Climate Science and Policy http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu CLISP - Climate Science and Policy Wed, 18 Aug 2010 13:13:06 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.6 en hourly 1 How do scientists assess the skill of climate models? http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/08/how-do-scientists-assess-the-skill-of-climate-models/ http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/08/how-do-scientists-assess-the-skill-of-climate-models/#comments Wed, 18 Aug 2010 13:11:13 +0000 Dennis Bray http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/?p=1097
Pitcure from the {link:http://www.flickr.com/photos/pnnl/3659908105/}PNNL - Pacific Northwest National Laboratory's album in Flickr {/link}

Pitcure from the {link:http://www.flickr.com/photos/pnnl/3659908105/}PNNL - Pacific Northwest National Laboratory's album in Flickr {/link}

In our surveys among climate scientists, we have asked – among others questions – also how well the components of climate models would perform. Three surveys were run in 1998, 2003 and 2008. They sampled mostly North Americans, Britons and Germans (CLISCI – for further details, such as sampling, return rates and related issues, refer to Bray, 2010a,b). A fourth survey was conducted in 2010 among climate scientists dealing with climate, climate change and impact in the Baltic Sea region with a majority of Scandinavian and Baltic participants (this was done in the framework of BALTEX; details, see Bray 2010c). In the following we will refer to CLISCI 1998, CLISCI 2003, CLISCI 2008 and BALTEX 2010.

The surveys CLISCI 2008 and BALTEX 2010 allowed to broadly identifying “modellers”, and consequently “non-modellers”. While in CLISCI this was explicitly asked, we cavalierly assigned scientists “dealing with past and ongoing climate change” as well as “projections of climate change” to the modeller-category.

We address three questions on the confidence scientists have on climate models

  1. Has the confidence increased since the first survey CLISCI 1998?
  2. Is there a difference between the “global” (CLISCI)-group and the Baltic Sea group (BALTEX)?
  3. Is there a difference in confidence between “modellers” and “non-modellers”?

For brevity, we limit our discussion to two atmospheric components, namely hydrodynamics and clouds (cf. Washington and Parkinson, 2005). Among climate modellers the former is considered relatively uncontested, while serious problem are acknowledged with the latter (see also below). Respondents were asked to reply on a 1-7 scale, with 1 representing no confidence at all, while a 7 would go with absolute confidence. A value of 4 designates a position of somewhat indifference.

In brief the results are – the confidence, as logged by the answers of our respondents, has not only not increased but actually decreased since 1993. “Modellers” differentiate their confidence – they have reasonable confidence in the representation of hydrodynamics but little confidence in the representation of clouds in climate models – the “non modellers” have a more uniform confidence. Finally, the BALTEX group is considerably more optimistic than the CLISCI respondents.

The temporal development of the opinion of all respondents in the four surveys is shown in Figure 1; the means are listed in Table 1.

bray_tab_1_0
Table 1
click to enlarge

All differences are significantly (risk  5%) nonzero, apart of CLISCI 1998/2003 (hydrodynamics and clouds) and CLISCI 1998/BALTEX (hydrodynamics).

The confidence in the description of the hydrodynamics declined monotonously in the CLISCI samples from 1998 until 2008, and was in 2008 half point below the BALTEX 2010 level. This is surprising, first because half a point is a large difference, second because between CLISCI 2008 and BALTEX 2010 was the “crisis”, associated with “ClimateGate” and the failure of COP-15. The situation is similar with the clouds, with an even larger difference in the median.

bray_fig1
Figure 1: Confidence expressed by all respondents, as recorded in the CLISCI 1998, 2003 and 2008 surveys (in green) an in the BALTEX 2010 survey (blue).
Click to enlarge

Obviously the two surveys CLISCI and BALTEX have not sampled the same populations, even if a joint feature is the confidence in the functioning of the hydrodynamics, while there is clear scepticism with clouds. If the difference is mostly reflecting different cultural perceptions and trust in science in general, remains to be seen.

When selecting from the CLISCI 2008-sample only the Northern European (almost all Germans or Dutch) respondents, the hydrodynamics mean went up to 4.43, which is however still significantly less than the 4.81 of BALTEX 2010. In CLISCI there were hardly any Scandinavian, Polish, Russian and Baltic state participants, while in BALTEX two thirds of the surveyed scientists were from these countries. A remarkable detail is the high percentage of about 15% of “7″ in case of BALTEX/hydrodynamics. In CLISCI hardly ever a response rate of 10% for 7 occurred.

Finally, we examined if there would be a significant difference between “modellers” and “non-modellers”; the distributions are shown in Figure 2, the means are listed in this Table 2.

bray_tab_2_0
Table 2
click to enlarge

Here significance, i.e., inconsistency with a true zero difference, is established for the differences within CLISCI 2008, and between CLISCI 2008 and BALTEX, but not within BALTEX (modellers vs. non-modellers). The latter is certainly due to the considerably smaller sample of BALTEX.
Not really surprisingly, “non-modellers” discriminate less between the two components – the difference “hydrodynamics – clouds” in CLISCI 2008 is 0.63, and in BALTEX 0.46 – compared to the “modellers”, which consistently gave the representation of hydrodynamics an assessment larger than 4, and that of clouds less than 4. For the modellers, who know better, the differences were much larger, namely 1.84 (CLISCI 2008) and 1.67 (BALTEX 2010). In both cases, the non-modellers vote for numbers closer to the indifferent value of 4 than the modellers.

bray_fig2
Figure 2. Confidence in the ability of contemporary climate models to describe properly atmospheric hydrodynamics and clouds among “modellers” and “non-modellers”. Top two diagrams: CLISCI 2008, bottom two diagrams. BALTEX 2010; left diagrams: hydrodynamics, right diagrams: clouds.
Click to enlarge

Interestingly, in all cases, modellers and non-modellers, hydrodynamics and clouds, the BALTEX 2010 sample is more confident than the CLISCI 2008, underscoring the difference between the two considered populations.

Thus, the three questions raised, may be answered in this way:
1.The confidence in the model has not been increased, at least not in the CLISCI sample, covering mostly North America, UK and Germany.
2.The BALTEX-scientists have generally a more confident view of the climate models.
3.”Non-modellers” do not understand the different quality of representing such different subsystems as hydrodynamics and clouds in climate models. “Modellers” are mostly well aware of these differences, which is illustrated by the fact that Working Group I of the Fifth Assessment report (AR5) of IPCC will have an extra chapter on clouds and aerosols.

References:
  • Bray, D., 2010a: Consensus among climate scientists revisited. Env. Sci. Policy, in press.
  • Bray, D., and H. von Storch, 2009: ‘Prediction’ or ‘Projection’? The nomenclature of climate science. Sci. Comm. 30, 534-543, doi:10.1177/1075547009333698
  • Bray, D., 2010c: Baltic Climate Scientists Assessment of Climate Change and Climate Science in the Baltic Sea Basin. BALTEX report, in press
  • Washington, W.M. and C.L. Parkinson, 2005: An Introduction to Three-Dimensional Climate Modelling. 2nd edition, University Science Books, Sausalito, California, 354 pp. (1st edition, 1986, 422 pp)
]]> http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/08/how-do-scientists-assess-the-skill-of-climate-models/feed/ 0 Knowledge Claims in A Post-Normal Stage: Thoughts on Climate Science and Policy http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/07/knowledge-claims-in-a-post-normal-stage-thoughts-on-climate-science-and-policy/ http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/07/knowledge-claims-in-a-post-normal-stage-thoughts-on-climate-science-and-policy/#comments Tue, 06 Jul 2010 15:25:57 +0000 Hans von Storch http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/?p=1085

{link:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ocean_%26_Earth_System.jpg}WikimediaCommons{/link}

{link:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ocean_%26_Earth_System.jpg}WikimediaCommons{/link}

The climate issue requires both scientific analysis and political decision-making. Perceiving climatic impacts, possibilities and necessities through the lens of political interests will hardly achieve long-term success. Quite to the contrary, a dispassionate scientific analysis is needed to present the various options in detail and thus to enable normative political decisions. To this end, climate research is in need of self-reflection. Fundamental scientific values such as contradiction, openness, sustainability, independence of individuals and falsification, enable science to unfold its potential as an action-guiding knowledge provider. For this purpose – Hans von Storch (GKSS Research Centre and) and Nico Stehr (Zeppelin University, Friedrichshafen) explain – the natural sciences need input from the social sciences, cultural studies and a discerning public.

Knowledge of climate change

The global climate − what we call the statistics of our weather − is changing due to the impact of human activities. Temperature frequency distributions are presently witnessing a shift towards higher values that will continue almost everywhere in the foreseeable future; sea levels are rising and rainfall quantities are changing.
Some, but not all, extremes will change. The primary motor behind these changes is the release of greenhouse gases. That is the scientific construct behind man-made climate change.
But what is the public’s perception of climate change? That the climate is changing because of humanity. That the weather is less reliable than it used to be, and that the seasons are less predictable. Extreme weather takes on catastrophic, unheard-of shapes. What is the reason behind this? Human greed and stupidity.

The original version of this article was published in the newsletter of the Neuenahr-Academy – Europäische Akademie, n. 99, June 2010.
The mechanism behind it: justice – the revenge of nature. If our climate changes, civilization is jeopardized; entire cultures will perish, such as Viking settlements in Greenland. That is the media-cultural construct of climate change, consistent with our culture and perpetuated by our media.
These two constructs compete in their interpretations of a complex environment; they are two “actors” in the knowledge market.
Of course, the practice of science is also influenced by the construct of media and culture because scientists themselves are always also caught up in their own culture. Their culture conditions their perception, guides them in their scientific research and their readiness to accept certain answers as argumentatively sufficient.

Post-normal science

If science must remain uncertain in its concrete statements, if scientific statements are of great practical import to formulating policies and making urgent decisions while affecting societal values, then that kind of science is less and less driven by pure “curiosity” but rather by the usefulness of its possible statements to decision-making and politics. It becomes “post-normal”. Methodological quality no longer occupies centre stage, but rather societal acceptance.
Science in its post-normal stage relies on its consistence with cultural constructs. Knowledge claims are not only raised by recognized scientists, but also by other experts serving specific interests.
Climate research is presently in a post-normal state. Its inherent uncertainties are enormous since future projections must be made, and such futures can only be presented in the form of models and under conditions which have yet to be observed. This lack of knowledge has nothing to do with incapacity on the part of the scientists. Rather the problem lies in the scarcity of available facts and in the incomplete nature of instrumental data − it spans much too short a period for the collection of reliable data necessary for the description of climatic variations across decades and centuries. Naturally, arguments exist which favour one answer or the other, and some considerations of plausibility allow us to exclude certain developments as unlikely or even impossible. However, there remains a degree of uncertainty which may not substantially diminish for many years to come.
Under such circumstances, representatives of societal interests tend to pick those knowledge claims which best support their position. The scientifically untenable film The Day After Tomorrow has been praised for increasing public awareness; political and scientific achievements were mixed up when the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Al Gore and the IPCC; professors have explained to the public – from a scientific angle – the supposedly inevitable reactions to the climate change.
In addition to such alarmist tendencies, there is also the skeptical counterpart, manifesting itself in such creations as Micheal Crichton’s State of Fear or the film The Great Swindle.
None of this can be considered what is rather vaguely described as “good science” where critical inquiry, clever testing and unconventional ideas result in real progress, rather than just being useful in the implementation of a policy which is perceived as being right.

The honest broker

But how should scientists deal with the present post-normal situation when both claims – conducting good science and giving sound advice to the public – are accepted as legitimate? For the analysis to achieve depth and substance it needs the help of the social sciences and cultural studies. Up to now, these two fields of study have more or less stood on the sidelines, while in fact there exist some excellent examples of successful supplementary social science research, e.g., the “Honest Broker” analysis by Roger A. Pielke, Jr.
According to this analysis, there are five types of scientists who engage in communication with the public in different ways.
“Pure scientists” are essentially driven by curiosity and have little interest in putting their research results in a societal context.
“Science arbiters” enable a correct understanding of indisputable scientific facts.
Both types fit well into “normal” science which is able to answer questions with a high degree of certainty, and whose answers are non-controversial regarding possible societal applications.
“Issue advocates” invest their scientific competence in the furthering of a value-oriented agenda. The consequences of scientific insight are narrowed to an interest-compliant “solution”.
The “honest brokers” widen the scope of practical options, thus enabling the political process to choose the “solution” which is desired by society.
The fifth type refers to the “stealth issue advocates” who are, by way of their actions, “issue advocates”, while pretending to be “science arbiters” or “honest brokers”.
Obviously, the “honest broker” is best suited to enable society to choose solutions to its controversies, despite uncertain knowledge about interconnections and possibilities, in a manner which is both rational and consistent with its values.

Sustainability

Science is a social activity which has the objective of creating new knowledge. Just like any other social activity, science can be conducted sustainably – or not.
Society expects science to create knowledge in order to aid in the understanding of a complex environment. Why do we entrust “science” with this role? The answer lies in the methods used by science. Scientific methods ensure that we are usually offered “coherent” interpretations allowing for actions which lead to the desired outcomes. “Incorrect” interpretations do occur, but tend to be rare. They are usually discovered sooner or later and replaced by a “coherent” interpretation.
According to science theorist Robert K. Merton, there are a few significant principles, such as disinterestedness and organized skepticism which present an idealization which can never be fully realized.
However, such principles do describe what the public views as a prerequisite for accepting knowledge claims. Only if such principles are respected, scientific practice can be conducted in a sustainable way, or, more specifically, only then will the public, the media and decision makers listen to our current post-graduate students as closely 20 years from now as they listen to us scientists today.
So, where does climate research stand when seen in the light of Merton’s criteria? Do self-serving interests influence research results?
There is no agreement on this matter: two camps, the “skeptics” and the “alarmists”, vehemently argue with each other over the political usefulness of their statements, while both groups only partly accept results as “correct” if they contradict their fundamental convictions.
Do knowledge claims undergo critical analysis and attempts at falsification by critical professional colleagues? – This area also has its deficits.
Gradual skepticism is accepted, while radical skepticism is punished by exclusion from the science community. In publicly debated cases over the past four months, falsification has been obstructed by the withholding of data required for duplicating the analysis.
In recent months, public trust in climate research has significantly eroded. For instance, Spiegel magazine questioned people as to whether they were personally fearful of climate change. In 2006, 62% agreed, while in 2010 only 42% agreed; in the US, Gallup asked people whether they believed the dangers of climate change were exaggerated; in 2006, 30% agreed, while in 2010 this figure had risen to 48%.
This erosion of trust is fundamentally based on a change of perception, since the key scientific messages about man-made climate change outlined above remain just as plausible as before.
The problem is that these key messages have been complemented with more messages – for instance regarding the extinction of species or the number of heat-related deaths; these are interesting scientific hypotheses, but they are again and again used argumentatively as politically relevant facts. The exaggerations in the report made by the second IPCC working group can be named as relevant examples.
These exaggerations, while minor in scale, contradicted the principle of sustainability in scientific practice. They made the representations by the IPCC look like a “bubble” which, in the eyes of the public, has now burst.
It is imperative that sustainability be restored; the most important element in this process is to restore the different functions of “politics” and “science”. It is the task of politics to arrive at decisions which have comprehensible and normatively acceptable consequences; science, however, must explain interconnections, independent of normative systems. Politics must not hide behind would-be scientific necessities – such necessities do not exist in climate policy, just as the goal of reducing global warming to two degrees in relation to the pre-industrial status quo has little scientific grounding. Science must not be guided by the political usefulness of its statements.
Politics and science may co-operate well as a team, but their roles and functions are completely different.

]]> http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/07/knowledge-claims-in-a-post-normal-stage-thoughts-on-climate-science-and-policy/feed/ 0 International and Domestic Politics: Climate Change as a Two Level Game http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/06/international-and-domestic-politics-climate-change-as-a-two-level-game/ http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/06/international-and-domestic-politics-climate-change-as-a-two-level-game/#comments Wed, 30 Jun 2010 09:54:40 +0000 Robert O. Keohane http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/?p=1063 Picture from {link:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:World_Map_1689.JPG}Wikimedia Commons{/link}

Picture from {link:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:World_Map_1689.JPG}Wikimedia Commons{/link}

International structure affects the foreign policy issues and the domestic politics; you can’t just prioritise one or the other you have to do both sequentially and simultaneously.
Prof. Robert Keohane (Princeton University) talks about international relations, cap-and trade and a “dual-leadership world” where Usa and China have to take the lead, but you can’t say to say which players can determine the outcomes in the system. How can we get action from people and leaders in climate negotiations?
“In the presence of a deadlock on the traditional ways of solving climate change questions, may be the Economy of Esteem could help us” Prof. Keohane argues in this interview to Climate Science&Policy.

A Two Level Game

Climate change is an issue that is described by a two level game in political science; that is you have to do both (international and national level) at the same time. You can’t just prioritise one or the other because the international structure affects the foreign policy issues and the domestic politics. It affects the costs and benefits of the states and therefore the reactions of domestic groups and of course domestic politics shapes what states can do and therefore shapes their bargaining positions and their credibility of their negotiating positions. So you have to do this simultaneously. That’s one reason why it’s so difficult; it requires this mutual back and forth. And this is also true of trade for example; trade is also a two level game. You only get a trade agreement if you both get a negotiation among the major trading partners and at the same time you get a domestic agreement on the trade agreement. So it’s a common phenomenon in international politics but it means you can’t make a choice being one or the other level. You have to do both sequentially and simultaneously.

Climate Change and the Economy of Esteem


You have to start with the basic problem, which is that it’s difficult to find incentives that are self-interested for states and leaders to pursue a responsible climate policy. And we’ve had a hard time doing this. The first best way to do it is with some sort of international agreement that everybody agrees to but we have failed in doing that, so far, at least. So Geofrey Brennan and Philip Pettit have a book on the economy of esteem, a general book from about five or six years ago. And they point out that prizes and prestige and reputation can be important incentives for leaders. So we could think about ways in which we could give prizes to states for taking advance action, prizes to cities or to cooperations. Some sort of awards, a distinction for people who take initiatives on climate change that is giving them reputational incentives to act in a way that otherwise a purely material basis wouldn’t act. It’s one way to think outside of the box as we say, to try to think about ways that may not be the principal way, I’m not at all saying that this is the principal way to solve climate change, but in the presence of a deadlock on the traditional ways of doing it. It’s one way to think about getting some action from some people in some context.

Incentives, Credible Actions and Binding Limits for a Global Climate Policy Architecture


(Talking about cap-and-trade architecture) I think it’s the best way that I have seen so far although you may not call it cap and trade anymore; it’s going to be very complicated. But the basic architecture has the advantage that it enables resources to be transferred from richer countries that are more willing to take action to poorer countries that are reluctant to have binding commitments without public funds explicitly being sent so that if you set up a situation where there were caps on everybody but the caps on the developing countries came into force later or were high enough that there was space, a so-called hot air, between the level of their actual emissions and the cap. They could sell the credits for that amount into the world market or into national carbon markets. So cap and trade is a way of giving material incentives to reluctant developing countries to actually take action. Now, so far they haven’t decided to do this. Partly because the actions by developed countries have not been sufficiently credible, especially the United States, and partly because they are reluctant to accept a binding limit in the condition of uncertainty. But the basic principle of market driven flows of funds that provide incentives to developing countries is I think going to have to be part of any climate architecture. It may not be called cap and trade. It may have lots of different variations to it. It may be safety valves and ways to reassure developing countries that they aren’t locked into a certain cap, which they then can’t meet effectively. But something like it, some adaptation of it will have to be part of the global structure.

Interrelated Topics for a Multilevel Issue


(Environmental topics, energy market, economics, policy and science) all of the above (are important) because you can’t separate them very well; that is you can analyse them somewhat separately but take energy market and climate emissions; those are inseparable. You change the nature of the energy market and you change climate emissions one way or the other. If you look at different sectors, that of course effects the general pattern and the international politics part involves especially the question of bargaining, how the commitments are going to be made via these other commitments and also the question of compliance. That is how you arrange patterns so that once agreements have been made in a very decentralised environment without any normally hierarchal way of forcing compliance, how you use reciprocity in some form to give incentives to states to comply with their commitments or at least to come close enough, they don’t have to always totally comply, but they come close enough where they are actually doing something worthwhile.

USA and China Potential Leadership for Important Players


It’s different to talk about which are the most important players then to say which players can determine the outcomes in the system. China and the US are the most important players. Each of them emitting approximately the same amount, roughly 20% of world emissions. So without them, nothing will happen. And no other blocks except for maybe Europe to some limited extent will take major action without the US and China acting. So their action is necessary, but it’s not sufficient; they can’t dictate terms. Europe is a major actor, India, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Russia are in different ways major actors and the combination of everyone else is also substantial. So you take the 17 or 18 major emitting countries that account for about 85% of the emissions. So all or almost all of them have to somehow be included. Although the US and China have to take the lead, and as long as the US and China are not taking the lead which they are not yet, then everybody else will not just use them as an excuse not to act but it will rightly see that they can’t really act from an economic point of view unless the US and China take action. So they are the key to the logjam but it’s not a bipolar world. They can’t dictate and you could imagine some set of rules that they could propose that everybody else would say this is terrible. For example, rules that were especially helpful to the US and China are bad for everybody else. So it’s not a bipolar world. You might call it a world of dual leadership or potential leadership.

]]> http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/06/international-and-domestic-politics-climate-change-as-a-two-level-game/feed/ 0 Smart Power for Global Climate Negotiations http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/06/smart-power-for-global-climate-negotiations/ http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/06/smart-power-for-global-climate-negotiations/#comments Mon, 28 Jun 2010 08:57:56 +0000 Joseph S. Nye http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/?p=1043

Picture from {link:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Jonesy22}Jonesy22 page in Wikimedia Commons{/link}

Picture from {link:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Jonesy22}Jonesy22 {/link} page in Wikimedia Commons

It could be described as the ability to shape the preferences of others and attract them so that they want what you want. It is Soft Power and it is crucial in order to create a narrative of climate change which is widely accepted. But soft power alone isn’t enough: we need smart power, a combination of soft power and hard power.
Prof. Joseph S. Nye (Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government) talks about the role of transnationl institutions, the new american course on climate policy  and “How could we get everybody into the act and still get action”. “We are going to have to use a variety of international institutions and focus the European phrase, Variable Geometry”, Prof. Nye says to Climate Science&Policy.


Soft, Smart, and Hard. A Combination of Power for International Climate Politics


Soft power, the ability to attract, is set partly by the example: if Europe is doing very well in managing its carbon emissions, that may make it attractive. But its soft power also establishes a narrative, for example the IPCC creates the view, which is widely accepted that there is a major danger from business as usual. Then that narrative creates a tendency for people to want to move in that direction. So that’s another dimension, which is not just an example but also the narrative that’s created. But I would say that soft power alone isn’t enough. There also has to be some hard power which is essentially payments and the payments can take the form of transfers or they could take the form of border adjustment taxes on lets say the carbon content of countries that don’t participate. So, a combination of soft power and hard power is smart power. I think you could find Developing Countries to contribute to this narrative. Obliviously states that are likely to be affected, the Baltic Islands or the various islands that work together in the UN meetings; they also have a certain amount of soft power and so it’s not just the narrative created by the rich or the powerful.

Obama and the New American Course on Climate Politics


Obama has changed the rhetoric of the American decision. In the Bush Administration there was not a favourable rhetoric about climate change. Obama has basically said we take it seriously, we want to work with others, and indeed his participation at Copenhagen helped to rescue something at the end of some political agreement even if not a binding legal treaty. So I think Obama has taken it seriously. The difficulty is more in terms of being able to pass energy legislation at home which depends on the congress and that has been less successful.

Variable Geometry. A Useful Definition for Climate Institutions


I think we are going to have to use a variety of institutions to use the European phrase, “Variable Geometry”. The UN framework is going to be important for legitimisation, but it’s not been very useful for negotiation because there are some countries that basically are spoilers and are not terribly interested. But if you had a G20 that would recover about 85% of the countries that are responsible for emissions then it’s easier to bargain in a smaller group. You’re going to also need some form of representation of those who are most effected to make sure their interests are taken into account so some people are G30 to make sure that that includes the most severely affected countries.

Narratives and Transnational Institutions


Well, transnational institutions can develop a narrative. They can provide the information, which also allows countries to understand their self-interests better. The IPCC I think does that. One could also imagine informal monitoring of those groups that basically give an independent opinion on whether a country which says its going to reduce its carbon intensity, actually is reducing the carbon intensity as much as it says so I think they can play a variety of roles.

USA/China: Are We Coming Back to a Bipolar World?


No, I don’t agree with that. I don’t think you can talk seriously about solving climate problems with just the US and China. Europe is still an economy, which is larger than the US, slightly. And Japan is still an economy, which is about the same size as China. So to imagine trying to deal with a trans-national global problem like climate without Europe and Japan doesn’t make sense. So I think we are going to need ways in which we organise the major stings to work out hard bargains about how we are going to solve this and that’s obliviously going to have to include the US and China since those are the two largest emitters but it’s also going to have to include Europe, Japan and a number of other countries.

Get Everybody into The Act. International Relations and Climate Change


Well, I think at this stage we need to think a lot about the International Relations. In other words, how do you organise so that we can manage this? There is a wonderful expression by a diplomat named Harlan Cleveland, which was, “How do you get everybody into the act and still get action?” And that problem is with us in climate change. When you are dealing with 192 countries all together at the same time, everybody’s in the act but it’s hard to get action. At the other hand you need to find ways if you have bargaining among smaller groups to relate back to the larger groups for legitimacy and enforcement so I think international relations and looking at the problem of institutions is going to be an essential question.

]]> http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/06/smart-power-for-global-climate-negotiations/feed/ 0 Low Carbon Economies: a necessity and a political possibility http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/06/low-carbon-economies-a-necessity-and-a-political-possibility/ http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/06/low-carbon-economies-a-necessity-and-a-political-possibility/#comments Thu, 03 Jun 2010 15:23:15 +0000 Thomas C. Heller http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/?p=1031 {link:http://www.flickr.com/photos/cobalt/}Pitcure from cobalt123's albun in Flickr{/link}

{link:http://www.flickr.com/photos/cobalt/}Pitcure from cobalt123's albun in Flickr{/link}

We have learned great deal at Copenhagen: whatever agreement we will come to, it has to be about the quality of economic growth and the way that it goes forward.
Interviewed by FEEM, Prof. Thomas Heller (Stanford University and Executive Director at Climate Policy Initiative) explains why, after the Cop15, we have now a better sense of what the problem is and where the solutions lie.
“It’s the same for all policy – Prof. Heller says – no matter how well it is designed, no matter how well it is intended, there are always questions about how it is implemented or how effective will it be”.

Would you please tell us what are in your opinion, the major achievements of the Copenhagen Accord?
I think we’ve learned a great deal at Copenhagen about the way that we have to move forward. I would say that among the things that we learned we found that whatever agreements we come to cannot be about limiting economic growth, it has to be about the quality of economic growth and the way that it goes forward. I think we’ve also learned that it is essential to involve the Heads of State and Ministers from across the governments who are concerned about the nature of growth and are looking to alternative means to determine how they can have both economic well-being for their people and the lower carbon footprint. And I think finally we learned that it’s going to take us a while in key countries all around the world both Developed and Developing to understand these alternative pathways in a practical sense. How one grows and at the same time increases the value we get from resources in ways that do not produce the waste, the by-products, the carbon that we are doing in our current modes of industrialization. So I think we have a better sense of what the problem is and where the solutions lie if we also have at the same time an understanding that this will take time and much has to go on below the international negotiations to prepare the foundations with which nations can approach these questions with greater confidence.

What are the most critical open questions, where are the gaps, and what needs to be done before the next important meeting in Mexico?
I would say the next round of negotiations in Cancun and in South Africa the year following are basically about restoring the trust that has become broken very evidently in the negotiations. The Developing Countries do not believe that concrete actions which always involve in the short run, making investments or spending money to change infrastructure to preserve the livelihoods of people in the forests of the world. They don’t really believe these things are forthcoming. So I don’t think what is lacking right now is a grand vision. I think it is concrete progress on a couple of issues: mainly forestry, some concern with adaptation, and some money that actually begins to flow whether through fast start or not fast start funding that begins to have a promise that all of this is not just talk but really the beginnings of action.

Please tell us about CPI, and how CPI may help answer key questions, providing precious insights to the current climate change debate.
The CPI is a new organisation and it’s one that looks forward to the changing world in which I think low carbon economies are both a necessity and a political possibility. The CPI notes the fact that in China, in India, in many states in the United States even if the federal government has not acted, in Europe, there is an increasingly wide portfolio of public policies being taken. Sometimes they are regulation, like renewables mandates. Sometimes they are market instruments like the ETS, and sometimes they are public spending as we’ve seen in the various stimulus programs around the world. And like all policy, no matter how well it is designed, no matter how well it is intended, there are always questions about how it is implemented or how effective will it be. And CPI’s job is to work in many of the major Developing and Developed Countries to help everyone see whether the policies are working. And to the extend that they are doing less well than people who design them hope to work with governments and with firms and with households to try and improve the performance to achieve the goals that low carbon economies have brought to governments.

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]]> http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/06/low-carbon-economies-a-necessity-and-a-political-possibility/feed/ 0 From Global Agreements to Micro Insurance, the Way for an Effective Adaptation http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/05/adaptation-and-the-way-to-be-effective-from-global-agreements-to-micro-insurance/ http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/05/adaptation-and-the-way-to-be-effective-from-global-agreements-to-micro-insurance/#comments Fri, 07 May 2010 16:11:23 +0000 Ian Burton http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/?p=995 Picture by {link:http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_zoom&Itemid=103}Grameen Bank Photo Gallery{/link}

Picture by {link:http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_zoom&Itemid=103}Grameen Bank Photo Gallery{/link}

It is going to be more and more imperative that countries around the world and people everywhere (nobody is excluded from this) will need to learn to cope with the impacts of climate change. What is really needed is money to help strengthen the capacity and the ability of poorer people with lower livelihoods through education and intermediate levels of technology to strengthen their livelihoods and their economy. “We should be able to help strengthen the capacity and the ability of poorer people with lower livelihoods” Prof. Ian Burton says. Micro insurance would help people in the period of risk and it could be provided in a manner which would encourage people to take adaptive actions. “It is an idea both of spreading risks and of helping to promote the idea of adaptation” Prof. Burton explains.
Watch at the video interview with Ian Burton at the International Workshop The Social Dimension of Adaptation to Climate Change in Venice

After Copenhagen: Adaptation and International Negotiations

In the last five years or more the profile of adaptation in the negotiations has become more and more important. People are realising that the issue of controlling the emissions of greenhouse gases is going to be very difficult and it is going to take a long time for political, economic, and technical reasons

I firstly think that the discussions and negotiations on adaptation are going very well compared to the discussions of mitigation on greenhouse gases, which are stalled in a very difficult place. In the last five years or more, the profile of adaptation in the negotiations has become more and more important. I think one reason for that is that the people, the negotiators, and the countries are realising that the issue of controlling the emissions of greenhouse gases is going to be very difficult and it is going to take a long time for political, economic, and technical reasons. Therefore it is going to be more and more imperative that countries around the world and people everywhere (nobody is excluded from this) will need to learn to cope with the impacts of climate change. I think this was very well reflected in the Copenhagen negotiations, although no specific conclusions were reached at that time.

Risks and Dangers for Adaptation Investments

What is really needed is money to help strengthen the capacity and the ability of poorer people with lower livelihoods through education and intermediate levels of technology to strengthen their livelihoods and their economy. But the large amount of money that the Copenhagen Accord promises for poorest countries could become lumpy investment if handled by large institutions only for large projects

One of the things that was said at Copenhagen is that the Copenhagen Accord (the political agreement, not the binding agreement that we had hoped would emerge) made a promise on behalf of the rich donor nations that there would be somewhere around 20 to 30 billion dollars a year made available for adaptation within the next 2 or 3 years, rising by 2020, to a hundred billion dollars a year. This is almost the equivalent of all the amount of foreign aid that is given today. A huge amount of money was promised to help especially the poorer developing countries and the small island states adapt to climate change. You can be sceptical about that. If that order of money came about it would be extraordinarily difficult to manage it in an effective way. In consequence, it would probably be handled to very large institutions that are used to handling large sums of money like the World Bank, for example. Typically they spend their money on large investments. I think that the danger of giving a large amount of money that is suggested for the purposes of adaptation in very poor countries at the moment, is that a lot of that adaptation will be going to very large engineering projects: seawalls, big dams for irrigation, and so on. What is really needed is money to help strengthen the capacity and the ability of poorer people with lower livelihoods through education and intermediate levels of technology to strengthen their livelihoods and their economy. I’m afraid that large amounts of money would then go because it is more efficient to manage large amounts of money by giving it out in big chunks. That’s what I mean by lumpy investment. While we will need some of that, no doubt, I think that there is a danger that we will get altogether too much of it.

Adaptation to Climate Change: Micro Insurance and Its Opportunities

It is an idea both of spreading risks and of helping to promote the idea of adaptation.
Most of the activities of the livelihoods of poor people in poor countries are not covered by insurance. In the same way we did with microfinance, micro insurance would help people over the period of risk and it could be provide in a manner which would encourage them to take adaptive actions

What we’ve seen in the developing world in the last 20 years or so, is something called the development of microfinance. This was developed initially by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and has spread quite widely among developing countries. It gives very small amounts of capital, which the private capital market does not supply. It gives small amounts of capital for people to invest in small villages and domestic industries, which can strengthen people’s livelihoods, increase their capacity to adapt to climate variability in change, and gradually increase their wealth and opportunities. Now you can expand microfinance by including an insurance element at a very low level. Most of the activities of the livelihoods of poor people in poor countries are not covered by insurance. There is virtually no insurance industry in those countries and certainly not at the rural level. If you could start in the way that we did with microfinance, micro insurance would help tied people over the period of risk with the experience of drought, flood, or some other adverse climate effect. Moreover, you could provide that insurance in a manner, which would encourage them to take adaptive actions. In other words, if the micro insurance were to be provided by some form of public or private cooperation, there could be a public element that helps to provide the insurance at an affordable rate for the people until such time as their resources and their wealth has sufficiently increased to be able to afford to pay the full actual rate of the premium themselves. It is an idea both of spreading risks and of helping to promote the idea of adaptation.

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]]> http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/05/adaptation-and-the-way-to-be-effective-from-global-agreements-to-micro-insurance/feed/ 0 An African Perspective on Global Warming http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/04/an-african-perspective-on-global-warming/ http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/04/an-african-perspective-on-global-warming/#comments Thu, 29 Apr 2010 11:22:01 +0000 S. George Philander http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/?p=983 Picture by {link:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NASA}NASA{/link} at WikimediaCommons

Picture by {link:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NASA}NASA{/link} at WikimediaCommons

What is the appropriate balance between our responsibilities towards future generations, and our obligations towards those suffering today?  To Africans, this is the central dilemma of global warming, one on which  the rich and the poor have different perspectives. The wealthy emphasize imminent environmental disasters, and “adaptation and mitigation” policies.  From an African perspective, this approach sends our children, most of whom live in abject poverty, the unfortunate message that their inheritance will be environmental disasters, and advice on how to cope.  We owe our children, not messages of gloom and doom, but promises of a better and brighter future.  Africans are therefore obliged to regard global warming, not as a threat, but as an opportunity to address a host of urgent problems.  We can learn how to cope  with potential floods and droughts  by dealing with those occurring right now.  We can create jobs and new business opportunities by exploring alternate energy sources. Above all global warming is an excellent vehicle for the promotion of education, the key to the alleviation of poverty,  by far the most urgent priority in Africa.

Education is most effective if it involves everyone  (school children, their parents, laymen in general, and scholars at universities) and  if it deals with issues and phenomena all of us care about dearly. Since we all love and cherish nature, and wish to be responsible custodians of this remarkable planet, the Earth is  an ideal focus for an educational program.

Africa, an ideal place to understand climate change and cop with it

We wish to be wise stewards of our planet but, unfortunately, are handicapped because we have to take, on faith, the alarms that scientists sound without comprehending the scientific reasons. Our response to the threat of global warming  will be far more effective if it were motivated by a rudimentary understanding of why the Earth is  habitable.  Furthermore, learning about planet Earth  is a vehicle for teaching  mathematics, chemistry and physics while discovering that  the familiar, natural  world around us is full of mysteries and wonders.  This is an opportune time for such a program because the earth sciences are entering an exciting new phase. What used to be separate disciplines are now being integrated in order to understand why ours is a habitable planet, and how human activities are affecting it. Those disciplines may have daunting names — meteorology, oceanography, biology, geology etc. — but they deal with phenomena familiar to everyone, the winds and clouds, hills and valleys, plants and animals, oceanic waves and currents.

The ideal place to study these topics is  Africa whose astonishing biodiversity depends on a variety of climatic zones that in turn depend on the three strikingly different surrounding oceans. Whereas the western coast of southern Africa is cold and highly productive, the eastern coast is warm and has entirely different species, while the under-explored Southern Ocean absorbs much of the carbon dioxide humans inject into the atmosphere. An African climate center for studies of the continent, the surrounding oceans, and the interactions between them, will have its own niche in the competitive world of science, and can be an internationally recognized  center of excellence,  a beacon that attracts students to science. Many of the gifted young scientists who should populate such a center are, at present, unaware that science can be a career. They need to be identified and nurtured.

Gilbert Walker and famine in India, an example from History and climate science

For Africans to deal effectively with global warming they should be, not merely the recipients of advice, but participants in discussions of how we can best cope with this problem.  Africans suffer from an excess of advice, a paucity of opportunities, especially in education. What we need are their own centers of excellence, beacons that attract students and boost their self-esteem, that help Africans articulate their own voice on environmental issues for example.

See also:

To appreciate why  Africans should have their own voice, consider how India learnt to deal with the horrendous famines that plagued that country in the 19th and early part of the 20th century.
The famines, that led to the  deaths of millions of people, were associated with   reduced crop production, a consequence of sporadic failures of the  monsoons. The British, while they were in charge of India, saw accurate predictions of the monsoons as an important step towards a solution. To that end, the  young Cambridge  mathematician Gilbert  Walker was sent to India after the famine of 1899. He made important discoveries concerning  the Southern Oscillation, but was unable to develop methods for the prediction of the monsoons. A century later the monsoons still defy accurate predictions, and still fail occasionally, but for several decades now there have been no massive famines. The solution to the problem of Indian famines depended critically on India becoming an independent democracy, responsible on its own for evaluating scientific information concerning possible failure of the monsoons, and for developing policies to cope with such potential problems. Indians are now able to cope even in the absence of precise predictions. Accurate scientific information is of course invaluable, but the use of any scientific information can not be divorced from the social, cultural, economic and historical factors that are unique to each country. This is the compelling reason why Africa needs its own voice on issues related to global warming. ]]> http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/04/an-african-perspective-on-global-warming/feed/ 0 A Low Carbon Economy for India http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/04/a-low-carbon-economy-for-indiaddet-questo-il-testo-cliccabile-qui-il-testo-esteso-ddet/ http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/04/a-low-carbon-economy-for-indiaddet-questo-il-testo-cliccabile-qui-il-testo-esteso-ddet/#comments Thu, 08 Apr 2010 17:39:33 +0000 P.R. Shukla http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/?p=932 {link:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Charminar.jpg}© Rhaessner at the German language Wikipedia{/link}

{link:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Charminar.jpg}© Rhaessner at the German language Wikipedia{/link}

Transforming the energy system, improving economy and reducing carbon emissions. These are the milestones of the Indian climate challenge. “We are working to become a more modern country and to build an economy where emissions would be significantly lower”, Prof. Shukla says. The solution requires a large portfolio of energy options and a different perception of the problem: “The conventional perception – Prof. Shukla explains – looks at energy related technologies and innovations from the supply side. Now, we are also looking for solutions that are coming from the demand side”. On the path toward a sustainable development, is the 2° target achievable?
Watch at the video interview with Prof. P.R. Shukla (Indian Institute of Management) at the International Workshop “Reconciling Domestic Energy Needs and Global Climate Policy: Challenges and Opportunities for China and India” in Venice


From Copenhagen to Cancun. Toward a Global Agreement

Let’s bring back the focus in the United Nations Framework Commission on Climate Change and let’s use economic forums to reach the necessary target: the global agreement

We believe that the Copenhagen process is still incomplete; we strongly believe that the post-Kyoto agreement will come in Cancun. One of the impressions, which came out of the Copenhagen discussion, was that only a few countries would sit together and decide. I think this has created a bit of a misunderstanding among various peers. The best case is to bring back the focus to the Framework Commission on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and at the same time use the Major Economies Forums, and such other forums, to keep the process going. That is what we think will bring forward the Post-Kyoto agreement.
We do believe that the global agreement is absolutely necessary. At the same time, the global agreement does not mean that there is a similar rule for every participant; the principle of common benefits and responsibilities is already there which is agreed by all countries.
And so we do believe that it is absolutely important to have a global agreement and not fragmented agreements.

Technologies for a Low Carbon Economy: the Indian Portfolio

Innovations from wind, solar and biomass; after the “123 Agreement” signed with United States, nuclear will be an energy option. All the innovations of the India’s  National Action Plan on Climate Change

We are treating the problem of energy as a portfolio problem. In this portfolio it is very difficult to really make a “pick and choose”; what has happened among the new technologies is that in the last one and a half decades, we have been able to master wind technology, so I will not consider right now the technology on the table for new innovations, because it is already developed to some point by our peers in India. We have a really strong solar energy mission, which is also communicated as a part of our National Action Plan on Climate Change; in this mission we have raised our goal to 2020; we plan to have 20,000 megawatts of solar installed. So this would definitely require a lot more innovation and also the funding from the government of India. About 15 years back when the Indian budget was announced, the government had imposed one dollar for every ton of coal and this would generate about 500 million dollars in the coming year. That would be adequate just to push solar technologies.
Apart from that, India has signed a new agreement with the United States called the “123 Agreement”. This agreement is for the nuclear. Since it has not signed the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, India did not have access to the nuclear supply group with supplies in nuclear fuel. But this “123 Agreement” is giving us access to the nuclear fuel. And so, as a result, this is another technology, some new work of innovations would go on; in the initial years we do expect the technologies to come from the developed countries but the local innovations will go on. We will also be looking at the biomass technology and that is already on the table. We are especially looking at the biomass which can be grown in areas so that we do not have to deploy the agricultural land for growing the biomass for energy. And so this is another work, which is going on. These are some areas which we believe in the next decade would help us also in our drive towards low carbon or zero carbon energy forms.

Global Emissions. The 2050 Scenario

We need need a different perception of the problem, but the 2 degree target could be reached.  We are a developing country; we are on the transition to a more modern and to an economy where emissions would be significantly lower

In 2050, we believe that we will be in the 2 degrees centigrade mark. I think right now that most of the work that is happening in India is considering that there is an expectation target of 2 degrees centigrade; the Government of India and the Prime Minister of India have commented at the Major Economies Forum and also at Copenhagen that we are committed to that. We believe that governments will be able to achieve this. We assume that this would require an energy transition which need a different perception than conventional perceptions that are going on. The conventional perception is to fix this problem by the energy related technologies which are coming from the supply side. We are looking at the solutions which of course are there from the supply side but also strong solutions which are from the demand side. Especially of putting our economy on a different development path, a literally modern sustainability development path through the opportunities of building new infrastructures. We are a developing country; we are making room for transition over the next several decades to a more compared to the developed countries. The programs would be looking at how we make our infrastructures and the behavioural modifications of all people different than the way this transition is happening in developed countries. We strongly believe the possibility to reach the 2 degree centigrade target globally. India will be transitioning towards an economy where emissions would be significantly lower while reaching the level of the incomes which are similar to what the level of incomes are today in the developed countries.

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]]> http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/04/a-low-carbon-economy-for-indiaddet-questo-il-testo-cliccabile-qui-il-testo-esteso-ddet/feed/ 0 A Focus on the Social Dimension of Adaptation http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/04/a-focus-on-the-social-dimension-of-adaptation/ http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/04/a-focus-on-the-social-dimension-of-adaptation/#comments Fri, 02 Apr 2010 11:20:49 +0000 Federica Viganò http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/?p=908 {link:http://www.photoxpress.com}© PhotoXpress.com{/link}

{link:http://www.photoxpress.com}© PhotoXpress.com{/link}

The recent workshop, “The Social Dimension of Adaptation to Climate Change,” organised in cooperation with CMCC, ICCGOV, and FEEM, was held on 18 February 2010. It provided the opportunity to better understand adaptation from different perspectives. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines adaptation as an  adjustment in ecological, social, or economic systems.  They also define adaptation as a response to actual and anticipated climatic stimuli and their impacts.  IPCC refers to changes in processes, practices and  structures to moderate potential damages, or to take advantage of opportunities associated with changes in climate (IPCC TAR, 2001). In line with the predominant impact studies approach, a social science oriented approach has recently emerged. This approach emphasises the importance of investigating the political, economic and social conditions of adaptation, which cause societies to be more vulnerable to environmental trauma.

It is crucial to examine the factors that affect the community as well as individuals in order to understand the concept of adaptive capacity. The IPCC defines adaptive capacity  as the ability or potential of a system to respond successfully to climate variability and change. It includes adjustments in behaviour, resources, and technologies (Adger et alii, 2007).
This definition verifies that adaptive capacity is two-fold: on the one hand it is influenced by economic development and technology adoption and use, while on the other hand it depends on societal and individual assets (quality and quantity of knowledge, labour, financial capital, and networks). It also depends on governing affordable services (transport, credit access, market conditions, recovery systems).  Rather than considering the driving economic factors, the latter perspective clearly demonstrates that adaptation is rooted in human behaviour and attitudes.

The complexity of adaptation

Adaptation is a complex issue. First, adaptation is not a concern for developing countries only. Adaptive practices should be analysed according to their different aspects for instance: spatial scale, sector environment, actions, participants, climatic zone, and temporal perspective. Second, it should be acknowledged that planned adaptation has a mostly local dimension that is both weak and strong. It is weak because it prevents the development of a common framework for adaptation. It is strong  because the measures and actions  are carried out at the local level. These actions are the most effective as they are well tailored to a specific case. Third, adaptation should be harmonious with development priorities. Even if climate vulnerability is not the same as poverty and marginalisation, these final factors often represent a strong constraint for social groups and individuals when coping with long term adaptation strategies. Finally, current vulnerabilities, more than future impacts, should be the focus of climate policies.  Adaptation should not be separated from the development processes.
The issue of adaptation policies was greatly investigated during the workshop held in Venice. They found that it is necessary to address adaptation not only through a top down planning approach (developed by the Governments or by the international community), but also through the design of strategies based on the understanding of the capacity of local communities to to adapt.
The plurality of cases and empirical evidence lead to consider the relevance of the social vulnerability studies, mostly bottom-up oriented, rather than the impact studies focused on the physical manifestations of climate change.
Literature shows that the current understanding of adaptive capacity relies on vulnerability assessment. Although the concepts of vulnerability and adaptation are related, they are also different. The indicators used to assess and measure social vulnerability (education, income, health) provide important insights on factors, processes and structures promoting adaptive capacity, yet  there is still a lot to accomplish in order to develop specific indicators for adaptive capacity.

The emerging soft factors: limits and barriers to adaptation

Apart from the technological factors (innovation and capacity to develop new strategies or adopt new technology), a growing body of research shows that social factors and governance structures (human and social capital) are highly conditioning the capacity to adapt.  Research also shows that the level of economic development is not the unique variable that influences adaptive capacity.   The complexity of this issue is clearly developing from a number of specific studies identifying conditions and constraints of adaptive capacity at the continental, regional and local scale.

An emerging body of literature is heading toward a detailed micro-perspective, exploring limits and barriers to adaptation as a response to climate change. Recent research is challenging the efficacy and legitimacy of adaptation in response to climate change.

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Among the different categories of limits, the following have been classified: physical/ecological limits, technological limits, financial barriers, informational and cognitive barriers, social/cultural barriers.  The final categories can be referred to as “soft factors”, and represent a notable challenge that deserves more attention in the near future.

References

  • Adger, W.N., S. Agrawala, M.M.Q. Mirza, C. Conde, K. O’Brien, J. Pulhin, R. Pulwarty, B. Smit and K. Takahashi, 2007: Assessment of adaptation practices, options, constraints and capacity. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 717-743.
  • Berkhout, F., J. Hertin and D.M. Gann, 2006: Learning to adapt: organisational adaptation to climate change impacts. Climatic Change, 78, 135-156.
  • Brooks, N. and W.N. Adger, 2005: Assessing and enhancing adaptive capacity. Adaptation Policy Frameworks for Climate Change, B. Lim, E. Spanger-Siegfried, I. Burton, E.L. Malone and S. Huq, Eds., Cambridge University Press, New York, 165-182.
  • Eriksen, S.H. and P.M. Kelly, 2007: Developing credible vulnerability indicators for climate adaptation policy assessment. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 12, 495-524
  • IPCC, Third Assessment Report (TAR), 2001
  • Klein, R.J.T. and J.B. Smith, 2003: Enhancing the capacity of developing countries to adapt to climate change: a policy relevant research agenda. Climate Change, Adaptive Capacity and Development, J.B. Smith, R.J.T. Klein and S. Huq, Eds., Imperial College Press, London, 317-334.
  • Tol, R.S.J. and G.W. Yohe, 2007: The weakest link hypothesis for adaptive capacity: An empirical test. Global Environ. Chang., 17, 218-227.
  • Tompkins, E.L. and W.N. Adger, 2005: Defining a response capacity for climate change. Environ. Sci. Policy, 8, 562–571.
]]> http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/04/a-focus-on-the-social-dimension-of-adaptation/feed/ 0 Adaptation and Its Social and Behavioural Limits http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/03/adaptation-and-its-social-and-behavioural-limits/ http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/03/adaptation-and-its-social-and-behavioural-limits/#comments Tue, 23 Mar 2010 10:59:33 +0000 Irene Lorenzoni http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/?p=894 © PhotoXpress.com {link:http://www.photoxpress.com}www.photoxpress.com{/link}

© PhotoXpress.com {link:http://www.photoxpress.com}www.photoxpress.com{/link}

Even considering that some mitigation target might be achievable, we need to deal with effects of climate change in the near future and in the longer term. This means that adaptation is necessary even if it is not easy to achieve. “In some cases it might be  inexpensive, but in some cases it might be really costly” Prof. Irene Lorenzoni says in this video interview to Climate Science&Policy. In which way adaptation strategies could affect our societies? “There are different facets of adaptation goals” Dott. Lorenzoni explains: “As individuals we don’t necessarily have the freedom of choice to respond to climate change in any way that we might want to. We are constrained to a certain extent, by the societal structures in which we operate”.
Watch at the video interview with Irene Lorenzoni at the International Workshop The Social Dimension of Adaptation to Climate Change in Venice

Adaptation is Necessary

To deal with the effects of climate change we need some form of adaptation within our society. However, it might be inexpensive in some cases, but it might be costly in other cases and we’ll have to face potential barriers and limits

Adaptation is necessary. We realise from a lot of studies that are looking into mitigation targets in the future, that even if we want to stabilise climate change at non-dangerous levels like 450 parts per million volumes equivalent, it will be very difficult to achieve that honest emissions from greenhouse gases drop substantially in the near term. Even considering the fact that some mitigation might be achievable, there is still the great likelihood that climate change will happen in the very near future, in the shorter-term and in the longer-term. To deal with the effects of climate change we need some form of adaptation within our society. However, we know that there are not necessarily easy ways of achieving adaptation. In fact, adaptation might be inexpensive in some cases, but it might be costly in other cases. There are potential barriers and limits to adaptation and there can be physical and ecological barriers. In some cases these are actually called limits, intended as absolute limits beyond which a reversible change will occur. However, there are also other types of limits, for example, the IPCC Working Group 2 and Fourth Assessment Report talk about financial barriers, social and cultural barriers, and individual barriers. The reason perhaps for which they use these different terminologies is to indicate that some limits need not necessarily be absolute. They could actually be subjective or mutable. They don’t necessarily need to be fixed absolute limits because they can be overcome depending on how we view as individuals and as a society the notion of adaptation, and what kind of issues that brings up in trying to address it.

Adaptation to Climate Change: Social and Behavioural Limits

We want to question whether there are sometimes undervalued, underestimated, or unspoken issues that actually seep into decisions that lead to adaptation. Think of cultural places and identities that can be affected by a lack of adaptation: what happens if those places are lost forever?

Social and behavioural limits can be manifested in societies in different ways. Perhaps it is useful to think about those identified in the IPCC report but question some of the underlying assumptions or underlying notions that they propose, and discuss those in more detail. From some work that we have carried out, we want to question whether there are sometimes undervalued, underestimated, or unspoken issues that actually seep into decisions that lead to adaptation. For example, we might think of cultural places and identities that can be affected by a lack of adaptation or maladaptation. The question that we want to raise is what happens if those places are lost forever. There are particular identities that we link to places and there are particular cultures that we link to places. So, what would happen to us as a society in relation to those losses, specifically if we actually value them quite closely? We care about them. Adaptation also needs to take these factors into account, which are often not spelled out like economic considerations of adaptation. We also need to think a bit more carefully about what the specific goals of adaptation are. They are underpinned by the very essence by values linked to decision-making. In decision- making there will be specific interests, views, perspectives, worldviews and particular notions of what we feel certain concepts, areas, issues are worth to ourselves. We need to clearly state them when we are taking decisions one way or another. In relation to adaptation, it is fundamental that we think carefully about whether we are targeting for vulnerability through adaptation measures in terms of being able to tolerate certain risks that might effect those more vulnerable in society, or whether we actually want to take adaptation measures geared toward that society as a whole in terms of its well-being, an improved well-being. Again there are different facets of adaptation goals and underpinning notions of those goals that can affect the way that we adapt. As far as society as a whole we need to think a bit more carefully about how we as individuals from part of a society, perceive certain risks from climate change, and how we decide to respond to them, if we decide at all. We know that those individuals are embedded with wider society. We don’t necessarily as individuals, have the freedom of choice to respond to climate change in any way that we might want to. We are constrained to a certain extent, by the societal structures in which we operate. So if we want to improve at the individual level, responding to climate change from an adaptation point of view, we need to bear in mind that they might be limited by our individual perceptions of our risk, of our situation, of what we are able to do, and also the wider context within which we are embedded. There are certain limits to adaptation from a societal, and individual, mental and governance point of view, but they are not necessarily set in stone. The question is that those limits are actually dependent upon how we see them, and they can be, at some extend, overcome presenting opportunities for further adaptation.

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