S. and  Oerlemans, J., Modelled atmospheric temperatures and global sea levels over the past million years, “Nature”, 2005, 437, 126-128.
• Bonelli, S.; Charbit, S.; Kageyama, M.; Woillez, M.-N.; Ramstein, G.; Dumas, C. & Quiquet, A., Investigating the evolution of major Northern Hemisphere ice sheets during the last glacial-interglacial cycle, “Climate of the Past”, 2009, 5, 1013–1053
• Bowen, D. Q., Sea level 400 000 years ago (MIS 11): analogue for present and future sea-level, “Climate of the Past Discussion”, 2009, 5, 1853–1882.
• Calov, R., Ganopolsi, A., Petoukhov, V., Claussen, M., Brovkin, V. and Kutbatzki, C., Transient simulation of the last glacial inception. Part II: sensitivity and feedback analysis, “Climate Dynamics”, 2005, 24, 563-576.
• Cane, M. A. and Molnar, P., Closing of the Indonesian seaway as a precursor to east African aridification around 3±4 million years ago, “Nature”, 2001, 411, 157-162.
• Fedorov, A. V., Dekens, P. S., McCarthy, M., Ravelo, A. C., deMenocal, P. B., Barreiro, M., Pacanowski, R. C. and Philander, S. G., The Pliocene Paradox (Mechanisms for a Permanent El Niño), “Science”, 2006, 312, 1485-1489.
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• Jouzel, J.; Masson-Delmotte, V.; Cattani, O.; Dreyfus, G.; Falourd, S.; Hoffmann, G.; Minster, B.; Nouet, J.; Barnola, J.; Chappellaz, J.; Fischer, H.; Gallet, J.; Johnsen, S.; Leuenberger, M.; Loulergue, L.; Luethi, D.; Oerter, H.; Parrenin, F.; Raisbeck, G.; Raynaud, D.; Schilt, A.; Schwander, J.; Selmo, E.; Souchez, R.; Spahni, R.; Stauffer, B.; Steffensen, J.; Stenni, B.; Stocker, T.; Tison, J.; Werner, M. & Wolff, E., EPICA Dome C Ice Core 800KYr Deuterium Data and Temperature Estimates, IGBP PAGES/World Data Center for Paleoclimatology Data Contribution Series 2007-091, NOAA/NGDC Paleoclimatology Program, 2007
• Klocker, A., Prange, M. and Schulz, M., Testing the influence of the Central American Seaway on orbitally forced Northern Hemisphere glaciation, “Geophysical Research Letters”, 2005, 32, L03703.
• Knorr G., and Lohmann G., Southern Ocean origin for the resumption of Atlantic thermohaline circulation during deglaciation, “Nature”, 424, 532-536.
• Kubatzki, C., Claussen, M., Calov, R. and Ganopolski, A., Sensitivity of the last glacial inception to initial and surface conditions, “Climate Dynamics”, 2006, 27, 333–344.
• Kubatzki, C. and Claussen, M., Simulation of the global bio-geophysical interactions during the Last Glacial Maximum, “Climate Dynamics”, 1998, 14, 461-471
• Lisiecki, L. and Raymo, M., A Pliocene-Pleistocene stack of 57 globally distributed benthic D18O records, “Paleoceanography”, 2005, 20, PA1003.
• Lisiecki, L. & Raymo, M., Plio–Pleistocene climate evolution: trends and transitions in glacial cycle dynamics, “Quaternary Science Reviews”, 2007, 26, 56-69.
• Lunt, D.J., Valdes, P. J., Haywood, A. and Rutt, I. C., Closure of the Panama Seaway during the Pliocene: implications for climate and Northern Hemisphere glaciation, “Climate Dynamics”, 2008, 30, 1-18.
• Lüthi, D., Le Floch M., Bereiter B., Blunier T., Barnola J.-M., Siegenthaler U., Raynaud D., Jouzel J., Fischer H., Kawamura K. and Stocker T.F., High-resolution carbon dioxide concentration record 650,000-800,000 years before present, “Nature”, 2008, 453, 379-382.
• Mysak, L. A., Glacial Inceptions: Past and Future, “Atmosphere-Ocean”, 2008, 46 (3), 317–341.
• Pagani, M., Liu, Z., LaRiviere, J. and Ravelo, A., High Earth-system climate sensitivity determined from Pliocene carbon dioxide concentrations, “Nature and Geoscience”, 2010, 3, 27-30.
• Peltier, W. R. and Marshall, S., Coupled energy-balance/ice-sheet model simulations of the glacial cycle: A possible connection between terminations and terrigenous dust, “Journal of Geophysical Research”, 1995, 100(D7), 14269–14290
• Petit, J., Jouzel, J., Raynaud, D., Barkov, N., Barnola, J., Basile, I., Bender, M., Chapellaz, J., Davis, J., Delaygue, G., Delmotte, M., Kotlyakov, V., Legrand, M., Lipenkov, V., Lorius, C., Ppin, L., Ritz, C., Saltzman, E. and Stievenard, M., Climate and atmospheric history of the past 420,000 years from the Vostok ice core, Antarctica, “Nature”, 1999, 399, 429-436
• Prueher, L. M. & Rea, D. K., Volcanic triggering of late Pliocene glaciation: evidence from the fux of volcanic glass and ice-rafted debris to the North Pacific Ocean, Palaeogeography, “Palaeoclimatology, Palaeoecology”, 2001, 173, 215-230.
• Ravelo, A., Dyke, H., Lyle, A.M., Lyle, A.O. and Wara, M., Regional climate shifts caused by gradual global cooling in the Pliocene epoch, “Nature”, 2004, 429, 263-267.
• Rea, D., Snoeckx, H. and Joseph, L., Late Cenozoic eolian deposition in the North Pacific: Asian drying, Tibetan uplift, and cooling of the Northern Hemisphere, “Paleoceanography”, 1998, 13, 215-224.
• Ruddiman, W. Orbital insolation, ice volume, and greenhouse gases, “Quaternary Science Reviews”, 2003, 22, 1597-1629.
• Steph, S.; Tiedemann, R.; Prange, M.; Groeneveld, J.; Schulz, M.; Tiimmermann, A.; Nurnberg, D.; Ruhlemann, C.; Saukel, C. & Haug, G. H., Early Pliocene increase in thermohaline overturning: A precondition for the development of the modern equatorial Pacific cold tongue, “Paleoceanography”, 2010, 25, PA2202
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Pitcure from {link:http://www.flickr.com/photos/davesag/543627248/} davesag's Flickr album {/link}

In the last two years the international community shared the objective  to limit the increase of  mean global temperatures to 2°C above pre-industrial levels in order to prevent the risks and effects of climate change. This agreement was made in a number of international meetings: G8 2009/2010, G20 2009, UN General Assembly 2009/2010, Copenhagen Conference 2009.
The Council of the European Union, on October 29, 2010, acknowledged that to stay below 2ºC would require global greenhouse gas emissions to peak at least by 2020.  In order to limit the atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) concentrations to less than 450 parts per million (ppm), global greenhouse gas emissions are reduced by at least 50% compared with 1990 by 2050 and continue to decline thereafter.  The developed countries as a group should reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 80% to 95% by 2050, through an intermediate legally binding quantified emission reduction commitment of 30% by 2020, with respect to 1990.
The developing countries as a whole should achieve a substantial deviation below the currently predicted emissions growth rate by 15-30% by 2020.
Furthermore, estimates based on available information such as current population projections by 2050, calculate that global average greenhouse gas emissions per capita should be reduced to around two tons  CO2 equivalent. A  gradual convergence of national per capita emissions between developed and developing countries would be necessary considering the national circumstances.

Feasible Targets? Atmospheric CO2 concentration and global emissions

The present atmospheric level of CO2 is approximately 390 ppm (NOAA, 2010).
Taking into account all the greenhouse gases, the CO2 equivalent is already 448 ppm  (EPRI, 2009, pdf) and it is expected to rise in the next years.

Until now,  efforts to reduce  carbon emissions through international legally binding agreements have not worked..
Ten years after the agreement of  the Kyoto Protocol, 1998-2007, the global emissions rose by an average of 2.5% a year. Although emissions fell in USA, Canada, Japan, EU, between 2008-2009 as the global recession took hold, they continued to grow in China, India and in the most of the developing countries. With 1.86 billion tons of CO2 emissions in 2009 (25% of the global emissions)China succeeded the USA as the world’s biggest carbon emitter.
Meanwhile India’s, emissions  have been growing at about a 5% yearly rate in the last decade,  succeeding Russia as the world’s third largest emitter.

The energy scenarios of 2030  project a significant increase in the demand for global fossil fuels as well as CO2 emissions. According to IEA World Energy Outlook 2009, the global demand grows by 40%  between 2008-2030, with coal use rising in absolute terms. The global energy demand is increasing mostly in the emerging and developing world, to sustain their economic growth and social development. CO2 emissions continue to grow (+45% in 2030) mostly from the emerging and developing world.

Nevertheless, per capita emissions in emerging and developing economies are far below those of most in  the developed world.
In 2010, per capita emissions in USA are three times larger than in China and 15 times larger than India.
Per capita emissions are a sensible indicator of the energy and social divide between the countries considering that 2 billion people in the developing world do not have access to energy.

The IEA Business As Usual scenario suggests  that after 2030, the global energy demand will continue to grow. In the Business As Usual (BAU) scenario, the “carbon neutral” energy sources (renewables, biofuels, nuclear),  combined with energy efficiency and the technology of carbon capture and storage are not sufficient to replace the fossil fuels  to meet the increasing energy demand, and fossil fuels will continue to supply more than two-thirds of the world’s energy.
Therefore, the global emissions will be larger than+ 130% with respect to 1990.

The “energy revolution” to meet the stabilization target

According to the ‘Blue Map’ scenario in 2010 Energy Technology Perspectives (IEA/ETP, pdf)

• global greenhouse gas emissions should peak by around 2020, and decline steadily towards the 50 % cut in carbon emissions by 2050;
• investments (public and private) in clean technologies should rise from the present $165bn a year, to $750bn in 2030 and $1.6 trillion in 2050;
• renewables should account for 48% of power generation, nuclear 24% and plants equipped with carbon capture and storage 17%;
• the widespread use of next-generation biofuels should replace gasoline and diesel;
• a huge improvement in energy efficiency should reduce the energy demand growth by only  32%, compared with 84 % under the BAU;
• the widespread introduction of electric, hybrid or fuel cells cars should account for at least 80% of all vehicles on the road;
• stable, long-term incentives such as feed-in tariffs, loan guarantees and tax credits must be introduced to encourage the adoption of low-carbon technologies, while market barriers such as planning obstacles, building codes and red tape must be cut.

The “Blue Map”, with the convergence of the “Per Capita Emissions” issue (2 tons  in 2050, as suggested by EU)  demand immediate global action to address :

• the “burden sharing” of 2020 peak and 2050 per capita emissions,  taking into account the present and predicted  gaps in carbon intensity and per capita between the countries;
• the energy technologies “revolution”  in terms of  agreed and mandatory
  • international standards ( in energy efficiency, sustainable biofuels, renewable performances…..);
  • international  rules to shift the energy system towards the “carbon neutral” technologies (for example phasing out the existing fossil fuel energy infrastructures not equipped with Carbon Capture&Storage technologies and forbidding  new plants, like in the case of  CFCs under Montreal Protocol);
• the international and domestic trade and fiscal rules, both to support low carbon technologies investments and to  avoid unfair competition and carbon leakage;
• the establishment and the management of international financial mechanisms to support the energy security in the developing world.

The challenge is new, complex and unprecedented. An international agreement to address the issues that are needed to tackle climate change, carbon intensity of the economies,and energy security has not yet been made. The traditional format of the agreements under the Climate Change Convention (Kyoto Protocol, Copenaghen Accord) is not adequate to meet the challenge.

The “test” of complexity lies within the combination of the low carbon strategies and measures with the existing and forecasted investments in oil and gas infrastructures. Is it possible to design and manage the exit strategy from fossil fuels while tens of  trillions of dollars are invested in new energy infrastructures based on oil, sand oil, natural gas and shale gas? How will it be possible to meet the long-term lifetime of such infrastructures with the 2020 peak?
Is the combination of international regulations  and the Environmental Social Responsibility of the private energy companies enough to address the exit strategy from fossil fuels?

Another test is the “parallel” case of China and USA

According to the head of the International Energy Agency, Nobuo Tanaka, “China’s emissions need to peak by 2020. Without such commitment from China, halving CO2 emissions by 2050, is simply impossible”.
According to the Chinese government, the 2020 peak target  combined with a projected 36 % cut in coal consumption by 2050, will force China to sacrifice economic growth.
China has already pledged to reduce energy intensity (CO2 emissions/GDP) by 40-45 % by 2020.  Today China is the biggest global investor in renewables, nuclear and carbon capture&storage technologies.
In addition, China’s per capita emissions , in comparison with USA, are 3 times lower in 2010, and are predicted to be 2,5 times lower in 2020.

As noted by Amy Heinzerling of the Earth Policy Instituter, 22% of China emissions come  from the production of exported goods, while goods imported by USA are responsible for 190 million tons of emissions per year.

Further domestic and international commitments made by China can be considered only if USA and the most developed countries make proportional and comparable commitments.  These commitments also depend on the efforts supported by multilateral/bilateral technology and financial cooperation in China.
Otherwise  China’s peak of emissions will be reached between 2030-2040,  under the present domestic policies and measures.

The United States have not been able to make commitments  to reduce emissions and shift from fossil fuel to a low carbon economy.
In September 1999, the US Senate rejected the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, proposed by the Clinton Administration, considering that the international treaty would affect the energy security and the national sovereignty of USA.

In 2010, the US Senate refused to examine the draft law for the introduction of limits to CO2 emissions through a mechanism similar to the European one. This occurred because of missing cost estimates and serious concerns regarding the effects on energy security and on the national sovereignty.
Furthermore, US Senate expressed its uneasiness to accept commitments that emerging economies, such as China and India, have not shared.

Meanwhile, in 2010, the EU countries and Japan, with comparable standards of life in  USA, emit only half per capita CO2. This is a case of unfair competition by  USA with EU and Japan because of unequal commitments for the emissions reduction.

A new leadership for Europe?

The European Council on October 28 suggested  “a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, as part of a wider outcome including the perspective of the global and comprehensive framework engaging all major economies “
Perhaps it is time that the EU  acknowledge that the Kyoto format is not adequate to meet the multiple challenges of climate change, low carbon economy and energy security.
Rather than focusing on complex legal structures and the construction of a new international bureaucracy on climate change, Europe should focus on promoting international projects. These projects will face the global technological challenge using the great potential of the European integrated economy, which has already achieved important levels of efficiency and innovation.
Europe should test the possible rules and measures necessary to promote a global “de-carbonized” economy able to sustain growth and reduce emissions, building a European “Global Platform” based on the three technological pillars: energy efficiency, renewable energy and nuclear energy, also including forestry management.

In this perspective, it is necessary to work at two levels:

The national level: through common EU policies and strategies on technologies and financing measures.  In spite of the framework established by the “climate and energy package” the lack of harmonized measures for energy efficiency, efficiency standards for renewables, nuclear, energy fiscal policy, agriculture and animal husbandry, forestry management, financing for research and development, hinder the valorization and development of the European potential to build a “green” and “de-carbonized” economy;

The international level: through a new and structured European initiative for the technological cooperation with emerging economies and with USA/Canada/Japan in order to use the European platform as a “Hub” for the global innovation and dissemination of low-carbon technologies. The technological initiative could represent an evolution of the Kyoto Protocol JI and CDM mechanisms.

The Threat of Climate Change: the Need of Adaptation Measures

Waiting for USA and China,  no agreement will be effective, and tackling global climate change will be more difficult, also because of the increasing CO2 concentration in the atmosphere.
The Atmosphere CO2 stabilization at 450 ppm is difficult to achieve.
Some scientific institutions suggest the consideration of more realistic targets, taking into account that the CO2 concentration, due to carbon cycle, is the result of both the emissions and the carbon dioxide already “stored” in the atmosphere.
According to EPRI (2009), two stabilization targets could be considered, taking into account the radiative forcing and the relative increasing in the mean global temperature.

Click to enlarge

Stabilization at 550 ppm  (target 3,7) which corresponds to + 2,5 °C,  requires too strong of a commitment even if postponed, in the deviation from the emissions baseline.
Stabilization at 650 ppm ( target 4,5) which corresponds + 3 °C,  requires challenging global measures  which address the emissions reduction and the adaptation to the effects of the temperature increasing above 2°C

However, as the temperature is increasing, extreme events may occur with greater frequency and intensity.

Last summer many regions and countries  were affected by extreme events, worse than any other in the historical record, with high economic costs and the loss of thousands of lives: flooding in Pakistan, Western China, and India; heat waves in eastern USA, parts of Africa and  Asia, and Russia with unprecedented drought and fires.

According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, in the first six months of the year 2010, the average temperatures were the warmest on record, in accordance with the trend of the recent decades.
Statistics show that the added heat in the atmosphere in the last decades is the driving force for the worsening of the extreme events.

Locally, “some extreme events occurring over a relatively short time period, especially in close proximity, could mutually reinforce each other in such a way that the resulting cascade of consequences becomes a global catastrophe.” Other extreme events can have secondary consequences that generate additional, substantial damage.   Secondary consequences, in turn, can trigger tertiary consequences that further amplify the adverse consequences, and so on” (“Responding to Threats of Climate Change Mega-Catastrophes”, Carolyn Kousky and others, 2009).

Pitcure from  “Climate Change and its possible security implications” – Report of the Secretary General to the General Assembly (September 2009) Click to enlarge

Drought and/or flooding, are the best examples of extreme events, which generate multiple effects: food and water shortage, loss of cultivated areas, devastation of urbanized areas in the coastal zones, migration of the populations, regional conflicts, and political instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world.
Projected climate change will seriously exacerbate already marginal living standards in many Asian, African, and Middle Eastern nations, causing widespread political instability and the likelihood of failed states.
According to UN secretariat (2009) the multiplier threat of climate change should be addressed while considering the adaptation (prevention policies) and the international assistance in the case of the extreme events.
Until now, such policies  have not been put in place.
This is an additional and urgent task for the international community.

References

• Geoffrey J. Blanford, International Participation in Post-Kyoto Climate Policy, Epri 2009
• Amy Heinzerling, Global Carbon Dioxide Emissions Fall in 2009 – Past Decade Still Sees Rapid Emissions Growth, Earth Policy Institute, July 2010
• International Energy Agency  – World Energy Outlook 2010
• International Energy Agency  – 2010 Energy Technology Perspectives (pdf)
• International Energy Agency  – World Energy Outlook 2009
• Martin I. Ioffert, Climate Change: Farewell to Fossil Fuels?, Science, 10 september 2010
• Carolyn Kousky, Olga Rostapshova, Michael A. Toman, Richard Zeckhauser, Responding to Threats of Climate Change Mega-Catastrophes, RFF Discussion Paper 09-45, November 2009
• Richard Richels, Feasible Climate Targets, Epri 2009 (pdf)
• UN General Assembly, Climate Change and its possible security implications – Report of the Secretary General to the General Assembly, September 2009

Picture from the album Flickr: {link:http://www.flickr.com/photos/fotogezi/2887406194/} voyageAnatolia.blogspot.com {/link}

“The first issue is that anything that results in foreign policy from any particular government whether it’s a developed country or a developing country is really based on the domestic policies of those countries. You can’t have foreign policy without a foundation of domestic policy. Basically what is this going to cost to deal with it? I think that’s true in the US, it’s true in the EU, and it’s certainly true in the Brics countries”.

To achieve a new climate agreement we need both domestic and global policy, Ray Kopp (Resources for the Future – RFF) says in this video interview to Climate Science&Policy

Challenges for a Post-Kyoto Agreement

Read the full transcript

USA and Developing Countries. Domestic and International Initiatives in Climate Policy

Read the full transcript

Resource for the Future and the Think Tank’s Role in Climate Change Policy

Read the full transcript

The Oil Spill and Its Impact in the American Debate

Read the full transcript

Image by {link:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tehran_Pollution.jpg} Matthias Blume on WikiMedia Commons {/link}

* The views of the authors do not necessarily represent the views of the OECD or of its member countries.

After Copenhagen, concerns over an uneven playing field for producers, caused by regional differences in climate mitigation policies, appear to be heightened. Consequently, the debate over protective measures continues, focusing largely on carbon-based border tax adjustments (BTAs).

In Europe, citing concerns over fair play for industries and jobs, French President Sarkozy has repeated calls for a carbon tax on imports into Europe, to be applied to countries that fail to implement a climate change mitigation policy. Yet the European Commissioner for Trade, Karel De Gucht, opposes this approach, citing apprehension about inciting trade wars (Chaffin et al, 2010). While the European Council concluded in October 2009 that the first-best solution to address carbon leakage is with a broad and deep climate deal, it left the option available to use appropriate measures to address the risk of leakage, and continues to evaluate additional approaches to address competitiveness (EC, 2009 and EC, 2010).

In the United States, similar fears have resulted in provisions for BTAs in the Waxman-Markey bill passed by the House of Representatives in 2009, and the Kerry-Lieberman bill introduced (and subsequently abandoned) in the Senate in 2010. The draft cap and trade policy in both bills included additional allowances for affected industries based on output (Waxman-Markey, 2009; Kerry-Lieberman, 2010). The extent of competitiveness concerns in the Congress was underscored in a letter to President Obama from nine Democrat Senators in December 2009, noting that “any new US climate change laws should establish a national system of border adjustments, in concert with emission allowances or rebates to trade- and energy-intensive sectors of the economy” (Broder, 2009).

In response, key trading partners are voicing their concerns. India along with the G-77 and China have been calling for language in the draft text of the UN climate negotiations that would caution against developed countries resorting to BTAs and other countervailing border measures (Khor, 2009).

Political debates about BTAs confuse several of the underlying issues. To clarify, there are two related issues of concern for countries taking on climate action:

1. that some of their domestic industrial production will lose competitiveness, and
2. that part of their efforts will be undermined by an increase in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions elsewhere, or “carbon leakage”.

In economic terms, loss of competitiveness stems from relative price differentials in traded goods: companies confronted with a relatively stringent climate policy will have higher production costs than competitors without such constraints. Insofar as this leads to a shift in economic activity towards regions with a less stringent or no climate policy, this will increase emissions in these new locations (leakage). There is, however, a second indirect channel driving leakage: policy dampens world energy demand, which puts downward pressure on global energy prices that in turn increases demand for GHG-emitting fuels in locations where emissions are not constrained.

Figure 1 – Carbon leakage with and without BTAs in 2030 Source: OECD ENV-Linkages model (Burniaux et al, 2010) Note: Results shown for scenarios with US, Japan, EU and Annex I respectively acting alone to reach a target of a 50% emission reduction by 2050. Leakage rates are calculated as the ratio of emission changes in non-acting countries over the emission reduction in acting countries or regions. Click to enlarge

The degree of carbon leakage depends on which countries are taking climate action and on differences in the level of stringency of policies. In an illustrative simulation using the OECD ENV-Linkages model, the leakage rate is estimated at almost 12% when the European Union cuts emissions unilaterally by 50% in 2050 from 2005 levels (OECD, 2009). Recent research (Burniaux et al, 2010) shows that similar results would occur if the US or Japan would act alone.  Figure 1 shows these leakage rates for 2030. However, if the effort to achieve a similar level of emission reduction is spread across all Annex I countries simultaneously, carbon leakage becomes negligible, falling to less than 2%. This reflects both the broader country coverage (fewer countries where leakage occurs) and reduced mitigation costs (as efforts are shared). Moreover, not only the magnitude but also the nature of carbon leakage changes with the size and composition of the mitigating coalition: larger coalitions have smaller losses in competitive position but a stronger effect on global fossil fuel prices.

While leakage and competitiveness concerns are inter-related, they can stem from different causes and may require separate policy treatment. Although BTAs could be effective to address leakage stemming from the competitiveness channel for a small group of acting countries, they do not address leakage that occurs through the world fossil fuel markets, nor do they directly address the loss of domestic production. And BTAs come with other costs: they can be damaging to the economy, costly to implement, and could instigate trade wars. The perhaps greater concern of loss of competitiveness for domestic industry should therefore be addressed with more targeted and effective policy levers. This article investigates each of these issues in more detail.

BTAs may reduce carbon leakage from the competitiveness channel

BTAs help to reduce the leakage rate when the coalition of acting countries is small by limiting the competitiveness channel. As the number of acting countries increases, the role and the effectiveness of BTAs decline rapidly, because leakage rates are much lower and tariffs address a smaller share of remaining leakage.

The effectiveness of BTAs in reducing leakage also depends on which channel of leakage is dominant. OECD (2009) analysis shows that if the EU were to act alone, and were to supplement its domestic action with a carbon-based border tax adjustment (calculated on the imported direct and indirect carbon content), then leakage disappears. Burniaux et al (2010) find that BTAs are also effective at limiting leakage when Japan acts alone. But if the USA implements a BTA, or all Annex1 countries together, then a BTA is less effective at reducing leakage; in the case of the USA acting alone, the BTA would reduce the amount of leakage by an estimated 2.5 percentage-points (Ross et al, 2009; Burniaux et al, 2010). This is because in these cases the major channel of leakage is not the loss of competitive position, but rather the second channel through international fossil fuel prices.

Figure 2: Impact of BTAs on production volumes of energy-intensive industries in 2030 Source: OECD ENV-Linkages model (Burniaux et al, 2010) Note: Results shown for scenarios with EU and US respectively acting alone to reach a target of a 50% emission reduction by 2050. Click to enlarge

BTAs fail to protect domestic industry

Although addressing competitiveness concerns is often voiced as a rationale for BTAs, analysis shows that BTAs may not curb the output losses incurred by domestic energy‑intensive industries. While carbon leakage may become very small with a large acting coalition, the impact of carbon pricing on the output of energy‑intensive industries in domestic and international markets may still be large in some countries, reflecting a shift in economic structure away from carbon‑intensive production. As Figure 2 shows, in certain cases (e.g. when the EU acts alone), BTAs can actually worsen the impact on the domestic energy-intensive industry. This is due to several factors, including the impact of BTAs on exchange rates and terms of trade, and the (usually large) share of imports of energy-intensive goods demanded by a number of domestic energy-intensive industries (for instance, car companies import huge amounts of steel products). The impact of BTAs on trading partners depends, in part, on the degree of international linkage and the relative energy-efficiency of trading partner industries.  For example, if the EU implements a BTA, Canada and the USA may actually benefit in comparison to less energy-efficient competitors, such as China, who will be impacted negatively.

Figure 3: Real GDP and welfare impacts in 2030 Source: OECD ENV-Linkages model (Burniaux et al, 2010) Note: Results shown for acting countries, the rest of the world (‘Non-Acting’) and global average for simulation scenarios with US, Japan, EU and Annex I respectively acting alone to reach a target of 50% emission reduction by 2050. Welfare is measured by equivalent variation in household income; it does not incorporate impacts of climate change. GDP and welfare are expressed in percentage change from the baseline. Click to enlarge

BTAs come at a cost

Clearly, BTAs can entail substantial economic losses when looking globally and particularly for non‑participating trading partners. For instance, in a scenario where Annex I countries cut their emissions unilaterally by 50% by 2050, BTAs help reduce world emissions, but the cost to non-acting countries’ GDP in 2030 would increase substantially as shown in Figure 3. The costs to world GDP would also increase as the BTA policy reduces global international trade.

BTAs improve welfare for the implementing country, but negatively impact global welfare. Figure 3 illustrates results from the OECD ENV-Linkages model (Burniaux et al, 2010), showing this negative effect on global consumer welfare, as reduced losses in acting countries cannot compensate fully for the additional losses in other countries. These effects are in line with existing estimates of other recent modelling studies (Mattoo et al, 2009; Dong and Whalley, 2009).

An interesting result for acting countries is that even if welfare is improved by imposing BTAs, they still have a negative impact on GDP (Figure 3). In the ENV-Linkages model the welfare improvement is the consequence of a positive effect on terms of trade; even though the policy increases import prices, export prices increase relatively more.

BTAs have additional complications

Apart from the disadvantages of BTAs in terms of aggregate mitigation costs and failure to protect domestic industry, they are also likely to be difficult and costly to implement. There are inherent challenges in measuring the emissions embodied in the full production cycle of goods abroad, including foreign emissions from production, combustion and indirect electricity use.

In addition, there are potential political implications of BTAs. Protectionist policies could incite retaliation from trading partners. BTAs could also face legal challenges by members of the World Trade Organisation. On the other hand, the “threat” of using BTAs may incite broader and deeper participation in a carbon market by trading partners. While this may hold to some extent for certain countries, it is uncertain that it will be credible for strong trading partners such as China.

More effective policy levers

Clearly the first-best option to address carbon leakage and loss of competitiveness would be to have global coverage of a climate policy. But given these uncertain times for the carbon market, the threat of BTAs is likely to remain. Yet considering the wide range of countries that have associated with the Copenhagen Accord and/or pledged mitigation targets and actions for 2020, even as a fragmented carbon market develops, leakage is likely to be very limited. BTAs are only effective in addressing leakage through one of the channels, do not directly address the loss of domestic production, and are costly. Thus the real focus should be on exploring more effective policy options to level the playing field than BTAs.

References:

• Broder, John M. (2009), “In Letter to Obama, Senators State Conditions for Supporting Climate Bill”, The New York Times, 3 December, (web).
• Burniaux J.M., J. Chateau, and R. Duval (2010), “Is there a case for carbon-based border tax adjustment? An applied general equilibrium analysis”, OECD Economic Department Working Paper No. 794, July 2010, (web)
• Chaffin, J., N. Tait and T. Barber (2010), “Trade War Fears Raised on Carbon Border Tax”, Financial Times, 12 January.
• Dong, Y. and J. Whalley (2009), “How Large Are the Impacts of Carbon Motivated Border Tax Adjustments”, Working Paper 15613, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts, (web)
• EC (2009), “Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (29/30 October 2009)”, 15265/1/09 REV 1, (web).
• EC (2010), “Analysis of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions and assessing the risk of carbon leakage”, COM(2010) 265 final, Brussels 26.5.2010.
• Khor, M. and H. Jhamtani (2009), “India, G77 Propose Text Against Trade Protection in Copenhagen Draft”, South Bulletin (Issue 40), South Centre, 10 September 2009,  (web).
• Kerry-Lieberman (2010), “American Power Act”, http://kerry.senate.gov/work/issues/issue/?id=7f6b4d4a-da4a-409e-a5e7-15567cc9e95c.
• Mattoo, A., A. Subramanian, D. van der Mensbrugghe, and J. He. (2009), “Reconciling Climate Change and trade Policy”, World Bank, CGD Working Paper No 189, November 2009.
• OECD (2009), Economics of Climate Change Mitigation: Policies and Options for Global Action beyond 2010, (web).
• Ross, M., A. Fawcett, A. and C. Clapp (2009), “U.S. Climate Mitigation Pathways Post-2012: Transition Scenarios in ADAGE.” Energy Economics, (web).
• Waxman-Markey (2009), “The American Clean Energy and Security Act (H.R. 2454)”, (web).

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In our surveys among climate scientists, we have asked – among others questions – also how well the components of climate models would perform. Three surveys were run in 1998, 2003 and 2008. They sampled mostly North Americans, Britons and Germans (CLISCI – for further details, such as sampling, return rates and related issues, refer to Bray, 2010a,b). A fourth survey was conducted in 2010 among climate scientists dealing with climate, climate change and impact in the Baltic Sea region with a majority of Scandinavian and Baltic participants (this was done in the framework of BALTEX; details, see Bray 2010c). In the following we will refer to CLISCI 1998, CLISCI 2003, CLISCI 2008 and BALTEX 2010.

The surveys CLISCI 2008 and BALTEX 2010 allowed to broadly identifying “modellers”, and consequently “non-modellers”. While in CLISCI this was explicitly asked, we cavalierly assigned scientists “dealing with past and ongoing climate change” as well as “projections of climate change” to the modeller-category.

We address three questions on the confidence scientists have on climate models

1. Has the confidence increased since the first survey CLISCI 1998?
2. Is there a difference between the “global” (CLISCI)-group and the Baltic Sea group (BALTEX)?
3. Is there a difference in confidence between “modellers” and “non-modellers”?

For brevity, we limit our discussion to two atmospheric components, namely hydrodynamics and clouds (cf. Washington and Parkinson, 2005). Among climate modellers the former is considered relatively uncontested, while serious problem are acknowledged with the latter (see also below). Respondents were asked to reply on a 1-7 scale, with 1 representing no confidence at all, while a 7 would go with absolute confidence. A value of 4 designates a position of somewhat indifference.

In brief the results are – the confidence, as logged by the answers of our respondents, has not only not increased but actually decreased since 1993. “Modellers” differentiate their confidence – they have reasonable confidence in the representation of hydrodynamics but little confidence in the representation of clouds in climate models – the “non modellers” have a more uniform confidence. Finally, the BALTEX group is considerably more optimistic than the CLISCI respondents.

The temporal development of the opinion of all respondents in the four surveys is shown in Figure 1; the means are listed in Table 1.

Table 1 click to enlarge

All differences are significantly (risk  5%) nonzero, apart of CLISCI 1998/2003 (hydrodynamics and clouds) and CLISCI 1998/BALTEX (hydrodynamics).

The confidence in the description of the hydrodynamics declined monotonously in the CLISCI samples from 1998 until 2008, and was in 2008 half point below the BALTEX 2010 level. This is surprising, first because half a point is a large difference, second because between CLISCI 2008 and BALTEX 2010 was the “crisis”, associated with “ClimateGate” and the failure of COP-15. The situation is similar with the clouds, with an even larger difference in the median.

Figure 1: Confidence expressed by all respondents, as recorded in the CLISCI 1998, 2003 and 2008 surveys (in green) an in the BALTEX 2010 survey (blue). Click to enlarge

Obviously the two surveys CLISCI and BALTEX have not sampled the same populations, even if a joint feature is the confidence in the functioning of the hydrodynamics, while there is clear scepticism with clouds. If the difference is mostly reflecting different cultural perceptions and trust in science in general, remains to be seen.

When selecting from the CLISCI 2008-sample only the Northern European (almost all Germans or Dutch) respondents, the hydrodynamics mean went up to 4.43, which is however still significantly less than the 4.81 of BALTEX 2010. In CLISCI there were hardly any Scandinavian, Polish, Russian and Baltic state participants, while in BALTEX two thirds of the surveyed scientists were from these countries. A remarkable detail is the high percentage of about 15% of “7″ in case of BALTEX/hydrodynamics. In CLISCI hardly ever a response rate of 10% for 7 occurred.

Finally, we examined if there would be a significant difference between “modellers” and “non-modellers”; the distributions are shown in Figure 2, the means are listed in this Table 2.

Table 2 click to enlarge

Here significance, i.e., inconsistency with a true zero difference, is established for the differences within CLISCI 2008, and between CLISCI 2008 and BALTEX, but not within BALTEX (modellers vs. non-modellers). The latter is certainly due to the considerably smaller sample of BALTEX.
Not really surprisingly, “non-modellers” discriminate less between the two components – the difference “hydrodynamics – clouds” in CLISCI 2008 is 0.63, and in BALTEX 0.46 – compared to the “modellers”, which consistently gave the representation of hydrodynamics an assessment larger than 4, and that of clouds less than 4. For the modellers, who know better, the differences were much larger, namely 1.84 (CLISCI 2008) and 1.67 (BALTEX 2010). In both cases, the non-modellers vote for numbers closer to the indifferent value of 4 than the modellers.

Figure 2. Confidence in the ability of contemporary climate models to describe properly atmospheric hydrodynamics and clouds among “modellers” and “non-modellers”. Top two diagrams: CLISCI 2008, bottom two diagrams. BALTEX 2010; left diagrams: hydrodynamics, right diagrams: clouds. Click to enlarge

Interestingly, in all cases, modellers and non-modellers, hydrodynamics and clouds, the BALTEX 2010 sample is more confident than the CLISCI 2008, underscoring the difference between the two considered populations.

Thus, the three questions raised, may be answered in this way:
1.The confidence in the model has not been increased, at least not in the CLISCI sample, covering mostly North America, UK and Germany.
2.The BALTEX-scientists have generally a more confident view of the climate models.
3.”Non-modellers” do not understand the different quality of representing such different subsystems as hydrodynamics and clouds in climate models. “Modellers” are mostly well aware of these differences, which is illustrated by the fact that Working Group I of the Fifth Assessment report (AR5) of IPCC will have an extra chapter on clouds and aerosols.

References:

• Bray, D., 2010a: Consensus among climate scientists revisited. Env. Sci. Policy, in press.
• Bray, D., and H. von Storch, 2009: ‘Prediction’ or ‘Projection’? The nomenclature of climate science. Sci. Comm. 30, 534-543, doi:10.1177/1075547009333698
• Bray, D., 2010c: Baltic Climate Scientists Assessment of Climate Change and Climate Science in the Baltic Sea Basin. BALTEX report, in press
• Washington, W.M. and C.L. Parkinson, 2005: An Introduction to Three-Dimensional Climate Modelling. 2nd edition, University Science Books, Sausalito, California, 354 pp. (1st edition, 1986, 422 pp)

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The climate issue requires both scientific analysis and political decision-making. Perceiving climatic impacts, possibilities and necessities through the lens of political interests will hardly achieve long-term success. Quite to the contrary, a dispassionate scientific analysis is needed to present the various options in detail and thus to enable normative political decisions. To this end, climate research is in need of self-reflection. Fundamental scientific values such as contradiction, openness, sustainability, independence of individuals and falsification, enable science to unfold its potential as an action-guiding knowledge provider. For this purpose – Hans von Storch (GKSS Research Centre and) and Nico Stehr (Zeppelin University, Friedrichshafen) explain – the natural sciences need input from the social sciences, cultural studies and a discerning public.

Knowledge of climate change

The global climate − what we call the statistics of our weather − is changing due to the impact of human activities. Temperature frequency distributions are presently witnessing a shift towards higher values that will continue almost everywhere in the foreseeable future; sea levels are rising and rainfall quantities are changing.
Some, but not all, extremes will change. The primary motor behind these changes is the release of greenhouse gases. That is the scientific construct behind man-made climate change.
But what is the public’s perception of climate change? That the climate is changing because of humanity. That the weather is less reliable than it used to be, and that the seasons are less predictable. Extreme weather takes on catastrophic, unheard-of shapes. What is the reason behind this? Human greed and stupidity.

Post-normal science

If science must remain uncertain in its concrete statements, if scientific statements are of great practical import to formulating policies and making urgent decisions while affecting societal values, then that kind of science is less and less driven by pure “curiosity” but rather by the usefulness of its possible statements to decision-making and politics. It becomes “post-normal”. Methodological quality no longer occupies centre stage, but rather societal acceptance.
Science in its post-normal stage relies on its consistence with cultural constructs. Knowledge claims are not only raised by recognized scientists, but also by other experts serving specific interests.
Climate research is presently in a post-normal state. Its inherent uncertainties are enormous since future projections must be made, and such futures can only be presented in the form of models and under conditions which have yet to be observed. This lack of knowledge has nothing to do with incapacity on the part of the scientists. Rather the problem lies in the scarcity of available facts and in the incomplete nature of instrumental data − it spans much too short a period for the collection of reliable data necessary for the description of climatic variations across decades and centuries. Naturally, arguments exist which favour one answer or the other, and some considerations of plausibility allow us to exclude certain developments as unlikely or even impossible. However, there remains a degree of uncertainty which may not substantially diminish for many years to come.
Under such circumstances, representatives of societal interests tend to pick those knowledge claims which best support their position. The scientifically untenable film The Day After Tomorrow has been praised for increasing public awareness; political and scientific achievements were mixed up when the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Al Gore and the IPCC; professors have explained to the public – from a scientific angle – the supposedly inevitable reactions to the climate change.
In addition to such alarmist tendencies, there is also the skeptical counterpart, manifesting itself in such creations as Micheal Crichton’s State of Fear or the film The Great Swindle.
None of this can be considered what is rather vaguely described as “good science” where critical inquiry, clever testing and unconventional ideas result in real progress, rather than just being useful in the implementation of a policy which is perceived as being right.

The honest broker

But how should scientists deal with the present post-normal situation when both claims – conducting good science and giving sound advice to the public – are accepted as legitimate? For the analysis to achieve depth and substance it needs the help of the social sciences and cultural studies. Up to now, these two fields of study have more or less stood on the sidelines, while in fact there exist some excellent examples of successful supplementary social science research, e.g., the “Honest Broker” analysis by Roger A. Pielke, Jr.
According to this analysis, there are five types of scientists who engage in communication with the public in different ways.
“Pure scientists” are essentially driven by curiosity and have little interest in putting their research results in a societal context.
“Science arbiters” enable a correct understanding of indisputable scientific facts.
Both types fit well into “normal” science which is able to answer questions with a high degree of certainty, and whose answers are non-controversial regarding possible societal applications.
“Issue advocates” invest their scientific competence in the furthering of a value-oriented agenda. The consequences of scientific insight are narrowed to an interest-compliant “solution”.
The “honest brokers” widen the scope of practical options, thus enabling the political process to choose the “solution” which is desired by society.
The fifth type refers to the “stealth issue advocates” who are, by way of their actions, “issue advocates”, while pretending to be “science arbiters” or “honest brokers”.
Obviously, the “honest broker” is best suited to enable society to choose solutions to its controversies, despite uncertain knowledge about interconnections and possibilities, in a manner which is both rational and consistent with its values.

Sustainability

Science is a social activity which has the objective of creating new knowledge. Just like any other social activity, science can be conducted sustainably – or not.
Society expects science to create knowledge in order to aid in the understanding of a complex environment. Why do we entrust “science” with this role? The answer lies in the methods used by science. Scientific methods ensure that we are usually offered “coherent” interpretations allowing for actions which lead to the desired outcomes. “Incorrect” interpretations do occur, but tend to be rare. They are usually discovered sooner or later and replaced by a “coherent” interpretation.
According to science theorist Robert K. Merton, there are a few significant principles, such as disinterestedness and organized skepticism which present an idealization which can never be fully realized.
However, such principles do describe what the public views as a prerequisite for accepting knowledge claims. Only if such principles are respected, scientific practice can be conducted in a sustainable way, or, more specifically, only then will the public, the media and decision makers listen to our current post-graduate students as closely 20 years from now as they listen to us scientists today.
So, where does climate research stand when seen in the light of Merton’s criteria? Do self-serving interests influence research results?
There is no agreement on this matter: two camps, the “skeptics” and the “alarmists”, vehemently argue with each other over the political usefulness of their statements, while both groups only partly accept results as “correct” if they contradict their fundamental convictions.
Do knowledge claims undergo critical analysis and attempts at falsification by critical professional colleagues? – This area also has its deficits.
Gradual skepticism is accepted, while radical skepticism is punished by exclusion from the science community. In publicly debated cases over the past four months, falsification has been obstructed by the withholding of data required for duplicating the analysis.
In recent months, public trust in climate research has significantly eroded. For instance, Spiegel magazine questioned people as to whether they were personally fearful of climate change. In 2006, 62% agreed, while in 2010 only 42% agreed; in the US, Gallup asked people whether they believed the dangers of climate change were exaggerated; in 2006, 30% agreed, while in 2010 this figure had risen to 48%.
This erosion of trust is fundamentally based on a change of perception, since the key scientific messages about man-made climate change outlined above remain just as plausible as before.
The problem is that these key messages have been complemented with more messages – for instance regarding the extinction of species or the number of heat-related deaths; these are interesting scientific hypotheses, but they are again and again used argumentatively as politically relevant facts. The exaggerations in the report made by the second IPCC working group can be named as relevant examples.
These exaggerations, while minor in scale, contradicted the principle of sustainability in scientific practice. They made the representations by the IPCC look like a “bubble” which, in the eyes of the public, has now burst.
It is imperative that sustainability be restored; the most important element in this process is to restore the different functions of “politics” and “science”. It is the task of politics to arrive at decisions which have comprehensible and normatively acceptable consequences; science, however, must explain interconnections, independent of normative systems. Politics must not hide behind would-be scientific necessities – such necessities do not exist in climate policy, just as the goal of reducing global warming to two degrees in relation to the pre-industrial status quo has little scientific grounding. Science must not be guided by the political usefulness of its statements.
Politics and science may co-operate well as a team, but their roles and functions are completely different.

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International structure affects the foreign policy issues and the domestic politics; you can’t just prioritise one or the other you have to do both sequentially and simultaneously.
Prof. Robert Keohane (Princeton University) talks about international relations, cap-and trade and a “dual-leadership world” where Usa and China have to take the lead, but you can’t say to say which players can determine the outcomes in the system. How can we get action from people and leaders in climate negotiations?
“In the presence of a deadlock on the traditional ways of solving climate change questions, may be the Economy of Esteem could help us” Prof. Keohane argues in this interview to Climate Science&Policy.

A Two Level Game

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Climate Change and the Economy of Esteem

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Incentives, Credible Actions and Binding Limits for a Global Climate Policy Architecture

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Interrelated Topics for a Multilevel Issue

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USA and China Potential Leadership for Important Players

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